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338 So. 2d 883

Docket No. 76-55.

White v. White

Edward W. WHITE, Appellant, v. M. Carole WHITE, Appellee.

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Decided October 26, 1976.

Rehearing Denied November 12, 1976.

District Court of Appeal of Florida · decided 1976-10-26

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“Provisions a of a separation agreement constituting a final settlement of the rights which each party has in property accumulated during their marriage are to be construed in the same manner as any other contract. Rights in property which have become fixed and vested under the provisions of such agreement should not be disturbed by the courts, except upon proof which would justify modification or cancellation of a contract between strangers. Each of the parties is justified in relying upon the property settlement provisions of a separation agreement in planning the future course of their respective lives. Rights acquired under such agreements cannot be destroyed nor withdrawn by the courts upon the mere representation of either party that further compliance with the contract would prove burdensome or inconvenient. This is particularly true when the agreement has been ratified and confirmed by the court and incorporated in a final decree of divorce. (emphasis supplied) [1]”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 369 So. 2d 99 - Benson v. Benson

Relies on 64 So. 2d 281 - Underwood v. Underwood · Sedell v. Sedell · 164 So. 2d 231 - Howell v. Howell

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1976-10-26

How this case has been cited

Cited by 10 later decisions — most recently December 1990

1 federal appellate · 6 state decisions

50197619801990decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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¶1Aschenbrenner & Cogen, Miami, for appellant.

¶2Mershon, Sawyer, Johnston, Dunwody & Cole and H. Michael Madsen, Miami, for appellee.

¶3Before HENDRY, HAVERFIELD and NATHAN, JJ.

¶4HAVERFIELD, Judge.

¶5Edward White seeks reversal of an order denying his petition to modify the alimony provision of a property settlement agreement.

¶6In November 1971, Carole White filed a petition for dissolution of marriage to Edward and alleged a special equity in certain jointly held properties. Subsequently, in May 1972 the parties entered into a property settlement agreement which provided that Edward pay as lump sum alimony $181,500, payable in $1,500 monthly installments commencing on June 1, 1972. The parties further agreed that the alimony award could not be modified regardless of any change in circumstances of either of the parties. The agreement also contained provisions dividing the parties' real and personal *884 property and in exchange therefor Carole released any and all claims against Edward. A dissolution of marriage judgment incorporating this agreement was entered on May 25, 1972. Edward paid the monthly installments through June 1973 and then, having suffered business reverses, in December 1973 filed a petition to modify property settlement which was amended in April 1975. The parties agreed to first place before the court the issue of whether these payments were subject to modification. After a hearing, the chancellor ruled that the alimony award was not modifiable and denied the petition as amended.

¶7Edward basically contends that the chancellor committed error in holding that the agreement was not subject to modification pursuant to Section 61.14 Florida Statutes (1975). We cannot agree.

¶8Despite the fact that the agreement uses the term alimony, it is not conclusive. Rather it is the substance and not the form which controls. Underwood v. Underwood,64 So.2d 281 (Fla. 1953). The terms of the agreement clearly reflect its character as a property settlement agreement between the parties whereby Carole, in exchange for a substantial sum of money and property, relinquished all claims against Edward. The agreement with respect to the lump sum alimony expressly bound Edward's estate in the event of his death and the obligation to pay the monthly installments does not terminate even if Carole should remarry. It is evident that the parties effected a complete contractual settlement, transfer, division and sale of their properties for a consideration definitely fixed for an expressed period of time. See Howell v. Howell,164 So.2d 231 (Fla.2d DCA 1964).

¶9The rights which became fixed and vested under the provisions of this agreement should not be disturbed by the courts except upon proof which would justify modification or cancellation of a contract between strangers. See Sedell v. Sedell,100 So.2d 639 (Fla.1st DCA 1958).

¶10Thus, we find the chancellor was eminently correct in holding the agreement was not subject to modification. See Gilbert v. Gilbert,312 So.2d 511 (Fla.3d DCA 1975).

¶11Affirmed.

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