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← 336 F.2d 706 - Ferry v. Udall

Ferry v. Udall’s Empirical Analysis

336 F.2d 706 · 1964

Citation profile

108
cited by 108 later decisions
2
states following
December 1999
most recently cited

63 federal appellate · 15 district · 2 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 108 later decisions — most recently December 1999 · most notably Langevin v. Chenango Court, Inc. (1971), United States v. Consolidated Mines & Smelting Co. (1971)

63 federal appellate · 15 district · 2 state decisions

5901964197019801990decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Federal Crop Ins Corporation v. Merrill · Maryland Casualty Co. v. United States · Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co. · Panama Canal Company v. Grace Line Grace Line · Cameron v. United States

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 108 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “(a)lmost every agency action involves some degree of discretion of judgment. Yet it cannot be said that, for this reason, every agency action is unreviewable.”
    6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““Since the Secretary has discretionary power to refuse to sell at all, he also has authority to set any conditions, consistent with the Act, upon which the sale may be made. (Citations omitted.) If the appellant did not like the system the Secretary established for entertaining bids, their remedy was that of not bidding at all.””
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act * * * excludes from the categories of cases subject to judicial review “agency action” that is “by law committed to agency discretion.” We think the initiation of a proceeding for readjustment of the tolls of the Panama Canal is a matter that Congress has left to the discretion of the Panama Canal Co. * * * It is “authorized” to prescribe tolls and to change them. * * * But the exercise of that authority is far more than the performance of a ministerial act. * * * These are matters on which experts may disagree; they involve nice issues of judgment and choice * * * which require the exercise of informed discretion. * * The case is, therefore, quite unlike the situation where a statute creates a duty to act and an equity court is asked to compel the agency to take the prescribed action. * * * We put the matter that way since the relief sought in this action is to compel petitioner to fix new tolls. The principle at stake is no different than if mandamus were sought — a remedy long restricted * * * in the main, to situations where ministerial duties of a nondiscretionary nature are involved. Where the matter is peradventure clear, where the agency is clearly derelict in failing to act, where the inaction or action turns on a mistake of law, then judicial relief is often available. * * * But where the duty to act turns on matters of doubtful or highly debatable inference from large or loose statutory terms, the very construction of ”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.