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339 Or. App. 245

568 P.3d 224

State v. Kropf

Court of Appeals of Oregon

Decided March 26, 2025

This page is marked noindex.

Court of Appeals of Oregon · decided 2025-03-26

Applies OR 137 § 137.700 · OR 163 § 163.207 · OR 163 § 163.411

Affirmed · Decided 2025-03-26

No. 260               March 26, 2025                    245

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                  STATE OF OREGON

                   STATE OF OREGON,
                    Plaintiff-Respondent,
                              v.
               JAMES STILSON KROPF III,
                   Defendant-Appellant.
              Washington County Circuit Court
                   20CR51953; A179182

  Theodore E. Sims, Judge.
  Argued and submitted April 29, 2024.
   Laura A. Frikert, Deputy Public Defender, argued the
cause for appellant. Also on the brief was Ernest G. Lannet,
Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, Office of Public
Defense Services.
   Adam Holbrook, Assistant Attorney General, argued
the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen F.
Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General.
  Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, Pagán, Judge, and
Mooney, Senior Judge.
  SHORR, P. J.
  Affirmed.
246   State v. Kropf
Cite as 
339 Or App 245
 (2025)                                             247

            SHORR, P. J.

         Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction
for several counts of first-degree unlawful sexual penetration and first-degree sexual abuse against his then 7- to
10-year-old daughter, O. Defendant raises four assignments
of error. First, he assigns error to the trial court’s denial of
his motion in limine to exclude evidence that he had moved
from Oregon to Michigan in violation of his post-prison
supervision (PPS) requirements.1 Defendant sought to prevent the state from arguing that those facts were evidence
of defendant’s consciousness of guilt in trying to avoid the
Oregon criminal charges in this case. Second, defendant
raises a similar argument that the trial court erred in
later denying a motion for mistrial after information was
disclosed that may have supported defendant’s contention
that his move to Michigan had been previously planned and
innocently undertaken. The trial court ruled that evidence
of defendant’s move to Michigan could be used as evidence of
flight or consciousness of guilt because it was both relevant
and not unfairly prejudicial. The court ultimately admitted
the evidence and left it to the jury to determine whether the
evidence supported intentional flight. As we discuss below,
we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying the
motion in limine. We further conclude that the trial court
did not err in denying defendant’s motion for mistrial.

         Defendant also argues that the trial court erred
in denying his objection to the prosecutor’s closing argument that O had stopped making reports of abuse to the
Department of Human Services (DHS) after she moved in
with her mother. Defendant contends that the prosecutor’s
argument was based on facts that were not in evidence. As
discussed below, we conclude that defendant’s argument on
appeal was not preserved. We also reject defendant’s final
assignment of error that contends that the trial court erred
in sentencing him to 300 months in prison on Counts 2 and
3 (two counts of first-degree unlawful sexual penetration of
a victim under 12). As a result, we affirm the judgment.

   1
       Defendant was on post-prison supervision in another unrelated matter.
248                                                          State v. Kropf

              PRETRIAL MOTION IN LIMINE
          We start with the issues surrounding the pretrial
motion in limine and the evidence regarding the circumstances under which defendant left Oregon. We review a
trial court’s pretrial decision on a motion in limine “in light
of the record made before the trial court when it issued the
order.” State v. Pitt, 
352 Or 566, 575
, 
293 P3d 1002
 (2012).
The facts below come from the pretrial hearing.
          In February 2020, Detective Tim Miller began
investigating the circumstances that ultimately led to this
case. Those charges, as noted, included allegations that
defendant had raped and sexually abused O, a child under
12 years old.
          In April 2020, Miller went to defendant’s residence.
Defendant was not home so Miller left his card with a person
who answered the door. Around early May, Miller was able
to reach defendant by phone. Miller was purposefully vague
about his reason for contacting defendant and told him
that “it involved his daughter and his ex-wife.”2 Defendant
responded that he did not want to speak with the detective
and terminated the conversation.
          Miller also testified at the pretrial hearing that
he spoke with defendant’s supervising officer, Tana Titus.
That conversation took place after defendant was indicted
on September 18, 2020. Titus indicated that defendant had
“likely fled or had fled.” Titus relayed that she had last spoken with defendant on May 5, 2020. On that date, defendant
informed Titus that the police had come to speak with him
and that his “sister and mother had told him about a pending investigation or something to that effect.” Titus noted
that defendant appeared nervous but stated that he had not
done anything wrong. Titus’s written notes indicated that
defendant had been approached by a detective and that
defendant “knew more information from his mother and sister” and that “he does not want to backslide.”
        Miller further testified at the pretrial hearing
that he had spoken with a sister of defendant about the
   2
     At the pretrial hearing, defense counsel noted that defendant had more
than one daughter and no ex-wife. Defendant, in fact, had not been married to O’s
mother, but she was defendant’s ex-girlfriend and they were both parents to O.
Cite as 
339 Or App 245
 (2025)                            249

investigation. The sister was aware of the investigation,
she was best friends with O’s mother, and she was a “disclosure witness.” Miller testified that he learned that O had
disclosed to defendant’s sister that something happened
relating to defendant and O, and that the sister believed
what had happened to O because the sister had had similar
experiences with defendant when the sister was a toddler.
Miller did not learn the specific details of O’s disclosure to
defendant’s sister.
         During his investigation, Miller also received a call
from defendant’s uncle Philip Wood on July 15, 2021. Miller
learned from Wood that defendant was in Grand Rapids,
Michigan. Miller learned that defendant was aware that
he faced charges that had “something to do with children”
and “were filed by his girlfriend because she was jealous.”
Defendant had told Wood that “it was something to do with
the kids and that it was a lie, and [defendant] needed to get
out of there.”
         Before trial, defendant moved to exclude references to the fact that defendant had left the state while on
supervision and had moved to Michigan, because it was not
relevant evidence under OEC 401 of defendant’s consciousness of guilt and was unfairly prejudicial under OEC 403.
In particular, defendant argued that there was insufficient
evidence that defendant knew of the specific investigation
against him or fled because of it. The state responded that
there was sufficient evidence to infer that defendant left the
state after learning of the criminal investigation into his
conduct and that he left to evade prosecution. The trial court
concluded that the jury could hear evidence that defendant
left the state after learning of the investigation but that
defendant could offer evidence or argument on alternative
explanations for his move. The court left it up to the jury as
a factual issue to draw any inference on why defendant left
Oregon.
         After the court made that ruling, the court and the
parties discussed how the court might limit the prejudicial
effect of the references to defendant’s supervision status.
The court offered to sanitize the record regarding defendant’s supervision status to limit any prejudicial reference
250                                             State v. Kropf

to defendant’s prior criminal conduct. Namely, the court
suggested that it or the parties could let the jury know
that defendant’s supervision status was tied to defendant’s
time in prison from 2014 to 2016 for a different conviction.
Defendant had intended to and later did offer into evidence
his 2014-to-2016 prison sentence as part of his defense
that he could not have sexually abused O during that time
frame. Defendant rejected the court’s offer and maintained
his objection. Ultimately, there was no stipulation placed on
the record and the state indicated it would just present its
witnesses.
         Defendant first assigns error to the trial court’s
ruling that denied defendant’s pretrial motion to exclude
evidence that defendant left Oregon for Michigan while on
supervision status after defendant learned of a criminal
investigation. We understand defendant to raise four arguments in support of this assignment of error. First, he contends that the trial court erred because the evidence that
defendant left Oregon for Michigan in violation of his supervision status violated OEC 404, mainly because it was based
on uncharged misconduct that was not relevant for a nonpropensity purpose. Second, defendant argues that any evidence of defendant’s move to Michigan was not logically relevant to the case because it was purportedly too speculative to
show that defendant fled because of his consciousness of guilt
as to the investigated crimes in Oregon. Third, he argues
that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the move
because it was unfairly prejudicial under OEC 403. Fourth,
in support of all of his arguments, defendant requests that
we reexamine prior case law that permits a jury to infer that
post-crime evidence of flight may be admissible as evidence
of consciousness of guilt because it is a “proposition rooted in
bias—that innocent people do not flee.”
        We briefly address that last argument first as we
provide a brief background of the Oregon case law on evidence of “flight.” We then proceed to address defendant’s
arguments in the order that he presents them. We initially
observe that both the Supreme Court and our court have
concluded that evidence of flight, if established, may be
admitted for the purpose of showing a guilty conscience. See
Cite as 
339 Or App 245
 (2025)                                             251

State v. Brown, 
231 Or 297, 300
, 
372 P2d 779
 (1962) (“The
purpose of the evidence adduced by the state was to show,
after the commission of the crime, flight, concealment, and
use of a false name. These facts, if established, are admissible as evidence of a guilty conscience, which is some evidence of guilt.”); State v. Minchue, 
173 Or App 520, 524
, 
24 P3d 386
 (2001) (“Oregon courts have long held that evidence
of flight is relevant as circumstantial evidence of guilty
knowledge, which is some evidence of guilt.”). Defendant has
not persuaded us that our case law is plainly wrong, and,
in any event, we are bound by the Supreme Court case law.
See State v. Riley, 
195 Or App 377, 380
, 
97 P3d 1269
 (2004),
rev den, 
340 Or 673
 (2006) (stating same).
           Turning to defendant’s arguments that evidence of
flight is inadmissible under OEC 404 because it relies on prior
uncharged bad conduct, defendant did not raise that argument below or preserve it for our consideration. See State v.
Wyatt, 
331 Or 335, 343
, 
15 P3d 22
 (2000) (stating that a party
must provide the court with an explanation “specific enough
to ensure that the [trial] court can identify its alleged error
with enough clarity to permit it to consider and correct the
error immediately”). In his written motion, defendant argued
that evidence of his possible flight while on supervision was
inadmissible because it was irrelevant under OEC 401 and
unfairly prejudicial under OEC 403. Defendant’s oral argument was consistent with that position. At no point did defendant raise OEC 404 or otherwise refer to evidence of flight as
based on prior bad acts, prior uncharged crimes or misconduct, or other similar statements that would have fairly given
the trial court notice that it needed to consider an OEC 404
issue. Defendant consistently framed the issue solely as one
of relevance and unfair prejudice.3 As such, we do not address
arguments beyond those raised in the trial court.
        We turn to defendant’s arguments that the trial
court erred because any evidence of flight was not admissible under OEC 401 and OEC 403. To the extent that
    3
      We recognize that issues raised under OEC 404 overlap with issues of relevance and unfair prejudice raised under OEC 403. See State v. Davis, 
372 Or 618, 633-34
, 
553 P3d 1017
 (2024) (noting that OEC 404(4), by its terms, requires the
court to ensure that the evidence is relevant and otherwise admissible under OEC
403). We expressly address the preserved OEC 401 and OEC 403 issues below.
252                                               State v. Kropf

defendant argues that it is categorically inadmissible, we
again reject that argument for the reasons discussed above.
We also reject defendant’s contention that the actual evidence of “flight” was too speculative here to be evidence of
consciousness of guilt. Defendant maintains that there was
no evidence that he fled because of any ongoing investigation. Certainly, much of the evidence was circumstantial,
but the evidence presented at the hearing on the motion in
limine included the following:
  •   A police detective stopped by defendant’s house in April
      2020 and left his card.
  •   The detective reached defendant directly in early May
      2020 and told defendant that he wanted to speak with
      defendant about something involving “his daughter and
      ex-wife.” The detective was purposely vague.
  •   Defendant’s sister was aware of the investigation, was
      a “disclosure witness,” and O had confided with defendant’s sister about something that had had happened
      between defendant and O that apparently had also
      occurred between defendant and his sister when the
      sister was young.
  •   Defendant’s supervising officer stated that she last
      spoke with defendant on May 5, 2020; he appeared nervous about the investigation and denied wrongdoing.
  •   Defendant’s supervising officer stated that defendant
      told her that defendant’s “sister and mother had told
      him about a pending investigation or something to that
      effect”; he “knew more information from his mother and
      sister”; and that “he does not want to backslide.”
  •   Defendant’s supervising officer reported that defendant
      had “likely fled or had fled” Oregon for Michigan despite
      his supervision status in Oregon.
  •   Defendant much later told his uncle that he was in
      Grand Rapids, Michigan, and indicated that he was
      aware that he faced a charge or charges that had “something to do with children, [and] were filed by his girlfriend because she was jealous.”
  •   Defendant stated to his uncle that “it was a lie, and
      [defendant] needed to get out of there.”
Cite as 
339 Or App 245
 (2025)                                             253

           Defendant is correct that the inference that he had
knowledge of any specific allegations or charges against him
at the time he left Oregon is based, in part, on circumstantial
evidence. A reasonable factfinder could also find that defendant did not leave Oregon because of the criminal investigation into him. However, taken together, a reasonable factfinder
could also infer the contrary—that defendant learned of a
criminal investigation into his conduct in which his daughter
O had raised allegations against him, had fled to Michigan
in response to that charge despite his supervision status, and
had remained in Michigan to avoid a criminal charge.
           Under OEC 401, relevant evidence is evidence that
has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable … than it would be without the evidence.” The evidence
here meets that low threshold and was not too speculative to
infer evidence of defendant’s flight, which, as noted, our case
law consistently has concluded may be admissible evidence
of defendant’s consciousness of guilt.
           Defendant argues that, alternatively, the trial court
abused its discretion in admitting the evidence under OEC
403.4 Defendant argues that the evidence of flight had minimal probative value and “introduced uncharged misconduct
into the case.” We conclude that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in admitting the evidence.
         The evidence did have some probative value, as discussed above, and permitted the jury to infer that defendant left the state while on supervision to avoid a pending
criminal investigation because he believed he was guilty.
Defendant’s primary argument on appeal is that the evidence inserted prejudicial “uncharged misconduct” into the
case based on the fact that defendant was on supervision
status.5 It is true that the jury was made aware that defendant was on supervision status when he left the state. That
was a necessary result of the fact that defendant’s supervising
    4
      OEC 403 provides, among other things, that relevant evidence may be
excluded “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice.”
    5
      Defendant raises other arguments relating to unfair prejudice arising from
inferences relating to his relationship with his Oregon girlfriend and Michigan
fiancée. We reject those arguments without further discussion.
254                                                            State v. Kropf

officer had the information and presented the evidence that
defendant had stopped reporting to her and had “likely fled
or had fled” the state. In addition, the fact that defendant
was willing to leave the state despite his supervision status
itself added probative value—that defendant was willing to
risk greater consequences in leaving the state. To the extent
that defendant contends that he was unfairly prejudiced
because the jury would have inferred from his supervision
status that defendant had previously committed a crime,
the jury was already aware that defendant had a criminal
record because defendant had presented that evidence as
part of his defense theory. Defendant’s defense relied on the
fact that he was in prison during a portion of the time that
O asserted that she had been sexually abused. Defendant
raised that issue in opening argument, elicited on crossexamination of his daughter that she recalled that he was
in jail or prison between 2014 and 2016, and raised the issue
again in closing.6
         On this record, we cannot say that the trial court
abused its discretion in weighing the evidence under OEC
403 and ultimately concluding that the probative value
of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by any
unfair prejudice that might arise from the jury learning
that defendant had been on supervision status when he left
Oregon for Michigan. See Davis, 
372 Or at 634
 (concluding that evidence is not unfairly prejudicial just because it
is harmful to the defense and unfair prejudice means an
undue tendency to suggest decisions based on an improper
basis, commonly an emotional one). We therefore reject all of
defendant’s arguments in connection with his first assignment of error.
  MOTIONS AND OBJECTION MADE DURING TRIAL
        We turn to defendant’s second assignment of error,
in which he contends that the trial court erred when it
denied his motion for a mistrial. Defendant moved for a
mistrial after his counsel reviewed defendant’s supervising
     6
       As noted, in light of the understanding that the jury would also learn that
defendant was in custody from 2014 to 2016, the court had offered during the
pretrial portion of the proceedings to “sanitize” defendant’s supervision status by
telling the jury that defendant’s supervision status was related to that period of
incarceration. Defendant refused that offer.
Cite as 
339 Or App 245
 (2025)                             255

officer’s notes and saw that, as early as February 2020,
defendant had reported to the officer that he desired to move
to Michigan to be with his fiancée. Defendant moved for a
mistrial on May 5, 2022, the first day of trial. The notes had
been provided by the state to the defense on May 3, two days
before trial. The notes also indicated that the officer told
defendant he could only go if he were married to the woman
in Michigan. Defendant argued that the trial court should
declare a mistrial because the notes had not been presented
to the court at the pretrial hearing on the motion in limine.
Defendant further argued that the new timeline established
that defendant indicated a desire to move to Michigan
before he was even approached by the detective regarding
a potential investigation. The court denied the motion for
a mistrial after concluding that, even if it had the notes, it
would have reached the same ruling as before, particularly
because the notes also indicated that defendant was told he
could not leave Oregon unless he was married to someone in
Michigan.
         “We review the denial of a motion for a mistrial
for abuse of discretion, and we will not reverse a conviction
on that basis unless the defendant was denied a fair trial.”
State v. Veatch, 
223 Or App 444, 455
, 
196 P3d 45
 (2008).
The trial court did not err in denying the motion. Defendant
has not demonstrated on appeal that he could not get a fair
trial. Again, there was evidence from which a reasonable
factfinder could infer that defendant left the state to avoid a
criminal investigation. There was also some evidence from
which that factfinder could find that defendant left for other
innocent reasons unrelated to any investigation. That was a
factual issue for the jury to decide.
         We turn briefly to defendant’s third assignment of
error. Defendant contends that the trial court erred when
it denied his objection to the state’s closing argument that
purportedly referred to facts not in evidence. On appeal,
defendant contends that the prosecutor presented facts not
in evidence when it argued in closing that O had stopped
making reports of abuse to DHS after she moved in with her
mother. Having reviewed the record, however, we note that
defendant did not object to that portion of the state’s closing
256                                                            State v. Kropf

argument. Indeed, the state had just restated its closing
argument in response to a prior objection. Defendant gave
no indication that he had any objection to the state’s carefully restated argument.
         Under those circumstances, we conclude that defendant’s argument on appeal is unpreserved and it would not
serve the practical purposes of preservation to conclude
otherwise. See State v. Amaya, 
336 Or 616, 629
, 
89 P3d 1163
(2004) (stating that the “purpose of the preservation rule
is the practical one of requiring a defendant to provide an
explanation of his or her position specific enough to ensure
that the [trial] court can identify its alleged error with
enough clarity to permit it to consider and correct the error
immediately.” (Internal quotation marks omitted; brackets
in original)). Defendant also does not ask for plain-error
review of this unpreserved argument. We ordinarily do not
engage in plain-error review in the absence of an explicit
request and an explanation of how the standards for that
discretionary review are met. State v. Ardizzone, 
270 Or App 666, 673
, 
349 P3d 597
, rev den, 
358 Or 145
 (2015). We decline
to do so here.
                              SENTENCING
         Finally, in his fourth assignment of error, defendant
argues that the trial court erred in imposing a mandatory
300-month prison sentence on Counts 2 and 3. Defendant
contends that the sentence was unconstitutionally disproportionate under Article I, section 16, of the Oregon
Constitution.7 To determine whether a sentence is unconstitutionally disproportionate, we consider whether the punishment “is so disproportionate, when compared to the offense,
so as to shock the moral sense of reasonable people.” State
v. Rodriguez/Buck, 
347 Or 46, 58
, 
217 P3d 659
 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). In making that assessment,
we consider the following three factors: “(1) a comparison
of the severity of the penalty and the gravity of the crime;
(2) a comparison of the penalties imposed for other, related
crimes; and (3) the criminal history of the defendant.” 
Id.
    7
      Article I, section 16, of the Oregon Constitution provides, in relevant part,
that “[c]ruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted, but all penalties
shall be proportioned to the offense.”
Cite as 
339 Or App 245
 (2025)                               257

         Defendant was convicted, among other things, of
two counts of first-degree unlawful sexual penetration of a
victim under 12 (ORS 163.411(1)(b)) for unlawfully sexually
penetrating his daughter when she was under 12. Under
ORS 137.700(2)(b)(F), defendant is subject to a mandatory
minimum of 300 months’ incarceration on each count, which,
here, were ordered to be served concurrently. We agree with
the trial court that a 300-month sentence for the conduct
here is not so disproportionate that it would shock the moral
sense of reasonable people.
         Under the first Rodriguez/Buck factor, defendant
argues that defendant’s conduct in twice penetrating his young
daughter’s vagina falls under the “lower edge” of offenses covered by the statute. We have rejected a similar argument in
the past and see no reason to deviate from our precedent. See
State v. Alwinger, 
236 Or App 240, 246
, 
236 P3d 755
 (2010)
(concluding that unlawful sexual penetration of a young child
is a “very serious crime” and even a “brief and singular act
that caused ‘no physical injury apart from some redness and
irritation’ does little to minimize the severity of [the unlawful
sexual penetration], especially given the fact that his conduct
was aimed at a particularly vulnerable victim”).
         Under the second factor, defendant argues that the
penalties imposed on defendant for first-degree unlawful
sexual penetration are disproportionate compared to the
penalties for the related crime of genital mutilation under
ORS 163.207, which defendant contends could result in a
maximum sentence of 45 months under the sentencing
guidelines grid block (OAR 213-017-0004(6)). We cannot conclude that these are sufficiently related offenses such that
a comparison of them would inform us as to whether the
punishment here is disproportionate. The state argues that
Oregon’s bar on genital mutilation prohibits a practice that
has been present in some cultures even though incompatible with the fundamental rights of girls and women and
barred by Oregon law and other United States jurisdictions.
We are not persuaded that genital mutilation or the punishment for that crime are helpful in determining proportionality here because it is not sufficiently related or comparable
to the crime of unlawful sexual penetration of a minor. See
258                                              State v. Kropf

Rodriguez/Buck, 
347 Or at 65
 (stating that courts should
compare “other crimes that have similar characteristics to
the crime at issue”). In any event, the legislature has the
   “central role in determining which crimes are more or less
   serious … and, reflecting changing societal norms, the
   legislature may decide that certain crimes should henceforth be considered more serious and subject to more severe
   penalties than other crimes that previously had been considered more serious.”
Id. at 64
.
          The final Rodriguez/Buck factor, the criminal history of the defendant, also weighs against disproportionality,
considering that defendant had six prior adult felony convictions, including one person felony (second-degree assault).
         Defendant also raises an identical argument regarding his sentence under the Eighth Amendment to the United
States Constitution that is based entirely on his arguments
above under the Oregon Constitution. We summarily reject
that argument for the same reasons. See State v. Wiese, 
238 Or App 426, 429-30
, 
241 P3d 1210
 (2010), rev den, 
349 Or 654
 (2011) (summarily rejecting the defendant’s federal proportionality challenge for the same reasons as his state constitutional claim).
        For all the reasons stated above, we reject each of
defendant’s four assignments of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
         Affirmed.

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