¶1F. Dale Crabtree, Oklahoma City, Okl., for appellant.
¶2John Quinn, U. S. Atty. (Ruth C. Streeter, Asst. U. S. Atty., on the brief), for appellee.
¶3Before LEWIS, BREITENSTEIN, and HILL, Circuit Judges.
¶5Appellant and two others were indicted for the interstate transportation of a kidnaped person and found guilty by a jury. In this direct appeal from the 7-*588year sentence imposed by the trial court, appellant attacks the sufficiency of the indictment and the refusal of the court to grant his motion for a separate trial.
¶6The offense proscribed by the statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a), is the knowing transportation in interstate commerce of a person kidnaped and “ransom or reward or otherwise · Case Law">for ransom or reward or otherwise · Case Law">held for ransom or reward or otherwise” and the severity of the punishment depends on whether such person is liberated unharmed.1 The indictment charges the kidnaping and transportation of Gloria Jean Galvez and says that she was held “for the purpose of taking indecent liberties with her person and of making an assault upon her.” Counsel for appellant argues that the quoted phrase does not satisfy the statute because it is too vague to indicate that such liberties caused harm.
¶7The use in the statute of the words “or otherwise” shows an intent of Congress to include within the offense any holding of a kidnaped person for a purpose desired by the captor and negatives the need for ransom or reward.2 The generality of the phrase encompasses a holding for the purpose of taking indecent liberties.3 The statute does not require that the kidnaping and holding cause harm to the person kidnaped. The matter of harm’relates only to punishment.4 In our opinion the indictment is sufficient.
¶8 Appellant was not prejudiced by the denial of his motion for a separate trial. No statement of one defendant implicating a co-defendant was received in evidence. The grant of a severance is within the discretion of the trial court5 and that discretion was not abused.
¶9Affirmed.