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335 Or. App. 74

State v. Moore

Court of Appeals of Oregon

Decided September 18, 2024

Court of Appeals of Oregon · decided 2024-09-18

Decided 2024-09-18

74                   September 18, 2024            No. 657

           IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                   STATE OF OREGON

                   STATE OF OREGON,
                    Plaintiff-Respondent,
                              v.
                 WADE CLAYTON MOORE,
                    Defendant-Appellant.
                 Linn County Circuit Court
                   19CR55070; A179759

     Thomas McHill, Judge.
     Submitted July 25, 2024.
   Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and Daniel Bennett, Deputy Public Defender, Office
of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.
   Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Jeff J. Payne, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
  Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, Mooney, Judge, and
Pagán, Judge.
     SHORR, P. J.
     Affirmed.
Cite as 
335 Or App 74
 (2024)                                75

        SHORR, P. J.
         Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction
entered after a conditional plea of guilty to two counts of
possession of prohibited firearms and one count of felon in
possession of a firearm. Defendant assigns error to the trial
court’s partial denial of his motion to suppress evidence
obtained pursuant to a search warrant. Defendant argues
that the affidavit for issuance of the warrant failed to establish probable cause because information provided by the victim was not reliable and law enforcement did not corroborate
the information. We conclude that the trial court did not err
in partially denying the motion, and, therefore, we affirm.
         We start with the key relevant facts from the affidavit presented in support of the application for the search
warrant. The victim, J, initially reported to police that he
had been “pistol whipped” and that his Chevrolet Tahoe
truck had been stolen. J later explained to police that he
and his ex-girlfriend, Kayla Zimmerman, had been in a
dispute about ownership of the truck. Zimmerman, a man
named Wade (who was later identified as defendant), and a
woman named Jill came to J’s property and took the truck
while a number of items belonging to J were still inside it.
While taking the truck, Zimmerman hit J on the left side of
his head. J began hitting the truck with a baseball bat, but
he stopped when defendant pointed a pistol at him. The officer who responded to the scene observed that J had visible
injuries to his left eye and left ear.
        After a search of police records, police identified
defendant and spoke with him at a gated fence in front of
his parents’ property. Defendant acknowledged transporting two others to retrieve the truck, but he denied that he
possessed a firearm during the incident. Defendant told
a deputy that he lived in a large metal shop on the property, which had an apartment inside. Defendant refused to
consent to a search of his vehicle, which he indicated was
parked on the property.
         Police observed Zimmerman leaving the large metal
shop on the property. She later spoke with a detective at
the police station. She stated that she sent J a text message
76                                            State v. Moore

indicating that she would return his items that were in the
vehicle. She consented to a search of her cellphone, which
she said was inside the large metal shop.
          Based on that and other information in the affidavit, police obtained a warrant to search the residence, the
metal shop, defendant’s truck, the disputed Tahoe truck,
and Zimmerman’s cellphone. When executing the search
warrant, police found the Tahoe truck inside the large metal
shop, and they found items listed on the warrant. Police also
found various firearms. A grand jury indicted defendant on
several charges, including robbery in the first and second
degree, unlawful possession of prohibited firearms, and
felon in possession of a firearm.
        Defendant filed two motions to suppress evidence
obtained from his residence and vehicle pursuant to the
search warrant. After a hearing on the motions, the trial
court granted the motion to suppress evidence obtained
from the residence on the property and from defendant’s
truck, but the trial court denied the motion as to evidence
obtained from the large metal shop and the Tahoe truck.
Defendant subsequently entered a conditional plea of guilty,
reserving his right to appeal the partial denial of the motion
to suppress evidence.
         On appeal, defendant argues that the affidavit in
support of the search warrant failed to establish probable
cause because “J was the sole source of evidence that a robbery had occurred,” J “abandoned” a claim that he had been
“pistol whipped,” and law enforcement failed to corroborate
the information that J provided. We are not persuaded that
the affidavit failed to establish probable cause.
         “Everyone who gives information to the police is an
‘informant’ in the classic dictionary sense—one who informs
or communicates information.” State v. Villagran, 
294 Or 404, 409
, 
657 P2d 1223
 (1983). Courts have held that “witnesses, including victims,” and “other persons unconnected
with the crime who provide information,” tend to be “more
worthy of belief than” informants who are participants in the
criminal activity or closely connected with it. 
Id.
 The veracity or reliability of information provided by an informant
Cite as 
335 Or App 74
 (2024)                                  77

can be established in several ways, “including corroboration
by the police,  the informant exposing himself to liability for filing a false report or by the informant’s statements
against penal interest.” State v. Pelster/Boyer, 
172 Or App 596, 604-05
, 
21 P3d 106
, rev den, 
332 Or 632
 (2001).
          Here, each of those factors supports J’s reliability.
J was the victim of the crime and a named informant. See
Villagran, 
294 Or at 410
 (“Identification of the informant
by name may also be a factor to consider.”). As such, he was
exposed to potential criminal or civil liability if he provided
false information. Pelster/Boyer, 
172 Or App at 604-05
. In
addition, J made a statement potentially against penal
interest when he acknowledged damaging the Tahoe truck
with a baseball bat. See State v. Payne, 
150 Or App 469, 474
,
946 P2d 353
 (1997), rev den, 
326 Or 390
 (1998) (“The statement against penal interest made by a named informant,
under these facts, is alone sufficient to establish the reliability of [the informant’s] statements.”).
         Other information in the affidavit shows that the
police corroborated most of the information that J had provided to them. Defendant, Zimmerman, and Jill confirmed
that they went to J’s residence to retrieve the Tahoe truck.
Zimmerman acknowledged that she punched J in the head.
The officer who was dispatched observed that J had visible injuries to his left eye and left ear. Zimmerman said
that she sent a text message to J letting him know that she
would return the items that J left in the truck, which corroborated J’s account of how defendant and the two others took
the Tahoe truck while items belonging to J were still inside
it. Thus, whether or not J initially lied about being “pistol
whipped,” police corroborated most of the information that J
had provided to them. See Payne, 
150 Or App at 474
 (“Police
corroboration of details from an informant’s statements is
yet another indication of the statement’s reliability.”).
        In arguing that the trial court erred in partially
denying the motion to suppress, defendant relies primarily
on State v. Culley, 
198 Or App 366
, 
108 P3d 1179
 (2005).
Defendant’s reliance on that case is misplaced. In Culley,
the named informant was intoxicated when she provided
information to police, and we concluded that she had a
78                                            State v. Moore

possible motive to lie in her police report. 
Id. at 370
. Under
those circumstances, we determined that police needed to
corroborate the information that she had provided, and they
failed to do so adequately. 
Id. at 371
. By contrast, here, as
explained above, the affidavit shows that police corroborated
most of the information that J had provided to them. Thus,
the trial court did not err in partially denying defendant’s
motion to suppress.
        Affirmed.

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