inline">606 February 5, 2025 No. 72 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON Jacqueline E. POTTER and William Potter, fka James R. Potter, Petitioners-Respondents, v. Brady R. BAXTER, Respondent-Appellant. Multnomah County Circuit Court 20PB05107; A178388 Patrick W. Henry, Judge. Argued and submitted September 24, 2024. Timothy R. Volpert argued the cause for appellant. Also on the briefs was Tim Volpert, P.C. Zachariah H. Allen argued the cause for respondents. Also on the brief were Richardson Wang, LLP and Joshua L. Ross and Keller Rohrback, LLP. Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, Egan, Judge, and Joyce, Judge. JOYCE, J. Reversed and remanded. Egan, J., dissenting. Cite as 337 Or App 606

 (2025)                                               607

         JOYCE, J.
         Respondent (trustee) appeals from a judgment and
money award, entered against him by default. On appeal,
trustee raises four assignments of error. In his first assignment of error, trustee challenges the trial court’s denial
of his motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Trustee’s
remaining assignments of error relate to the trial court’s
decision to enter the default order and related judgment.
We conclude that the courts of Oregon do not have personal
jurisdiction over trustee and, consequently, that the trial
court erred in denying trustee’s motion to dismiss for lack
of jurisdiction. That conclusion obviates the need to address
the trustee’s remaining assignments of error relating to the
default judgment. We reverse.
         When reviewing a trial court’s decision on a motion
to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, we look to the
facts as alleged in the pleadings, any relevant supporting
affidavits, and other evidence submitted by the parties.1
Cox v. HP Inc.,

 (2021). The
party seeking to invoke the trial court’s jurisdiction, in this
case the petitioners, “bears the burden of alleging and proving the facts necessary to establish jurisdiction.” Wallace v.
Holden,

297 Or App 824, 826

445 P3d 914

, rev den,

365 Or 557

 (2019); see Cerner Middle East Ltd. v. Belbadi Enterprises
LLC,

305 Or App 413, 420

472 P3d 299

, rev den,

367 Or 257

(2020) (explaining that “the party seeking to invoke the trial
court’s jurisdiction * * * had the burden to come forward with
facts sufficient to establish jurisdiction”). In determining
whether the petitioners have met that burden, we assume
that the facts alleged in the petitioners’ “complaint are true
and construe any disputed facts consistently with the trial
court’s ruling.” Barrett v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.,

361 Or 115

, 117 n 1,

390 P3d 1031

 (2017). “[W]here, as here, the trial
court made no express findings, we assume that the court
found facts consistent with its judgment,” and we review
    1
      ORCP 21 A(2)(b) provides that, when a party asserts any of the defenses
enumerated in ORCP 21 A(1), including lack of personal jurisdiction, if “the facts
constituting the asserted defenses do not appear on the face of the pleading and
matters outside the pleading (including affidavits, declarations, and other evidence) are presented to the court,” the court, after providing a reasonable opportunity for all parties to submit evidence, “may determine the existence or nonexistence of the facts supporting the asserted defenses.”
608                                                      Potter v. Baxter

the court’s implicit factual findings to determine whether
they are supported by “any competent evidence.” Sutherland
v. Brennan,

131 Or App 25, 28

883 P2d 1318

 (1994), aff’d
on other grounds,

321 Or 520

901 P2d 240

 (1995) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “Once the jurisdictional facts are
established, we review the determination of personal jurisdiction for errors of law.” Kotera v. Daioh Int’l U.S.A. Corp.,

179 Or App 253, 262

40 P3d 506

(2002).
I. FACTS
Consistent with those standards of review, we present the facts based on the first amended complaint, declarations, and other evidence that the parties submitted.
Jacqueline Potter and William (Liam) Potter filed a complaint in Oregon alleging breach of trust against trustee, a
resident of Texas. The complaint alleged that their mother,
Elizabeth Potter, a resident of California, created a trust
in California in 2013, naming herself as the trustee. That
trust designated the children as the beneficiaries and
appointed trustee, a friend of Elizabeth, as the successor trustee.2 According to the complaint, at the time that
the trust was created, the assets of the trust included all
of Elizabeth’s “tangible and intangible personal property,”
which was located in California, as well as securities in a
Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. account.
Under the terms of the trust, upon Elizabeth’s
death, trustee was to divide the assets of the trust into
two separate trusts (one for each child’s benefit), provide
each of the children with the income that was generated by
their respective trust, and distribute half of the assets of
each child’s trust when they reached the age of 35, and the
remainder when they reached the age of 40. The trust stated
that it was to be governed by the laws of California, “regardless of the domicile of any trustee or beneficiary.”
Elizabeth died in April 2014, and trustee began
administering the trust. At that time, the Charles Schwab &
Co., Inc. account had a balance of nearly $5 million. Trustee

2
To avoid confusion, we refer to Elizabeth Potter, Jacqueline Potter, and
Liam Potter by their first names. We refer to petitioners, Jacqueline and Liam,
jointly as “the children.”
Cite as

337 Or App 606

(2025) 609

assumed the trusteeship with the knowledge that the children were residents of Oregon.
Following her mother’s death, Jacqueline moved
her mother’s personal property from her mother’s home in
California to a storage unit in Oregon. Although Jacqueline
initially paid the cost of moving and storing the personal
property, trustee used funds from the trust to reimburse
her. Trustee also began paying the monthly storage unit
fees using money from the trust.
Between 2015 and 2019, Jacqueline and trustee
talked on the phone every three to six months. The amount
of contact increased in 2019 because the children were hoping to use trust funds to purchase a home for Liam. Over the
years, Jacqueline requested accountings, but trustee never
provided one.
Trustee’s alleged lack of transparency is ultimately
what prompted the children to file this action claiming
breach of trust against trustee. In their first amended complaint, the children alleged that trustee breached the trust
by failing to provide accountings, distribute income, and
invest and manage trust assets as a prudent investor would.
The children sought relief including removal of trustee, an
accounting, and surcharge.
Trustee moved to dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction.3 He argued that the court lacked general
personal jurisdiction over him under ORCP 4 A because he
was not in the state when served, is not domiciled in Oregon,
and does not engage in substantial activities within the
state. Trustee also argued that none of the bases set forth in
ORCP 4 B to L that provide for specific personal jurisdiction
applied on the facts of this case. Finally, he argued that he
lacked minimum contacts with the state such that the assertion of personal jurisdiction over him was unconstitutional.
In response, the children argued that ORCP 4 E(3)
provided the court with personal jurisdiction because the
litigation arose out of a promise that trustee had made to
deliver things of value (i.e., trust distributions) to them in
3
Trustee also challenged subject matter jurisdiction, but the trial court
rejected that argument, and he has abandoned it on appeal.
610 Potter v. Baxter

Oregon. The children also argued that trustee had sufficient minimum contacts with the state to make the exercise
of personal jurisdiction constitutionally permissible.
Before the trial court ruled on trustee’s motion to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, the children issued a subpoena to Charles Schwab for the trust’s financial account
statements. The statements showed that there was only
$114.79 remaining in the account.
After learning of the remaining balance, the children filed supplemental briefing opposing trustee’s motion
to dismiss, asserting that, “[w]ith the discovery of this information, the legal context of this case has shifted dramatically from trust administration to one of conversion, fraud,
and misrepresentation.” However, the children did not (at
that time) file or move to file an amended complaint to add
those claims to the action. In the supplemental briefing,
the children also asserted additional bases on which the
trial court should find that it had personal jurisdiction over
trustee. More specifically, the children argued that, in addition to ORCP 4 E, the court also had jurisdiction pursuant
to ORCP 4 C, D, and L. Relying on ORCP 4 C, the children
argued that the court had jurisdiction because they were
injured when trustee made assurances over the telephone
that caused them not to seek interim judicial remedies that
might have preserved or protected their inheritance. With
respect to ORCP 4 D, the children argued that jurisdiction was proper because their claims arose from economic
injuries “connected with an out-of-state act or omission by
[trustee] and [that was] associated with solicitation and
‘service activities’ ” that trustee had engaged in within the
state. Finally, the children contended that ORCP 4 L provided the court with jurisdiction because “the prosecution of
this action against [trustee was] not inconsistent with the
[c]onstitution of this state or the [c]onstitution of the United
States.”
After a hearing, the court ruled that it had personal jurisdiction over trustee pursuant to ORCP 4 C, D,
E, and L and denied trustee’s motion to dismiss. In ruling
that the court had jurisdiction, the court stated that it was
“adopt[ing] the reasoning and arguments [from the children]
Cite as

337 Or App 606

 (2025)                                   611

in [their] submissions to the [c]ourt.” The trial court entered
an order denying trustee’s motion to dismiss.
                          II. ANALYSIS
         On appeal, trustee argues that the trial court erred
in denying his motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction
because ORCP 4 C, D, E, and L did not provide the court
with personal jurisdiction. We agree and address each basis
for personal jurisdiction separately.
A.    Personal Jurisdiction Under ORCP 4 C
         We begin with trustee’s argument that the trial court
erred in determining that there is jurisdiction under ORCP
4 C. That provision supplies Oregon courts with jurisdiction
over a party “[i]n any action claiming injury to person or property within or without this state arising out of an act or omission within this state by the [respondent].” ORCP 4 C (emphasis added). By the rule’s own words and as we have previously
explained, “ORCP 4 C applies only to claims for personal
injury or injury to property.” Portland Trailer & Equipment v.
A-1 Freeman Moving,

166 Or App 651, 655

5 P3d 604

, adh’d
to as modified on recons,

168 Or App 654

4 P3d 741

 (2000).
Here, the children’s first amended complaint does not allege
damages for personal injury or injury to property. Instead, it
seeks damages for economic loss of their inheritance caused
by trustee’s alleged breach of trust. Because the children
have not alleged the type of injury that ORCP 4 C requires,
we conclude that the trial court erred in determining that
jurisdiction was proper under that provision.
B.    Personal Jurisdiction Under ORCP 4 D
         Next, we consider trustee’s argument that the trial
court erred in finding that it had jurisdiction under ORCP 4 D.
That rule provides, in relevant part, that Oregon courts
have personal jurisdiction over a party:
        “In any action claiming injury to person or property
     within this state arising out of an act or omission outside
     this state by the [respondent], provided in addition that at
     the time of the injury * * *
        “D(1) Solicitation or service activities were carried on
     within this state by or on behalf of the [respondent].”
612                                          Potter v. Baxter

“ORCP 4 D, like subsection 4 C, requires either a claim for
injury to person or property.” Portland Trailer & Equipment,

166 Or App at 656

. Because the children have not pleaded
either type of injury, ORCP 4 D is also inapplicable to the
facts of this case.
C. Personal Jurisdiction Under ORCP 4 E
         We now turn to the issue of whether the trial court
erred in concluding that ORCP 4 E provided personal jurisdiction over trustee. ORCP 4 E(1) and (3) state in relevant
part that Oregon courts have jurisdiction over a party in
an action that arises out of “a promise, made anywhere
to the [petitioner] or to some third party for the [petitioner’s] benefit, by the [respondent] to perform services within
this state” or “to deliver * * * within this state * * * things
of value.” Thus, determining whether ORCP 4 E(1) and (3)
apply to the facts of this case require us to examine whether
the action arises out of a promise that trustee made to either
(1) perform services within this state or (2) deliver things
of value within this state for the benefit of the children. If
so, we consider whether an exercise of jurisdiction over an
out-of-state respondent comports with due process. Dreher v.
Smithson,

162 Or App 645, 648

986 P2d 721

 (1999), rev den,

329 Or 589

 (2000).
         In arguing that ORCP 4 E(1) and (3) apply to
the facts of this case, the children rely on Dreher. There
the plaintiff was an Oregon resident and the beneficiary
of a trust that had been created in Massachusetts.

Id. at 647

. The defendants were trustees who all accepted their
appointments with an awareness that the plaintiff was a
resident of Oregon.

Id.

 The defendants administered the
trust in Massachusetts, and their sole contacts with Oregon
were “correspondence and telephone calls to and from plaintiff and her advisors and trust distribution checks that
defendants mailed to plaintiff in Oregon.”

Id.

 Because the
defendants had knowledge that the plaintiff resided in
Oregon at the time that they each assumed their duties as
trustee (including the obligation to make trust distribution
payments), we concluded that the record allowed a finding
that the defendants had made an implicit promise to the
grantor to deliver “things of value” within Oregon, and that
Cite as

337 Or App 606

 (2025)                              613

was sufficient to bring the case, “at least facially, within the
scope of ORCP 4 E(3).”

Id. at 650

. However, after considering whether the exercise of jurisdiction would comport with
due process, we ultimately concluded that the defendants’
contacts were insufficient to establish jurisdiction because
the defendants had not purposefully directed their activities
toward Oregon residents.

Id. at 652-53

.
           Based on Dreher, the children contend that, because
the record here also contains evidence that trustee assumed
the trusteeship with knowledge that the children were residents of Oregon, the trial court could similarly infer that
trustee made an implied promise to make trust distributions
(i.e., deliver things of value) to the children in Oregon so as
to bring this case facially within the scope of ORCP 4 E(3).
We agree. Jacqueline alleged in her first declaration that she
and her brother were residents of Oregon and that trustee
“assumed the trusteeship with this knowledge.” Under the
applicable standard of review, we “construe any disputed
facts consistently with the trial court’s ruling,” and, where
the trial court made no express findings, we assume that it
found facts consistent with its judgment, provided that those
assumed facts are supported by any competent evidence in
the record. Barrett,

361 Or at 117

 n 1; Sutherland,

131 Or App at 28

.
          Here, although the trial court made no express factual finding as to whether trustee began administering the
trust with knowledge that the children were Oregon residents, that factual finding is consistent with its ultimate conclusion that it had jurisdiction pursuant to ORCP 4 E and is
supported by evidence in the record. Thus, we assume that
the trial court found that trustee had knowledge that the
children were Oregon residents at the time that he assumed
the trustee position. As explained in Dreher, that finding
is sufficient to allow the inference that trustee promised to
deliver “things of value” to the children in Oregon so as to
bring this case facially within the scope of ORCP 4 E(3).
To be sure, as in Dreher, there is no evidence that trustee
“explicitly promised” that he would deliver trust distributions within Oregon, but again as in Dreher, “such a commitment may be fairly inferred from [trustee’s] knowledge
614                                             Potter v. Baxter

that [the children] resided in Oregon at the time” that he
assumed his duties as trustee.

162 Or App at 650

. Because
this record allows us to infer that trustee made an implicit
promise to Elizabeth to deliver “things of value” within
Oregon, that is sufficient to bring this case facially within
the scope of ORCP 4 E(3).
          Accordingly, we turn to the due process analysis.
The exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident is proper
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution if the respondent has
“minimum contacts” with the forum state and the assertion
of jurisdiction comports with notions of “fair play and substantial justice.” State ex rel Circus Circus Reno, Inc. v. Pope,

317 Or 151, 159-60

854 P2d 461

 (1993). Minimum contacts
exist where the nonresident respondent has “ ‘purposefully
directed’ ” activities at Oregon residents and where the litigation “ ‘arises out of or relates to’ ” that contact.

Id.

 (quoting
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,

471 US 462, 472

105 S Ct 2174

85 L Ed 2d 528

 (1985)).
         The children argue that trustee has sufficient
Oregon contacts to satisfy the demands of due process
because he “intentionally targeted Oregon and its residents with tortious conduct causing in-state harm.” We are
not persuaded by the children’s argument. To begin, the
alleged tortious conduct that the children rely on does not
fall within the scope of the claims articulated in their first
amended complaint. Although the children ultimately filed
a second amended complaint that asserted claims including
intentional interference with prospective inheritance, conversion, and fraud, the operative complaint at the time that
the trial court ruled on the motion to dismiss only contained
claims for breach of trust based on trustee’s alleged failure to provide accountings, distribute income, and manage
trust assets as a prudent investor would. Because specific
personal jurisdiction is claim-specific, the particular claims
at issue guide our inquiry into whether the respondent has
minimum contacts with the State of Oregon. See McFadin
v. Gerber,

587 F3d 753, 759

 (5th Cir 2009), cert den,

562 US 827

 (2010) (“[S]pecific personal jurisdiction is a claim-specific inquiry: A plaintiff bringing multiple claims that arise
Cite as

337 Or App 606

 (2025)                              615

out of different forum contacts of the defendant must establish specific jurisdiction for each claim.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.)). Where, as here, the claims at issue are for
breach of trust, the contacts that are relevant for purposes
of establishing minimum contacts include those that relate
to the formation of the trust and the subsequent alleged
breach. See Trois v. Apple Tree Auction Ctr., Inc.,

882 F3d 485, 489

 (5th Cir 2018) (explaining that “[b]ecause specific
personal jurisdiction is a claim-specific inquiry, only those
acts which relate to the formation of the contract and the
subsequent breach are relevant” (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted)).
          We turn to trustee’s contacts with Oregon that
relate to the formation of the trust and the alleged breach.
To begin, none of the facts related to the formation of the
trust establish any contact between trustee and the State
of Oregon. The trust was created in the State of California
by a resident of that state, and the terms of the trust stated
that it was to be governed by the laws of California, “regardless of the domicile of any trustee or beneficiary.” At the time
that the trust was created, trustee was, and has remained,
a resident of Texas. Although the record reflects that trustee
accepted the trusteeship with knowledge that the children
lived in Oregon, a respondent’s “knowledge that an Oregon
resident is involved in a transaction is not, standing alone,
sufficient to establish the contact necessary to impose jurisdiction.” Dreher,

162 Or App at 651

.
         The facts related to the alleged breach also do not
establish that trustee has the requisite minimum contacts
with Oregon. The record shows that trustee administered
the trust exclusively from Texas and, thus, that is where the
alleged breaches of trust occurred. Although trustee sent
money from the trust to Oregon and had phone calls with
the children about the trust, we have repeatedly held that
those acts are insufficient to establish the kind of purposeful
direction that is necessary to satisfy the minimum contacts
requirement. See Dreher,

162 Or App at 651

 (finding minimum contacts were not established where “the payment of
money by mail to an Oregon resident and related communications [were] the sum and substance of defendants’ contacts”);
616                                          Potter v. Baxter

see also State ex rel Jones v. Crookham,

296 Or 735, 742

681 P2d 103

 (1984) (“[T]he act of making monthly payments to
an Oregon plaintiff is insufficient to require a non-resident
to litigate a contract action in Oregon.”). To the extent that
the children contend that the phone calls delayed their recognition of trustee’s breaches of trust, we note that, as to that
theory, our case law requires detailed allegations of the particular guarantees that caused the harmed individual’s reasonable reliance. See Boehm & Co. v. Environmental Concepts
Inc.,

125 Or App 249, 254

865 P2d 413

 (1993) (discussing
the particular promise at issue that played an “integral part”
in causing significant economic consequences and explaining
that “reliance on a guaranty is a critical factor in determining the reasonableness of asserting personal jurisdiction over
a nonresident”). Unlike in Dreher, here all of the beneficiaries are residents of Oregon; however, that fact alone does not
compel a different outcome. See Walden v. Fiore,

571 US 277, 290

134 S Ct 1115

188 L Ed 2d 12

 (2014) (“The proper question is not where the plaintiff experienced a particular injury
or effect but whether the defendant’s conduct connects him to
the forum in a meaningful way.”).
         The children contend that the fact that trustee
administered assets of the trust that were physically located
in Oregon (i.e., Elizabeth’s personal property that was being
held in storage) distinguishes this case from Dreher and is
sufficient to establish minimum contacts. We do not agree.
To establish minimum contacts with the State of Oregon
“the [petitioner’s] claims must arise out of or relate to the
[respondent’s] contacts with the forum state.” Cox,

368 Or at 496

 (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, “the
nature and quality of the [respondent’s] Oregon activities
must permit a determination that it was reasonably foreseeable that the [respondent] would be sued in Oregon for the
type of claim at issue.”

Id.

 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, however, the claims against trustee for breach of
trust relate to his alleged handling of the trust’s financial
assets, rather than the physical assets located in Oregon.
Consequently, the presence of physical assets in this state
does not establish the necessary connection between trustee’s conduct and Oregon to support the exercise of jurisdiction over trustee.
Cite as

337 Or App 606

 (2025)                                            617

          Like in Dreher, “this case does not present a typical commercial transaction under ORCP 4 E in which an
out-of-state enterprise has purposefully targeted an Oregon
market or resident,” and there is no evidence that trustee
purposefully sought out the trusteeship.

162 Or App at 652

.
Rather, the record shows only that he agreed with his friend,
Elizabeth, to take over the administration of a preexisting
California trust that happened to have two Oregon beneficiaries. In sum, the facts as they pertain to the claims alleged in
the children’s first amended complaint support the conclusion
that trustee did not purposefully direct his activities toward
Oregon residents. Consequently, trustee’s contacts are insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction under ORCP 4 E.
D. Personal Jurisdiction Under ORCP 4 L
Finally, trustee contends that the trial court erred
in concluding that there is jurisdiction under ORCP 4 L,
which extends personal jurisdiction to the limits of due process. The analysis under ORCP 4 L is the same due process test that applies to the specific jurisdictional bases
described in other subsections of ORCP 4, including ORCP
4 E. Therefore, for the reasons we have already explained,
ORCP 4 L does not provide Oregon with personal jurisdiction over trustee.
III. CONCLUSION
In sum, the claims as alleged in the children’s
first amended complaint failed to establish jurisdiction
over trustee. Thus, the trial court erred in denying trustee’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.4 Because the
court did not have the opportunity under ORCP 21 A(2)(c) to
determine whether to dismiss with or without prejudice, we
reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
EGAN, J., dissenting.
In this case concerning personal jurisdiction, it is
undisputed that respondent accepted the trusteeship at the
time of the death of petitioners’ mother knowing that both
4
We do not express any opinion as to whether the second amended complaint
gave rise to personal jurisdiction.
618 Potter v. Baxter

of the beneficiaries lived in Oregon. The question at hand
is whether or not respondent had “substantial and not isolated” contacts with Oregon. In my view, respondent had
those substantial contacts.
Oregon’s long-arm statute, ORCP 4, outlines five
general bases for establishing personal jurisdiction under
ORCP 4 A and more detailed bases for personal jurisdiction
under ORCP 4 B through K, and then announces “a catchall provision under ORCP 4 L that confers jurisdiction to
the extent permitted by due process.” Robinson v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co.,

354 Or 572, 576-77

316 P3d 287

 (2013)
(citing State ex rel Circus Circus Reno, Inc. v. Pope,

317 Or 151, 154-56

854 P2d 461

 (1993)). The catchall provision of
ORCP 4 L makes it clear that sections 4 B to K are not all
inclusive; rather, they are simply illustrations of personal
jurisdiction. We ultimately look for due process and, if jurisdiction is fair, it is permissible. Siskiyou Properties, LLC v.
Bennett Holdings, LC,

13 Fed Appx 553, 555

 (9th Cir. 2001);
see Hayden v. Shin-Etsu Handotai America, Inc.,

80 F Supp 2d 1119, 1120-21

 (D Or 1999) (“Oregon’s jurisdictional statute confers personal jurisdiction coextensive with due process. * * * As a result, this court need only analyze whether
exercising jurisdiction comports with due process.”).
          The hurdle for meeting due process requirements is
low. In International Shoe Co. v. Washington, the Court held
that a state court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction satisfies the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution if it does not violate “ ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ”

326 US 310, 316

66 S Ct 154

90 L Ed 95

 (1945) (quoting Milliken
v. Meyer,

311 US 457, 463

61 S Ct 339

85 L Ed 278

 (1940));
see also Insurance Corp. v. Compagnie des Bauxites,

456 US 694, 703

102 S Ct 2099

72 L Ed 2d 492

 (1982) (holding that
personal jurisdiction over a defendant satisfies due process
if it aligns with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice). Even when the cause of action occurs outside of
the forum state, “due process is not offended” when a state
subjects a defendant “to its in personam jurisdiction when
there are sufficient contacts between the State and the
[defendant].” Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v.
Cite as

337 Or App 606

 (2025)

619 Hall, 466

 US 408, 414,

104 S Ct 1868

80 L Ed 2d 404

 (1984).
Due process can be satisfied even when a defendant has
essentially zero contacts with the forum, so long as service
of process is accomplished while he is transiting through the
forum. Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal.,

495 US 604, 619

110 S Ct 2105

109 L Ed 2d 631

 (1990).
         As the Oregon Supreme Court has made clear,
the exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is
consistent with due process if the defendant has minimum
contacts with the forum state and the assertion of jurisdiction would comport with notions of fair play and substantial
justice. Circus Circus,

317 Or at 159-60

. Minimum contacts
exist when “the defendant has ‘purposefully directed’ its
activities at residents of the forum state and where the litigation ‘arises out of or relates to’ those activities.”

Id.

 at 159
(quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,

471 US 462, 472

105 S Ct 2174

85 L Ed 2d 528

 (1985)) (emphasis in original).
          The Ninth Circuit set out three narrow questions in
order to test whether or not the necessary contact comports
with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice:
First, did the defendant do “some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities
in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections
of its laws[?]” Gray & Co. v. Firstenberg Machinery Co. Inc.,
913 F2d 758, 760 (9th Cir 1990) (citing Shute v. Carnival
Cruise Lines, 897 F2d 377, 381 (9th Cir 1990)). Second, did
the claim “arise out of the defendant’s forum-related activities[?]”

Id.

 Third, is “the exercise of jurisdiction [on the facts
of the case] reasonable[?]”

Id.

 From my perspective, the
answers to those three questions support jurisdiction in this
case.
        First, respondent accepted the responsibility for
administering a trust in which all of the beneficiaries lived
in Oregon. During the course of administering that trust,
respondent strung those beneficiaries along for six years
maintaining constant contact with decedent’s children.
Respondent repeatedly coordinated and arranged for trust
property to be moved to and administered in Oregon. Those
contacts included the transportation of trust property from
California to Oregon that included furniture, antiques,
620                                           Potter v. Baxter

valuable art, and jewelry. Respondent used funds from the
trust to pay for the storage of trust property in Oregon and
reimbursed one of the beneficiaries of the trust for her own
costs and monthly payments to storage facilities in Oregon.
Thus, respondent did several “act[s] by which he purposefully avail[ed] himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum[.]”

Id.

         Second, the claim arose, at least in part, out of
respondent’s activities in Oregon. It is important to note
here that petitioners claimed that respondent dissipated
millions of dollars of the trust assets for his own personal
use and that respondent made minimal distributions of
those substantial assets to the beneficiaries during the six
years preceding their lawsuit. The beneficiaries’ claim arose,
in part, because respondent strung the beneficiaries along
by paying for the administration of trust property that was
transported to Oregon and that respondent administered in
Oregon when he paid for that transportation and storage.
Thus, the claim arose, in part, because of respondent’s activities in Oregon.
         Finally, the exercise of jurisdiction in Oregon is
reasonable because respondent should have understood that
moving property to Oregon, administering that property in
Oregon, and stringing beneficiaries along by sending rent
payments to Oregon placed him on “fair warning that a
particular activity may subject [him] to the jurisdiction of
a foreign sovereign.” Burger King,

471 US at 472

 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Based on that “fair
warning,” the exercise of jurisdiction on the facts of this case
is reasonable.
        Therefore, I would conclude that respondent’s contacts with Oregon are sufficient to satisfy due process.
        I respectfully dissent.

Citation profile

How this case has been treated — in progress