Solesbee v. Balkcom’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

102 federal appellate · 9 district · 76 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 302 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “* * * The power to reprieve has usually sprung from the same source as the power to pardon. Power of executive clemency in this country undoubtedly derived from the practice as it had existed in England. Such power has traditionally rested in governors or the President, although some of that power is often delegated to agencies such as pardon or parole boards. Seldom, if ever, has this power of executive clemency been subjected to review by the courts. See Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27 , 42, 37 S.Ct. 72, 74, 61 L.Ed. 129, and cases collected in Note, 38 L.R.A. 577, 587.”

   9 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Ford v. Wainwright · Murphy v. State

2. “[a]fter sentence of death, the test of insanity is whether the prisoner”

   5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Gray v. Lucas · State v. Hulin

3. ““From a reading of these statutory provisions, it is apparent that the instant proceeding, initiated after final judgment, is not one to determine the guilt or innocence of a defendant, but is an anomalous proceeding provided by statute to determine whether the judgment of conviction, having become final, should be presently executed. In line with the humane principle expressed in Section 1367 of the Penal Code that no person shall ‘be * * * punished for a public offense, while he is insane,’ the sole purpose of this collateral proceeding is to determine whether a defendant who has been sentenced to death is ‘presently sane.’ ‘ ‘Rut there is no peal finality to any verdict or order entered in such proceeding. Recognizing that the mental condition of a convicted person may change from time to time, there is statutory provision for the determination of a defendant’s restoration to sanity following an adjudication of his insanity at the time of the prior inquiry into the matter * * *. “A study of the historical background of the cited statute does not disclose that a convicted person, who may become insane following his conviction, has any constitutional or inherent right to have the execution of his sentence suspended by reason of such insanity. At common law the granting of an application for such suspension appears to have been discretionary with the court or the executive power in the exercise of clemency, as a merciful dispensation, an act of grace. In such cases there was ”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Caritativo v. Teets · 19 Ohio App. 2d 254 - In Re Keaton