Benjamin v. Cronan’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

32 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 32 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““However, the rule is definite and strict as to the requirements respecting the character and quantum of proof necessary to establish an oral contract to adopt or to^ establish adoption on the theory of estoppel. This rule, as expressed in numerous cases,, is that such evidence must be clear, cogent,, and convincing, and such as to leave no reasonable doubt. Kay v. Neihaus, 298 Mo. 201 , loc. cit. 205, 249 S.W. 625 ; Taylor v. Coberly, 327 Mo. 940 , 38 S.W.(2d) 1055 , loc. cit. 1060; Gipson v. Owen, 286 Mo. 33 , loc. cit. 49, 226 S.W. 856 ; Ahern v. Matthews, [337] (Mo.Sup.) [362] 85 S.W.(2d) 377 , loc. cit. 383. The cases as to this rule are likewise numerous and none to the contrary. In Wales v. Holden, supra, 209 Mo. 552 , loc. cit. 558, 108 S.W. 89, 90 , it is said: ‘The circumstances of this case (for specific performance of alleged oral contract to adopt) forcibly illustrate the wisdom of the rule of evidence so firmly established and so often declared by this court, namely, that the proof to sustain a claim of this kind, in the face of the statute of frauds, must be overwhelmingly in its probative force, leaving no room for a reasonable doubt.’ And, as stated in Kinney v. Murray, 170 Mo. 674 , loc. cit. 700, 71 S.W. 197, 202 , ‘there must be no equivocation or uncertainty in the case.’ In the present case, as in all such cases, the burden of proof was on plaintiff to establish his case by that character and quantum of proof as required by law. 1 C.J. 1379; Teats v. Fla”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Wohlgemuth v. Browning

2. “It is true that plaintiff, when of tender years, was taken into the Benjamin home, but such is not necessarily consistent only with an agreement to adopt. Sitton v. Shipp, 65 Mo. 297 ; Wales v. Holden, supra. Neither is adoption effected necessarily by recognizing and referring to a child as an adopted child. 1 C.J. 1373, and cases cited in note 34. Nor will adoption necessarily be effected by the alleged adoptive parent, in an application for life insurance, naming the alleged adopted child as the beneficiary and designating such child as son or daughter as the case may be.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. In Re Candelaria's Estate

3. “then couples, childless or not, will be reluctant to take into their homes orphan children, and for the welfare of such children, as well as for other reasons, the rule should be kept and observed. No one, after he or she has passed on, should be adjudged to have adopted a child unless the evidence is clear, cogent, and convincing....”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 32 Cal. 4th 160 - In Re Estate of Ford