34 Ala. App. 447 - Warren v. State’s Empirical Analysis
1949
Citation profile
47 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 47 later decisions — most recently April 2008 · most notably 47 Ala. App. 132 - Morris v. State (1971), 51 Ala. App. 352 - Kilpatrick v. State (1973)
47 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Cobb v. Malone · Brown v. State · 33 Ala. App. 171 - McKee v. State · McNeill v. State · Brewer v. State
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 47 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““Murder in the second degree is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice, but without deliberation or premeditation. Title 14, Sec. 314, Code 1940; Miller v. State, 145 Ala. 677 , 40 So. 47 ; Strickland v. State, 151 Ala. 31 , 44 So. 90 . - “The presence of malice in murder in 'the second degree distinguishes the offense from manslaughter in the first degree. Harold v. State, 12 Ala.App. 74 , 67 So. 761 . “ ‘Legal malice’ as applied’ to homicide is an intent unlawfully to take the life of another without legal excuse, justification or mitigation. It is not necessarily ill will or hatred. “The intentional and unjustifiable use of a deadly weapon in a deadly manner raises the presumption of malice. This prima facie presumption prevails unless the circumstances incident to the killing rebut the presumption. * * * ””
1 later decision quote this exact passage“"The principle we announce is that the law does not declare the provocation sufficient unless the parties are detected in the act; but a jury may say whether the compromising position of the parties was sufficient to arouse passion in the husband to such a degree as to overthrow reason, just as a jury may say, in other cases, whether the offense was the result of sudden and sufficient provocation to reduce the offense from murder to manslaughter. . . . There is no law, unless made so by statute, which wholly excuses the husband from liability for *Page 892 taking the life of the wife or her paramour, although he slay them, or either, while in the act of adultery."”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.