Foust v. Metcalf’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 2 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “We have determined that [pjlaintiff is not the true owner of the [disputed property]; that decision, however, does not mean that [defendant is the true owner. See Robinson, 260 S.W.2d at 410 (stating that a finding of adverse possession for purposes of champerty does not require a finding that the party adversely possessed for the prescriptive period required under the adverse possession statutes). We have determined the 2006 deed from [the railroad company] to [p]laintiff was void. Accordingly, [the railroad company] still possesses whatever interest it had in the property at that time. Further, if [the railroad company] is the true owner of the property, then [the railroad company] is an indispensable party to any action brought by [defendant pursuant to Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-2-105 to establish that [defendant owns the property by adverse possession. See Wilson [v. Price], 195 S.W.3d [661,] 670-71 (2005).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Milledgeville United Methodist Church v. Jimmy G. Melton

2. “Under [the champerty statutes], if one out of possession attempts to convey land which is adversely possessed by a third party, the conveyance is void. Kincaid v. Meadows, 40 Tenn. (3 Head) 188 , 192, 1859 WL 3430 , at (1859); Blair v. Gwosdof, 46 Tenn.App. 314 , 329 S.W.2d 366, 368 (1959). Regardless of the validity of the conveyor’s title to the land, such title becomes merely a pre tended title, within the statute, when there is an attempt to convey it under such circumstances. Kincaid, 40 Tenn. (3 Head) at 192, 1859 WL 3430 , at ; Blair, 329 S.W.2d at 368 . There is no required duration of adverse possession by the third party; all that is required is that the third party adversely possess the land at the time of the conveyance. Kincaid, at 192; Blair , at 368.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Milledgeville United Methodist Church v. Jimmy G. Melton