State v. Garcia

No. 825             November 14, 2024                  241

   This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
    pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
         except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                  STATE OF OREGON

                  STATE OF OREGON,
                   Plaintiff-Respondent,
                             v.
              ISRAEL ANTUNEZ GARCIA,
                   Defendant-Appellant.
              Deschutes County Circuit Court
                   18CR01767; A180836

  Beth M. Bagley, Judge.
  Submitted August 29, 2024.
   Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and Meredith Allen, Deputy Public Defender, Office
of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.
   Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Jon Zunkel-deCoursey, Assistant
Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.
  Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Egan, Judge, and Kamins,
Judge.
  KAMINS, J.
  Affirmed.
242                                           State v. Garcia

        KAMINS, J.
         Defendant, who had previously been convicted as a
juvenile of attempted first-degree robbery, attempted first-degree assault, and unlawful use of a weapon, appeals the
trial court’s order denying him conditional release under the
“second look” statute, ORS 420A.203. Reviewing for substantial evidence, ORS 420A.203(6)(c), we affirm.
         To be eligible for conditional release, a defendant
has the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that they have been “rehabilitated and reformed”; that they
would not pose a threat to the safety of the victim, the victim’s family, or the community if released; and that they
would comply with release conditions. ORS 420A.203(3)(k);
ORS 420A.203(4)(a)(B). Here, the trial court addressed each
of the statutory factors, ORS 420A.203(4)(b), and concluded
that defendant’s evidence of rehabilitation was outweighed
by three factors: “The gravity of the loss, damage or injury
caused or attempted, during or as part of the criminal act[s],”
“[t]he manner in which” defendant committed the offenses for
which he was convicted and sentenced, and defendant’s history of misconduct and discipline during his imprisonment.
ORS 420A.203(4)(b). Defendant contends that the trial court’s
findings were not supported by substantial evidence and that
its ultimate conclusion was not supported by substantial reason because the court failed to connect it to those findings.
        We summarize the factual findings most relevant
to defendant’s arguments. Defendant committed the criminal conduct when he was 15. He had a history of substance
abuse, but had no prior criminal or delinquent behavior.
ORS 420A.203(4)(b)(A), (B). Early in his custody, defendant
had a serious disciplinary history, including at least five
aggressive or assaultive incidents. In the latter portion of
his custody, he was disciplined in connection with contraband on several occasions. ORS 420A.203(4)(b)(A).
        Since his adjudication, defendant has graduated
high school, enrolled in community college, and completed
numerous trainings and programs. ORS 420A.203(4)(b)(F).
He has engaged in and completed all of the rehabilitation
programs available to him and has repeated some at his
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 

 (2024)             243

own request. He has also completed all mental health and
substance abuse treatment available to him and now acts as
a facilitator and certified recovery mentor. ORS 420A.203
(4)(b)(G). Defendant took responsibility for his past and future
conduct, and while incarcerated he has made payments of
$1,038.16 from his own funds toward the restitution imposed
as part of his sentence. ORS 420A.203(4)(b)(H), (I).
         The trial court considered, and placed particular weight on, the gravity of the injury to the victim that
resulted from defendant’s conduct. ORS 420A.203(4)(b)(D).
The trial court found that the victim and his family remain
fearful and concerned for their safety and that, although
defendant was deemed to be at low risk to reoffend, predictions of his future conduct were ultimately “speculative.”
ORS 420A.203(4)(b)(K).
         As noted, we review the trial court’s findings for
substantial evidence, ORS 420A.203(6)(c), and we conclude
that the record contains substantial evidence to support the
trial court’s findings. The trial court’s decision was also supported by substantial reason. See Jenkins v. Board of Parole,

, 

 (2014) (“the substantial reason
requirement is part of the substantial evidence standard of
review” (emphasis omitted)). The court evaluated the nature
of the crimes, the gravity of the harm, and defendant’s disciplinary record and concluded that the evidence supporting
defendant’s rehabilitation was outweighed by those other
factors. See ORS 420A.203(4)(b) (setting forth factors).
         To be sure, the record would be sufficient for a
different factfinder to come to a different result in light of
defendant’s commendable progress. But that result was not
compelled by the record. See State v. A. R. H., 

,

 (2023) (“[O]ur task on review is to determine
whether the only finding permitted by this record is that
youth had proved that it was highly probable he had been
rehabilitated and did not present a risk of [reoffending].”).
Because the court’s decision to deny defendant conditional
release is supported by both substantial evidence and substantial reason, we affirm.
        Affirmed.