¶1Supplemental Opinion on Rehearing.
¶2Since it appears in Petition for Rehearing that the defendants have misconstrued our opinion herein, we think it desirable to distinguish this case from Phelps v. Young, 149 Okl. 120, 299 P. 461. In that case the relief sought was habeas corpus and custody, and nothing more. We held that an attack upon the validity of an adoption in a habeas corpus proceeding would constitute a collateral attack, which cannot be done, unless the adoption is void on the face of the record. In 2 C.J.S. Adoption of Children § 50a, page 440, the author states:
“An attack made upon a decree of adoption in any proceeding other than a direct appeal or a petition to set aside the adoption is a collateral attack. Tims, for example, an adoption decree is attacked collaterally where its validity is questioned in a will contest, a habeas corpus proceeding, an action to determine title to land, and an application for letters of guardianship.” (Emphasis ours.)
¶3In the case now before us the plaintiffs allege in their First Amended Petition that the adoption decree is void because their consent to the adoption was procured by fraud. They pray that the adoption decree be vacated and set aside. They then pray, in effect, that when the adoption decree is vacated the court issue a writ of habeas corpus and that custody be given to plaintiffs. They apparently predicate their right to habeas corpus and custody upon a finding and judgment that the adoption decree was void, and that they would not be entitled to habeas corpus unless, and until, the court vacates the adoption proceeding. The prayer for habeas *741corpus therein appears to be upon the theory that habeas corpus is the machinery or vehicle through which the court may take charge of the children and change the custody after it first finds that the adoption decree is void. It is upon these considerations that we have concluded that the Amended Petition herein is not an action in habeas corpus hut an action to set aside and vacate the adoption proceedings.
¶4In 2 A.L.R.2d at page 890, in an annotation dealing with annulment or vacation of adoption decree, the author states:
“The power of a court of general equitablé jurisdiction to annul, vacate, or set aside an order of adoption under proper circumstances seems to be generally conceded, and has not been ques-’ tioned in any of the cases discussed herein; and in fact, in some cases the courts have emphasized the powers of a court of equity in adoption matters.”
¶5In Zupancis v. Zupancis, 107 Colo. 323, 111 P.2d 1063, the court recognized in the first paragraph of the syllabus that the validity of an adoption proceeding might be questioned in a petition to set aside the adoption, but that any other attack thereon (other than an appeal) would constitute a collateral attack.
¶6It is asserted in Petition for Rehearing that if this adoption is going to be reviewed it should be reviewed by the County Court of Grady County, where the adoption was completed and the facts are well known to that court. We observe that the issue presented to us is whether the District Court has jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs’ amended petition, and not whether it would have been inore desirable to review the adoption proceeding in the County Court. In our opinion herein we noted that an order of the County Court -permitting an adoption is conclusive upon that court, and that the County Court has no further jurisdiction in the matter. Citing In re Hughes, 88 Okl. 257, 213 P. 79.
¶7Our original opinion is affirmed and rehearing is denied.