No. 114 February 20, 2025 1
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
In the Matter of the Conservatorship of Allen J. Wong,
Protected Person.
Sandra LUM,
an individual;
Macdonald & Associates, LLC; and Allen J. Wong,
Respondents,
v.
Suzanne F. LEE,
Appellant.
Clackamas County Circuit Court
20PR00918; A179358
Susie L. Norby, Judge.
Argued and submitted December 6, 2024.
Jeffrey S. Frasier argued the cause for appellant. Also on
the opening brief was Chenoweth Law Group, PC. Also on
the reply brief were Olivia A. Courogen and Buchalter.
David A. Anderson argued the cause for respondent
Sandra Lum. Also on the brief were Jessie Y. Minger and
Schwabe, Williamson & Wyatt, P.C.
No appearance for respondents Macdonald & Associates,
LLC, and Allen J. Wong.
Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, Hellman, Judge, and
Mooney, Senior Judge.
ORTEGA, P. J.
Appeal dismissed as moot.
2 Lum v. Lee
ORTEGA, P. J.
This is a proceeding involving a protected person,
Wong, who is now deceased. Lee, who was Wong’s wife,
appeals from a limited judgment that appointed a conservator for Wong at the request of his daughter from his previous marriage, Lum, and that prohibited Lee from accessing
assets she held jointly with Wong without conservator or court
approval. Wong died during the pendency of this appeal, and
the court entered judgments that approved the conservator’s
final accounting and discharged the conservator. Based on
those events, Lum argues that the case is now moot. We conclude that the case is moot and dismiss the appeal.
The relevant facts are primarily procedural. This
case began when Lee, who married Wong after his first wife’s
death, petitioned to be appointed his guardian when his
health and mental capacity deteriorated. Court-appointed
counsel for Wong objected, and the parties entered into a
stipulated limited judgment that appointed a professional
fiduciary as Wong’s guardian. Based on a report by the
fiduciary that raised concerns about changes to Wong’s
estate plan made after his decline, Wong’s attorney moved
to expand the fiduciary’s authority. Wong’s adult daughter,
Lum, separately petitioned for the fiduciary to be appointed
as Wong’s conservator. Lee objected and counter-petitioned
to have herself appointed as conservator.
Following an evidentiary hearing, the court entered a
limited judgment that appointed the fiduciary as conservator
and, among other things, authorized the conservator to conduct a full investigation of alterations to Wong’s estate from
the date of his marriage to Lee, “to take necessary action to
rectify any improper interference with [Wong’s] estate plan
and asset ownership,” and “to pursue litigation if deemed necessary to rectify misdirection or mismanagement of [Wong’s]
pre-marital estate and estate plan.” The court also ordered
that Lee was “prohibited from accessing assets jointly held
with [Wong] without written permission of either the conservator or this court.” Lee appeals from that limited judgment.
After Lee initiated this appeal, Wong died. While
the appeal was pending, the fiduciary completed a final
Cite as 338 Or App 1 (2025) 3
accounting of Wong’s estate and, in a final judgment, the
court approved that accounting and directed the fiduciary
to distribute the remaining conservatorship assets to the
personal representative of Wong’s estate, Lum. After the
fiduciary distributed the assets, the court entered a supplemental judgment discharging the fiduciary, exonerating the
fiduciary’s bond, and closing the protective proceeding. Lum
then moved to dismiss this appeal as moot.
We typically will not decide cases that have become
moot. State v. K. J. B., 362 Or 777, 785,
416 P3d 291 (2018).
“[A] case becomes moot when a court’s decision will no longer have a practical effect on the rights of the parties.”
Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). The burden is on the
party moving for dismissal to establish that the case is moot.
Id. The responding party then “must identify any collateral
consequences that he or she contends has the effect of producing the required practical effects of a judicial decision.”
Id. at 786. The moving party has the burden to demonstrate
that the identified collateral consequence “either does not
exist or is legally insufficient.”
Id. We must then “determine
the existence and significance of those effects or consequences and … decide, as a prudential matter, whether
an appeal is moot.” Dept. of Human Services v. A. B.,
362 Or
412, 426,
412 P3d 1169 (2018).
Lum has met her initial burden to establish that
this appeal is moot. The court approved the fiduciary’s
final accounting, the fiduciary delivered the conservatorship assets to the personal representative, and the court
discharged the fiduciary as guardian and conservator and
closed the protective proceeding. Any decision by us on Lee’s
appeal, which challenges the court’s action in establishing
the conservatorship and limiting Lee’s access to jointly held
assets, would have no practical effect on the rights of the
parties because the conservatorship no longer exists, and
the limitation on Lee has no further effect. What remains
for us to address is whether Lee has identified a collateral
consequence that prevents the appeal from being moot.
Lee argues that the case is not moot because there
are ongoing disputes between the parties, specifically identifying a civil case in which Lum, as personal representative
4 Lum v. Lee
of Wong’s estate, seeks to recover, based on a claim of undue
influence, assets that Lee held jointly with Wong. Lee asserts
that the undue influence case relies on findings and rulings
made in this proceeding, and that a decision on appeal will
have a practical effect on the rights of the parties because
Lum will continue to rely on the findings in this case.
Lum makes two arguments in response. First, she
asserts that the collateral consequences doctrine does not
apply to a case like this which does not involve state action
affecting parties’ interests. Second, even if the doctrine
applies, Lum argues that Lee has not identified a collateral
consequence sufficient to prevent the case from being moot
because any effect the findings in this case has on the undue
influence case does not rise to the level of the required “significant practical effect,” as discussed in A. B. Lum points
out that any findings for this case used in the civil case
would be part of the evidence presented that Lee has the
opportunity to rebut as part of her case.
We first reject Lum’s assertion that the collateral
consequences “doctrine” does not apply in this type of proceeding. The collateral consequences inquiry is not a doctrine separate from mootness; rather it is an integral part of
our consideration of whether a case is moot. Oregon case law
does not support the contention that the type of proceeding
alters the analysis.
Turning to the identified collateral consequence,
we conclude that it is not sufficient to prevent this appeal
from becoming moot. Lee has not identified which findings
of the court she claims are being used in the undue influence case or how they are being used beyond stating that
Lum quoted portions of the transcript to obtain an initial
temporary restraining order. Although Lee states that
“[t]here is a risk of issue preclusion,” she provides no other
context. Lum, for her part, responds that the preliminary
injunction she obtained in the undue influence case was not
based on the court giving preclusive effect to any finding
in this case, and we judicially note that the preliminary
injunction order does not purport to rely on preclusive effect.
Without more context from Lee, we are persuaded that Lum
has shown that leaving this limited judgment intact would
Cite as 338 Or App 1 (2025) 5
not be “significantly disadvantageous” to Lee. See A. B.,
362
Or at 428 (in concluding that the juvenile dependency case
was moot, the Supreme Court was persuaded that, “if the
department considers allegations concerning mother in the
future, the existence of the findings and judgment will not
be significantly disadvantageous”). In addition, the limited
judgment does not change the evidentiary or legal standards that Lum must meet to prove her undue influence
claim—which is not a claim or issue decided by the limited
judgment—and Lee will have the opportunity to present her
own evidence to rebut Lum’s case.
Even if Lee is correct that the potential use of the
court’s findings by Lum in a related proceeding can qualify as a collateral consequence, in the circumstances of this
case, it is not a sufficient collateral consequence that prevents this appeal from becoming moot.
Appeal dismissed as moot.
