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← 337 N.C. 298 - State v. Bryant

State v. Bryant’s Empirical Analysis

1994

Citation profile

43
cited by 43 later decisions
2
states following
August 2007
most recently cited

41 state decisions

Relationships

Relies on In the Matter of Samuel Winship · Estelle v. McGuire · Victor v. Nebraska · Cage v. Louisiana · State v. Coffey

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 43 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “A reasonable doubt is not a mere possible doubt, for most things that relate to human affairs are open to some possible or imaginary doubt. A reasonable doubt is not a vain, imaginary or fanciful doubt, but it is a sane, rational doubt arising out of the evidence or lack of evidence or from its deficiency. When it is said that the jury must be satisfied of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, it is meant that they must be fully satisfied or entirely convinced or satisfied to a moral certainty of the truth of the charge. If, after considering, comparing and weighing all the evidence, the minds of the jurors are left in such condition that they cannot say they have an abiding faith to a moral certainty in the defendant’s guilt, then they have a reasonable doubt; otherwise not. A reasonable doubt, as that term is employed in the administration of criminal law, is an honest substantial misgiving generated by the insufficiency of the proof. An insufficiency which fails to convince your judgment and confidence and satisfy your reasons as to the guilt of the defendant.”
    5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “the [U.S. Supreme] Court in Victor [Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. —, 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994)] acknowledged the distinction drawn in Gage [Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 29 , 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990)] between “moral certainty” and “evidentiary certainty.” Victor, 511 U.S. at— , 114 S.Ct. at 1248 , 127 L.Ed.2d at 596 . The Court stated, however, that in Cage, “the jurors were simply told that they had to be morally certain of the defendant’s guilt; there was nothing else in the instruction to lend meaning to the phrase.” Id. In Victor, the jury was explicitly told to base its conclusion on the evidence in the case, and there were other instructions which reinforced this message. Likewise, in the present case, the jury was instructed that a reasonable doubt existed “if, after considering, comparing and weighing all the evidence, the minds of the jurors are left in such condition that they cannot say they have an abiding faith to a moral certainty in the defendant’s guilt.” The jury was also instructed that a reasonable doubt is “a sane, rational doubt arising out of the evidence or lack of evidence or from its deficiency” and that it is “an honest substantial misgiving generated by the insufficiency of the proof.” We therefore conclude that, under Victor, “there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury would have understood moral certainty to be disassociated from the evidence in the case.” Victor, 511 U.S. at-, 114 S.Ct. at 1248 , 127 L.Ed.2d at 597 . Thus, on remand, we hold, contra”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “A defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and in case of a reasonable doubt whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he is entitled to a verdict of not guilty. This presumption places upon the State the burden of proving him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: It is not a mere possible doubt; because everything relating to human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.