Michael v. United States’s Empirical Analysis
338 F.2d 219 · 1964
Citation profile
15 federal appellate · 2 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 19 later decisions — most recently January 1988
15 federal appellate · 2 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Duberstein D Stanton · Pryor's Administrator v. Otter · Stallings v. Hullum · Murphy v. Homans · W. F. Robinson & Son v. Jones
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 19 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““* * * However, the issue of whether an act of negligence proximately contributes to a tortious act presents a question of fact. Hines v. Westerfield [Ky., 254 S.W.2d 728 ], supra; Cook v. Gillespie, 259 Ky. 281 , 82 S.W.2d 347 (1935); Prosser, The Law of Torts 282 (2d ed. 1955). The District Judge found as a fact that even if negligent, the mail carrier’s conduct was not a proximate cause of the accident. He stated: ‘I am of the opinion that the facts in this case show that the intervening act which brought about this accident was. the act of the third man by the name of Johnie Brown, who was driving the automobile at a very rapid rate, exceeding the lawful speed limit; that he undertook to stop behind the station wagon and his brakes failed. * * * My opinion is that that is the intervening and superseding act which this man who was driving his mail car could not have anticipated reasonably. * * *.’ (Emphasis supplied.) The District Judge further analyzed the evidence which in his view supported his factual finding that the mail carrier’s conduct was not a proximate cause of the injuries to plaintiffs. In our view, such finding was not clearly erroneous, and therefore will not' be set aside. Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a); Krumholz v. Goff, 315 F.2d 575 , 580 (CA 6, 1963); Commissioner [of Internal Revenue] v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 , 291, 80 S.Ct. 1190 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1218 (1960).””
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority““Another rule of Kentucky law apposite to this case is that one guilty of negligence will not be charged in tort if some independent intervening cause interrupts the chain of causation so as to render such negligence so causally remote as not to be considered a proximate cause. One expression of the Kentucky rule is that ‘if an independent cause intervenes, which is of itself sufficient to produce the result, it is regarded as proximate cause, and the originator of the first cause is relieved from liability.’ ” Michael v. United States, 338 F.2d at 220 .”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority““If the original negligent act set in force a chain of events which the original negligent actor might have reasonably foreseen would, according to the experience of mankind, lead to the event which happened, the original actor is not relieved of liability by the intervening act. If, however, the ultimate injury is brought about by an intervening act or force so unusual as not to have been reasonably foreseeable, the intervening act is considered as the superseding cause and the original actor is not liable.””
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.