Toms v. Taft’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

6 federal appellate · 3 district · 3 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 43 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[The Sixth Circuit] court evaluates qualified immunity claims using a three-part inquiry. First, [the court] determine[s] whether the facts viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs show that a constitutional violation has occurred. Feathers v. Aey, 319 F.3d 843, 848 (6th Cir.2003). Second, [the court] determine[s] whether the right that was violated was a clearly established right of which a reasonable person would have known. Id. Finally, [the court] determine[s] whether the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts, and supported the allegations by sufficient evidence, to indicate that what the official allegedly did was objectively unreasonable in light of the clearly established constitutional rights. Id.; Williams v. Mehra, 186 F.3d 685 , 691 (6th Cir.1999).”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 279 F. Supp. 2d 846 - HRSS, INC. v. Wayne County Treasurer · 148 F. App'x 396 - Schultz v. Sillman

2. “In some circumstances, as when an earlier case expressly leaves open whether a general rule applies to the particular type of conduct at issue, a very high degree of prior factual particularity may be necessary. But general statements of the law are not inherently incapable of giving fair warning, and in other instances a general constitutional rule already identified in the decisional law may apply with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question even though ‘the very action in question has [not] previously been held unlawful.’ Our opinion in Lanier thus make's clear that officials can still be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances. Indeed, in Lanier , we expressly rejected a requirement that previous cases be “fundamentally” similar. Although earlier cases involving “fundamentally similar” facts can provide especially strong support for a conclusion that the law is clearly established, they are not necessary to such a finding. The same is true of cases with “materially similar” facts.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 332 F. Supp. 2d 1071 - Magrum v. Meinke

3. “[g]overnment officials who perform discretionary functions are generally entitled to qualified immunity and are protected from civil damages so long as `their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Dean v. Byerley