No. 940 December 26, 2024 113
This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JOSHUA DYLAN RICE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Coos County Circuit Court
22CR50168, 22CR50811, 22CR57889;
A180413 (Control), A180414, A180984
Andrew E. Combs, Judge.
Submitted October 30, 2024.
Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and Kristin A. Carveth, Deputy Public Defender,
Oregon Public Defense Commission, filed the brief for
appellant.
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Michael A. Casper, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Kamins, Judge, and
DeVore, Senior Judge.
TOOKEY, P. J.
Affirmed.
114 State v. Rice
TOOKEY, P. J.
In this consolidated criminal appeal, defendant
appeals a judgment of conviction entered after a jury found
him guilty of unauthorized use of a vehicle (UUV), ORS
164.135, and possession of a stolen vehicle (PSV), ORS
819.300.1 In two assignments of error, defendant argues that
the trial court erred in denying his motions for judgment of
acquittal because the state presented insufficient evidence
to prove that defendant did anything more than trespass in
the stolen vehicle. We are not persuaded that the trial court
erred in denying defendant’s motions. Accordingly, we affirm.
On review of the denial of the motions, we view the
facts in the light most favorable to the state and evaluate
those facts to determine whether a rational trier of fact could
have found the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt. State v. Cunningham, 320 Or 47, 63,
880 P2d 431
(1994), cert den,
514 US 1005 (1995). A person commits the
crime of UUV when the person “knowingly takes, operates,
exercises control over or otherwise uses another’s vehicle.”
ORS 164.135(1)(a)(A). A person commits the crime of PSV “if
the person possesses any vehicle which the person knows or
has reason to believe has been stolen.” ORS 819.300(1).
Here, defendant argues that there was insufficient
evidence to show that he did anything more than trespass in
the stolen vehicle. In so arguing, defendant relies on State v.
Douthitt, 33 Or App 333, 338,
576 P2d 1262 (1978), in which
the defendant unlocked a parked car door through an open
window and rifled through the glove box. We held that the
defendant’s actions relating to the vehicle did “not constitute a sufficient exercise of control over the vehicle such
that [the] defendant has manifested an intent to affect the
rightful possessor’s relationship to the automobile, i.e., there
was no intention to use the vehicle.”
Id. Similarly, here,
1
Defendant’s two assignments of error relate to Counts 1 and 2 in Case No.
22CR50168. In the judgment, the trial court merged the verdicts into one conviction for UUV. If we were to reverse the judgment in that case, defendant argues
that we should remand for resentencing in Case No. 22CR50811, in which defendant was also found guilty of UUV. However, defendant does not otherwise challenge the judgment in that case. Defendant also appeals the judgment in Case
No. 22CR57889, in which he pleaded guilty to second-degree criminal mischief
and giving false information to a police officer, but he does not challenge any
aspect of that judgment.
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 337 Or App 113 (2024) 115
defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence of his
intention to interfere with the owner’s possessory interest in
the vehicle.
We are not persuaded. In the instant case, there
was evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer
that defendant possessed a stolen vehicle and exercised control over it. The state presented evidence that, in October
2022, someone broke into a wastewater treatment facility
in Bandon, stole a truck’s keys and took the truck. The jury
watched surveillance footage showing someone wearing a
reflective vest driving the truck out of the facility.
Two days later, at approximately 7:00 a.m., a resident of Coos Bay noticed the truck parked outside his home.
It was parked on the wrong side of the road, and the person inside the truck was engaged in “suspicious activity.”
He was “[c]onstantly going from one seat to the other to the
back seat.” When the resident returned home from work, the
truck and the “same individual” were still there. The resident called the police.
A police officer arrived at around 7:20 p.m., and
defendant exited the truck from the driver’s side. Based
on his demeanor and movements, the officer believed that
defendant was under the influence of methamphetamine.
Defendant admitted that the truck was not his, and he
said that he was the only person in the vehicle. The officer
arrested defendant.
The officer found a dental “flosser” in defendant’s
pocket, and the officer observed a bag of flossers near the
driver’s seat of the truck. In the back seat, the officer could
see a reflective vest similar to the one worn by the person
who took the truck two days earlier. The officer took photos
of items visible inside the truck, including drink containers,
paper towels, used food containers, and a bar of deodorant.
The officer did not observe the keys to the truck; however,
the keys and the truck were subsequently returned to the
wastewater facility.
Considering that evidence in the light most favorable to the state, the jury could have found that defendant
was in possession of a truck that he knew or had reason to
116 State v. Rice
know was stolen and that he had exercised control over it.
The presence of the reflective vest linked defendant to the
initial theft of the truck. The testimony of the person who
observed defendant in the truck, as well as the dental flossers and the other items in the truck, indicated that defendant was staying in the truck, and that he had exercised
control over it for a substantial amount of time. It was also
reasonable for the jury to infer that the keys were recovered
from inside the truck. Based on that evidence, a reasonable
trier of fact could find defendant guilty of UUV and PSV.
Affirmed.
