Nelson v. Evans’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

66 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 66 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““ ‘Instructions on burden of proof should not state too many technical rules and, if an attempt is made to go into degrees of preponderance of evidence, it is almost certain to get the matter so complicated that a jury of laymen will have no idea.at all as to what is meant. “A short, simple instruction, tell-, ing the jury that the burden is on. plaintiff to prove his case by a preponderance or greater weight of'the credible evidence, and that unless he has done so the jury must find for defendant, ought to be sufficient to inform the jury what plaintiff is required to do. A plain declaration to that effect will be easily understood by a jury. The more the instruction is elaborated upon, the more complex it becomes and the more it is likely to be misunderstood.” [Citing case.] Certainly all that ought to he required, in addition to such a statement as to which party has this burden, should be a clear definition of preponderance of evidence, informing the jury that what is meant thereby is evidence which is more convincing to them as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.’ ””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Mengel v. City of St. Louis · Nelson v. Tayon

2. “the truth as to the charge of negligence as against the defendant remains undetermined in your minds .”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Morris v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. · Mueller v. Schien

3. ““It is further contended that the' instruction authorized a verdict for defendant if the jury found that plaintiff failed to maintain proper vigilance- and that the failure to keep a proper" lookout can never be the proximate cause of a collision. The case of Robinson v. Ross (Mo.App.) 47 S.W.(2d) 122 , loc. cit. 125, is cited as an authority. The point now under discussion was not ruled upon in that case. The opinion expressly so states. The court in the course of the opinion did say: ‘One’s failure to look is never the direct cause of a collision but such a failure merely prevents one from doing other things, in a pertinent case, such as stopping the car or swerving or sounding a warning, in order to avoid' a collision.’ The opinion goes on to say that that question was not presented to the court. “The failure to keep a proper lookout is in many cases the only negligent act proven to support a verdict. In Alexander v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co., 327 Mo. 1012 , 38 S.W.(2d) 1023 , loc. cit. 1026(2), it was held that plaintiff’s lack of vigilance constituted negligence as a matter of law, barring a recovery on primary negligence. To-the same effect is the case of Woods v. Moore, 48 S.W.(2d) 202 , loc. cit. 207 (7-9), an opinion by the Kansas City-Court of Appeals. It ought, therefore, be sufficient to authorize a verdict if a jury finds that a party was negligent-in failing to keep a proper lookout and that such negligence resulted in a collision or damage. So in this case”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Anthony v. Morrow