State v. J. B.

34                    December 26, 2024                No. 924

           IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                   STATE OF OREGON

                     In the Matter of J. B.,
            a Person Alleged to have Mental Illness.
                    STATE OF OREGON,
                          Respondent,
                               v.
                             J. B.,
                           Appellant.
                  Lane County Circuit Court
                     21CC04662; A183465

     Michelle P. Bassi, Judge.
     Submitted November 8, 2024.
   Joseph R. DeBin and Multnomah Defenders, Inc., filed
the brief for appellant.
   Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Julia Glick, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
  Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Lagesen, Chief Judge,
and Kamins, Judge.
     TOOKEY, P. J.
     Affirmed.
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 (2024)                                 35

        TOOKEY, P. J.
          Appellant appeals from a “Supplemental Judgment
of Continued Commitment” continuing her “basic needs”
commitment to the custody of the Mental Health Division
of the Oregon Health Authority for a period up to 180
days, challenging the trial court’s determination that she
is “still a person with mental illness and is in need of further treatment.” ORS 426.301(1)(a)(C); ORS 426.307(6);
ORS 426.005(1)(f)(B) (describing basic needs commitment).
Appellant does not request de novo review, nor is this an
exceptional case warranting de novo review. See ORAP
5.40(8)(c). Accordingly, we review the trial court’s decision to
continue the civil commitment for legal error. State v. S. T.,

, 

 (2019). In doing so, we
“view the evidence, as supplemented and buttressed by permissible derivative inferences, in the light most favorable to
the trial court’s disposition” to determine “whether, when
so viewed, the record was legally sufficient to permit that
outcome.” 

        For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
          The trial court may continue the involuntary commitment of a person if it determines by clear and convincing
evidence that “the person is still a person with mental illness and is in need of further treatment.” ORS 426.307(6).
As relevant here, a “person with mental illness” includes “a
person who, because of a mental disorder,” is “[u]nable to
provide for basic personal needs that are necessary to avoid
serious physical harm in the near future, and is not receiving
such care as is necessary to avoid such harm.” ORS 426.005
(1)(f)(B). The state bears the burden of proving by “clear and
convincing evidence” that a person is a person with a mental
illness. ORS 426.130(1)(a).
         Appellant suffers from a mental disorder, schizophrenia. She has been civilly committed based on basic
needs since August 2021, with several continuations. After
the most recent hearing, in January 2024, the trial court
once again continued appellant’s commitment, determining
that appellant continues to be a mentally ill person in need
of treatment.
36                                                              State v. J. B.

         On appeal, appellant points out that, despite remaining symptomatic, appellant was not malnourished or dehydrated and had no medical conditions that affected her
health. Citing State v. M. B., 

, 

 (2019) (explaining in an initial commitment proceeding
that “serious physical harm” means a nonspeculative threat
that the person will not “safely survive” without treatment,
and “in the near future” means something less immediate
than “imminent” but not so attenuated from present circumstances as to render it speculative. 

 (citing State v.
M. A. E., 

, 237, 

 (2019)), appellant contends that her physical condition and circumstances
are not such that an inability to provide for her basic needs
as a result of her mental disorder would cause her to suffer
serious physical harm in the near term.1
          We have reviewed the record and conclude that the
evidence is sufficient. The trial court heard testimony that,
despite being in treatment for almost two and a half years
and taking several psychiatric medications, appellant continued to experience serious symptoms, including hallucinations, fixed delusions, and disorganization so severe that she
would not be able to communicate her needs to people in the
community and be understood. At the time of the hearing,
appellant needed daily reminders and substantial assistance
to carry out activities of daily living. She could not prepare
her own food or remember whether she had eaten. She had
difficulty with speech and making herself understood. And
she suffered from “traumatic” hallucinations daily, including “hostile” interactions with unseen others that often led
to appellant yelling and using profanity. In addition to her
regular medications, staff had to administer additional
as-needed medication to control appellant’s symptoms when
she was in “crisis mode.” Witnesses opined that if appellant
    1
      Appellant also cites State v. D. M., 

, 

(2011) (basic-needs initial commitment reversed where there was no evidence
that the appellant had suffered, or was at risk of suffering, any life-threatening
harm, despite being homeless or at risk of being homeless); and State v. E. A. L.,

, 

 (2002) (on de novo review, reversing a basic
needs commitment where there was insufficient evidence that the appellant’s
failure to take medication would be in any way life-threatening, much less in
the near future). Both cases were decided before the Legislative Assembly’s 2015
amendments to ORS 426.005(1)(f)(B), which we held in M. A. E. altered the standard for determining a basic-needs commitment. 

.
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were released, she would cease taking her psychiatric medications, would decompensate and become more symptomatic
within a week’s time, and would be unable to obtain food.
She does not have others in the community who would take
care of her.
         We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s determination that, if the commitment
is not continued, appellant will be at risk of serious physical harm. ORS 426.005(1)(f)(B). As we held in M. A. E., 

, “the phrase ‘serious physical harm,’ in [the
context of ORS 426.005(1)(f)(B)], means bodily harm that
is serious enough that a person who suffers that harm is
unsafe in the absence of commitment, treatment, or other
amelioration of the physical condition.” Even assuming, as
appellant contends, that she has no health conditions that
would, in and of themselves, place her safe survival at risk,
appellant’s inability to obtain or prepare food if she were
released from the hospital, would risk her safe survival in
the near future. See id. at 242 (“Although no witness testified as to the harm associated with an absence of food, the
trial court could infer, as a matter of common knowledge,
that a person who literally does not eat will soon be at risk of
suffering serious physical harm—of a sort that compromises
the person’s ability to safely survive—in the near future.”).
We conclude that the evidence here was legally sufficient to
permit the trial court to find that, without continued treatment, there was a nonspeculative risk that appellant would
suffer “serious physical harm in the near future,” within the
meaning of ORS 426.005(1)(f)(B). We therefore affirm the
order of commitment.
        Affirmed.