Fulmer v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 17 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 19 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Though ordinarily the word “shall” is mandatory, and the word “may” is directory, they are often used interchangeably in legislation. Arkansas State Highway Comm’n v. Mabry, 229 Ark. 261 , 315 S.W.2d 900 (1958). In Mabry, this court recognized that to carry out the legislature’s intent, the word “shall” may, in certain circumstances, be construed as the equivalent of the word “may.” This court concluded that if the language of the statute, considered as a whole and with due regard to its nature and object, reveals that the legislature intended the word “shall” to be directory, it should be given that meaning. Since Mabry, this court has consistendy held that the use of the word “shall” in a statute means that the legislature intended mandatory compliance with the statute unless such an inteipretation would lead to an absurdity. See Hattison v. State, 324 Ark. 317 , 920 S.W.2d 849 (1996); Klinger v. City of Fayetteville, 293 Ark. 128 , 732 S.W.2d 859 (1987); Loyd v. Knight, 288 Ark. 474 , 706 S.W.2d 393 (1986). This court has also consistendy held that in determining whether a statute’s provisions are mandatory or merely directory, we adhere to the principle that those things which are of the essence of the thing to be done are mandatory, while those not of the essence of the thing to be done are directory only. See McElroy v. Grisham, 306 Ark. 4 , 810 S.W.2d 933 (1991); Taggart & Taggart Seed Co., Inc. v. City of Augusta, 278 Ark. 570 , 647 S.W.2d 458 (1983); Edwards v. Hall,”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Ward v. Doss