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← 339 GAAPP 306 - The State v. Young

The State v. Young’s Empirical Analysis

2016

Citation profile

7
cited by 7 later decisions
1
states following
February 2019
most recently cited

7 state decisions

Relationships

Relies on Miranda v. State of Arizona Vignera · Schneckloth v. Bustamonte · Vergara v. State · Hughes v. State · Williams v. State

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 7 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section I, Paragraph XIII of the Georgia Constitution both protect an individual's right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures, and apply with equal force to the compelled withdrawal of blood, breath, and other bodily substances. Because a breath test is a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, absent a warrant, the State must show that it falls into one of the specifically established and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement. Consent is a valid basis for a warrantless search where it is given freely and voluntarily, and the State does not argue that any other exception might apply. Therefore, the only question in regard to the validity of the search is whether the State met its burden of proving that [MacMaster] actually consented freely and voluntarily under the totality of the circumstances [to the State-administered breath test]. Historically, we considered a defendant's affirmative response to the reading of the implied consent notice as sufficient to allow a search of his or her bodily fluids without further inquiry into the validity of the defendant's consent. However, [in Williams v. State , 296 Ga. 817 , 821-822, 771 S.E.2d 373 (2015), our Supreme Court] rejected this per se rule automatically equating an affirmative response to the implied consent notice with actual consent to a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Instead, courts must now cond”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  2. “Georgia law requires you to submit to state[-]administered chemical tests of your blood, breath, urine, or other bodily substances for the purpose of determining if you are under the influence of alcohol or drugs. If you refuse this testing, your Georgia driver's license or privilege to drive on the highways of this state will be suspended for a minimum period of one year. Your refusal to submit to the required testing may be offered into evidence against you at trial. If you submit to testing and the results indicate an alcohol concentration of 0.08 grams or more, your Georgia driver's license or privilege to drive on the highways of this state may be suspended for a minimum period of one year. After first submitting to the required state tests, you are entitled to additional chemical tests of your blood, breath, urine, or other bodily substances at your own expense and from qualified personnel of your own choosing. Will you submit to the state [-]administered chemical tests of your (designate which tests) under the implied consent law?”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “[i]n conducting a totality of the circumstances analysis, we have considered a host of factors. A consent to search will normally be held voluntary if the totality of the circumstances fails to show that the officers used fear, intimidation, threat of physical punishment, or lengthy detention to obtain the consent. The defendant's affirmative response to the implied consent notice may itself be sufficient evidence of actual and voluntary consent, absent reason to believe the response was involuntary. The defendant's failure to express an objection to the test or change his or her mind also is evidence of actual consent. There is, however, no duty to inform suspects of their constitutional right against unreasonable searches. The use of handcuffs does not negate a defendant's ability to give consent. And the mere fact that a defendant was visibly intoxicated does not render his consent involuntary.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.