Norris v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

59 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 61 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The question of “implied consent” . . . was more closely examined recently in U.S. v. Gonzalez, supra. In Gonzalez, the officer approached an individual outside her home and asked if she would consent to a search of her home. Following a conversation with her daughter, she told the officer she wanted to go inside and get a drink of water. The officer then told her he “wanted to go in” with her, and when she did not bar him from going in, he followed her inside. The Eleventh Circuit held that there was no consent to enter: We have previously noted our hesitancy to find implied consent (i.e. consent by silence) in the Fourth Amendment context, and we agree with our colleagues in the Ninth Circuit that whatever relevance the implied consent doctrine may have in other contexts, it is inappropriate to ‘sanction entry into the home based upon inferred consent.’ Gonzalez then quoted from U.S. v. Shaibu, 920 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir. 1990), to which it had referred above: The government may not show consent to enter from the defendant’s failure to object to the entry. To do so would be to justify entry by consent and consent by entry. “This will not do .’’Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. at 17. We must not shift the burden from the government — to show “unequivocal and specific” consent ■— to the defendant, who would have to prove unequivocal and specific objection to a police entry, or be found to have given implied consent. Gonzalez, 71 F.3d at 830 .”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Holmes v. State · Latta v. State

2. “[T]he physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed. * * * The Fourth Amendment protects the individual’s privacy in a variety of settings. In none is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual’s home ■— a zone that finds its roots in clear and specific constitutional terms: “The right of the people to be secure in their ... houses ... shall not be violated.” That language unequivocally establishes the proposition that“[a]t the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.” [Citation omitted.] In terms that apply equally to seizures of property and to seizures of persons, the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 83 Ark. App. 392 - Baird v. State

3. “It is true that this Court and the legislature of this State have recognized driving while intoxicated as a serious offense. The question then becomes whether, in the statutory scheme of criminal offenses, the seriousness of DWI, first offense, rises to the level that would warrant violation of the Fourth Amendment’s special protection afforded to the individual in his home, as articulated in Payton, supra, and Welsh. We hold that it does not.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Stutte v. State