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← 339 F.2d 770 - Davis v. North Carolina

Davis v. North Carolina’s Empirical Analysis

339 F.2d 770 · 1964

Citation profile

47
cited by 47 later decisions
2
cited 2 times by the Supreme Court
5
states following
June 1984
most recently cited

22 federal appellate · 8 district · 5 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 47 later decisions (2 by the Supreme Court) — most recently June 1984 · most notably Miranda v. State of Arizona Vignera (1966), Davis v. North Carolina (1966)

22 federal appellate · 8 district · 5 state decisions

370196419701980decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Appellate journey

Relationships

Relies on Gideon v. Wainwright · Escobedo v. Illinois · Brown v. Allen · Massiah v. United States · McNabb v. United States

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 47 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““This case is, therefore, far from the principle of Escobedo v. [State of] Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 [ 84 S.Ct. 1758 , 12L.Ed.2d 977]. In Escobedo, a suspect, not otherwise lawfully subject to detention, was being interrogated. During the course of his questioning he repeatedly asked permission to consult his lawyer, and his lawyer was present in police headquarters, insistently demanding access to his client. One time, through opening doors, the lawyer and client actually got a glimpse of each other, but their persistent demands and requests to consult were as persistently refused until after a confession had been obtained. The Supreme Court held, of course, that the suspect should have been allowed to speak to his lawyer who was present for that purpose and who was actively asking, himself, to speak to his client. Denial of the right to consult his attorney was held, under those circumstances, to have been a denial of due process. “Here, we have no such circumstances. Davis, advised that he could consult an attorney if he wished, sought only to have his sister come to see him. The police did all that they could to assist him in the realization of that wish. When there was no request of legal assistance and when the police did all that reasonably might be expected of them to facilitate the prisoner’s seeing the one person he wished to see, it cannot be held that the police unreasonably deprived him of his right to counsel.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.