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336 F.3d 648

Docket No. 03-2512.

Noel v. Norris

Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals

Submitted: July 2, 2003.

Filed: July 8, 2003.

Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 2003-07-08

2 counsel of record

Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))

Relies on Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard · Mose Young v. Dee Joyce Hayes

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Opinion by (per_curiam) · Decided 2003-07-08

How this case has been cited

Cited by 9 later decisions — most recently November 2020

6 federal appellate · 2 state decisions

60200320102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1*649Craig Lambert, argued, Little Rock, AR, for appellant.

¶2Joseph V. Svoboda, argued, Little Rock, AR, for appellee.

¶3Before BOWMAN, MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.

¶4PER CURIAM.

¶5This is an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 brought by Riley Dobi Noel, a prisoner under sentence of death. He claims that the State of Arkansas violated his constitutional right to due process when it interfered with his ability to prepare and present his case for executive clemency.

¶6Because clemency is extended mainly as a matter of grace, and the power to grant it is vested in the executive prerogative, it is a rare case that presents a successful due process challenge to clemency procedures themselves. See Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 280-81, 118 S.Ct. 1244, 140 L.Ed.2d 387 (1998). On the other hand, if the state actively interferes with a prisoner’s access to the very system that it has itself established for considering clemency petitions, due process is violated. See Young v. Hayes, 218 F.3d 850, 853 (8th Cir.2000).

¶7Mr. Noel’s claim seems to be a kind of amalgam. He asserts that state officials did not give him enough time to prepare for his clemency hearing and that the state would not allow him to undergo a particular kind of brain-scan procedure to prove his assertion that his brain damage ought to be considered on the question of whether he deserved clemency.

¶8We think that Mr. Noel’s claim must be rejected. He presented a four-hundred page record to the state authority charged with making recommendations concerning clemency, and that authority denied his request. The materials that he presented included some evidence, though not the particular evidence that Mr. Noel sought to produce, of his brain damage. He does not claim that he was prevented from presenting any other kind of evidence. In the circumstances, we cannot say that the process was so arbitrary as to be unconstitutional or that the state prohibited Mr. Noel from using the procedure that it had established.

¶9We have examined Mr. Noel’s equal protection claim and find it to be meritless.

¶10The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

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