Makariw v. Rinard’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

18 federal appellate · 1 district · 10 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 36 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “A person who is not a party to an action, who is not represented in it and does not participate in it, is entitled to an opportunity to litigate his rights and liabilities.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Shelley v. Gipson · Hayles v. Randall Motor Co.

2. ““(2) If the injured person brings such an action against the indemnitee, the judgment binds neither the plaintiff nor the indemnitor in a subsequent action between them, * * * “Comment: “a. * * * normally a person is entitled to relitigate an issue where the adversary is a different person. Relitigation of an issue with a new adversary is permitted because of the assumed unfairness of binding one party to a proceeding by the rules of res judicata while the other party is not bound: where there is a new adversary who was not privy to the first action, since the second adversary would not be bound by the rules of res judicata, the person who was a party to the first proceeding should not be bound either. This desirability for equality between litigating parties with reference to the rules of res judicata is not, however, of pervading importance and disappears when there are countervailing reasons for requiring one to be bound while the other is not.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Moore v. Deal

3. ““The former adjudication was not a defense to this action. It is elementary and fundamental that every individual is entitled to his own day in court m which to assert his own rights or to defend against their infringement. The present plaintiff was not a party to the former action. He is not in privity with any party in the sense that his rights are derived from one who was a party. His cause of action is, and always has been, his own. It is in no way derived from his employer, who was a party. The relation of employer and employee, in and of itself, does not confer upon the employer any power to represent or to bind the employee in litigation. That the plaintiff testified as a witness in the former action is immaterial. He had no control over the conduct of the trial. He could not cross-examine opposing witnesses. The essential elements of an es-toppel by judgment are lacking.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Adams v. Woodfin