Pearl Brewing Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.’s Empirical Analysis
1972
Citation profile
9 federal appellate · 2 district · 2 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 18 later decisions — most recently April 1998
9 federal appellate · 2 district · 2 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 15 U.S.C. § 1 (§ 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act) · 15 U.S.C. § 13 (§ 2 of the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914) · 15 U.S.C. § 15 (§ 4 of the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914) · 15 U.S.C. § 2 (§ 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act) · 15 U.S.C. § 26 (§ 16 of the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914)
Relies on Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. · United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. · Standard Oil Company of New Jersey v. United States · American Tobacco Co. v. United States · United States v. Colgate & Co.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 18 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“contract, combination . . . or conspiracy in restraint of trade . . .”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority““. . . While the purpose of the Sherman Act, and section 1, as aptly expressed in its title, is ‘to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies’, 26 Stat. 209 , the dominant theme of the law is readily apparent — the protection and preservation of competition. The intended implementation of this purpose can be seen by examining the statutory framework of the Act. Section 1 of the Act is aimed at certain ‘means’ to restrain trade or commerce. Accordingly, that section is set in a framework which forbids unduly restraining trade or commerce by means of contracts, combinations and conspiracy. Section 2 of the Act is aimed at the ‘ends’ or results of cer tain practices, rather than the form of the means employed. It, therefore, outlaws attempts to monopolize and actual monopolization of trade or commerce. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 , 31 S.Ct. 502 , 55 L.Ed. 619 (1911).” (Emphasis supplied).”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“It is obvious that the . •. . thrust of [Parke-Davis] is that the reseller or wholesaler must be free to make his own independent pricing determination, and that any trespass on his independence is violative of section 1 of the Sherman Act, whether the conduct is characterized as a contract, combination or conspiracy. It follows from such a premise that a practice of conditioning a price reduction on the acquiescence or cooperation of the recipient to reduce its price can only be viewed as imposing restrictions on the reseller’s freedom of decision and, as such, is an unlawful price fixing combination. Such a practice, while admittedly less exacting than the provisions of a formal contract, may, nevertheless, employ other means to a sufficiently high degree so that acceptance by the reseller is affected.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.