State v. Kuhn

816                  March 12, 2025               No. 222

   This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
    pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
         except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                 STATE OF OREGON

                  STATE OF OREGON,
                   Plaintiff-Respondent,
                             v.
                JEREMY JACOB KUHN,
                   Defendant-Appellant.
              Deschutes County Circuit Court
                   21CR50924; A180615

  Raymond D. Crutchley, Judge.
  Submitted August 28, 2024.
  Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and James Brewer, Deputy Public Defender, Oregon
Public Defense Commission, filed the briefs for appellant.
   Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Erica L. Herb, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
  Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, Pagán, Judge, and
Mooney, Senior Judge.
  MOONEY, S. J.
  Affirmed.
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 

 (2025)                               817

           MOONEY, S. J.
         Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction for driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII), ORS 813.010,
entered after a conditional guilty plea. He argues that the
trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence
obtained during a traffic stop that was not supported by reasonable suspicion. We conclude that the trial court did not
err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress. We affirm.
         A police officer may stop and temporarily detain a
person if the officer reasonably suspects—based on specific
and articulable facts—that the person committed a specific
crime or type of crime. State v. Hames, 

,

 (2008); see also ORS 131.615(1) (“A peace officer who reasonably suspects that a person has committed or
is about to commit a crime may stop the person and, after
informing the person that the peace officer is a peace officer,
make a reasonable inquiry.”). “For a court to determine that
an investigative stop was lawful under Article I, section 9,
[of the Oregon Constitution1], the court (1) must find that
the officers actually suspected that the stopped person had
committed a specific crime or type of crime, or was about
to commit a specific crime or type of crime, and (2) must
conclude, based on the record, that the officers’ subjective
belief—their suspicion—was objectively reasonable under
the totality of the circumstances existing at the time of the
stop.” State v. Maciel-Figueroa, 

, 

 (2017). Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause. Hames, 

.
          A citizen’s report may form the basis of reasonable suspicion provided it is reliable. As we evaluate the
reliability of a citizen’s report, we consider three factors:
(1) “whether the informant is exposed to possible criminal
and civil prosecution if the report is false,” (2) “whether the
report is based on the personal observations of the informant,” and (3) “whether the officer’s own observations
    1
      Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution provides: “No law shall violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure; and no warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause, supported by oath, or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.”
818                                              State v. Kuhn

corroborated the informant’s information.” 

. Those
three factors are not dispositive on the question of reliability
but are intended instead “to serve as an aid in evaluating
the reliability of a [citizen] report.” State v. Mitchele, 

, 

 (2010) (“[A]lthough the second
factor is not satisfied in the strictest sense,” the report was
reliable.). Whether a report is reliable “rests on the particular circumstances in each case[.]” State v. Killion, 

, 

 (2009).
         We review the trial court’s suppression ruling for
legal error and are bound by the trial court’s factual findings
that are supported by constitutionally sufficient evidence.
State v. Fuller, 

, 

 (2019).
The pertinent facts, drawn from the record in accordance
with that standard, are as follows: Officer Rasmussen was
on patrol, riding in the passenger seat of a Redmond patrol
vehicle while training another officer. Dispatch reported
that it was receiving an inordinate number of “traffic complaints” concerning what callers described as “gunfire coming from a vehicle,” “machine gun fire,” or “a car backfiring,”
in the southwest part of town, involving “a small red sports
car” with a “Trailblazer sticker.” Dispatch told Rasmussen
that they could hear “the vehicle backfiring” during the
calls. Rasmussen could hear a vehicle backfiring in the distance when he was contacted by dispatch. At that point,
Rasmussen believed that the driver was intentionally trying to cause some sort of disturbance and he had a hunch
that the vehicle belonged to defendant.
         Rasmussen was familiar with defendant from prior
police contact for other complaints related to defendant’s
red Jetta. He was aware that defendant lived in southwest
Redmond and that he had a Portland Trailblazers sticker
on the back of his Jetta. Rasmussen had heard defendant’s
Jetta backfire and he was aware that it backfired loudly
“due to … computer electronic tuning” that was “intentional” and “designed to do that … for effect.” With that
knowledge, Rasmussen drove to defendant’s residence and
observed that defendant’s red Jetta was not there.
        Rasmussen then received a second batch of calls
reporting a physical fight in the parking lot of the Obsidian
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 

 (2025)                           819

Apartments located in the southwest part of town. The callers reported that a red vehicle with a Portland Trailblazers
sticker making loud backfiring sounds was there. Suspecting
that defendant might be involved, Rasmussen drove to an
intersection that he thought defendant might cross through
on his way home from the Obsidian Apartments, and he did,
in fact, see defendant driving his red Jetta at that point.
Rasmussen initiated a traffic stop because he believed that
defendant had committed the crimes of disorderly conduct2
and reckless driving. He cited defendant and impounded his
vehicle.
         At trial, defendant argued that Rasmussen’s stop was
not justified by either probable cause of a traffic violation or
reasonable suspicion of a crime. Defendant moved to suppress
all evidence obtained as a result of that stop. The trial court
denied the motion. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial
court should have granted his motion because Rasmussen’s
suspicion was based on unreliable citizen reports that rendered his suspicion unreasonable. We disagree.
         We recognize that the state did not offer evidence
establishing the identity of the persons who called to register their concerns. But the totality of all the circumstances
articulated by Rasmussen—including the level of detail
contained within the citizen reports and the sheer volume
of those detailed reports, Rasmussen’s prior contact with
defendant and familiarity with defendant’s vehicle, his
observation that defendant’s vehicle was not parked at his
residence and the fact that Rasmussen heard the distinct
backfiring sounds coming from defendant’s part of town—
was enough to support reasonable suspicion to stop defendant for disorderly conduct. See, e.g., State v. Bybee, 

, 

 (1994) (explaining that an officer may corroborate a report “either by observing the illegal
activity or by finding the person, the vehicle and the location
substantially as described by the informant”).
          Affirmed.

    2
      As relevant here, a person commits second degree disorderly conduct “if,
with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly
creating a risk thereof, the person … [m]akes unreasonable noise[.]” ORS
166.025(1)(b).