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34 Cal. 635

Keller v. Chapman

California Supreme Court

Decided July 1, 1868

California Supreme Court · decided 1868-07-01

This was a proceeding, under the statute, by the contestant, as a qualified elector of Los Angeles County, to contest and set aside the election of defendant, at the general election held in 1867, to the office of District Attorney of said county.

Relies on People ex rel. Whitney v. Board of Delegates of San Francisco Fire Department · Searcy v. Grow · Saunders v. Haynes

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1868-07-01

How this case has been cited

Cited by 11 later decisions — most recently June 1916

11 state decisions

40186818701880189019001910decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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By the Court, Rhodes, J. .*

¶1Proceedings instituted to contest the election of county officers are special and summary in their character. (Saunders v. Haynes, 13 Cal. 150; Whitney v. Board of Delegates, 14 Cal. 503; Searcy v. Grow, 15 Cal. 117; Dorsey v. Barry, 24 Cal. 449; Gasgrove v. Howland, 24 Cal. 457.)

¶2The contestant is not permitted to take judgment by default. (Searcy v. Grow; Dorsey v. Barry, supra.)He must, therefore, prove the allegations of his statement. He failed to prove that Howard received any votes except at the precincts the returns of which were rejected by the Court, and certain others which were in controversy, at which the respondent received the majority of the votes. This error is fatal.

¶3The rejection by the County Judge of the returns of the election held at the Half-Way House Precinct, and at San Juan Precinct, on account of irregularity in the appointment of certain of the officers of the election, cannot be sustained without overturning the doctrine of Sprague v. Norway, 31 Cal. 173, as it does not appear that any injurious results accrued therefrom, either by the reception of illegal votes or the rejection of legal votes, or that either of the candidates lost or gained votes thereby.

¶4In Dorsey v. Barrywe commented upon section sixty-two of the Election Act, and held that the provision that the Court “ may adjourn from day to day until such trial is ended, and may also continue such trial before its commencement to any time not exceeding twenty days, for good cause shown,” etc., precluded the Court from ordering any other continuances than such as were therein provided for. The summary nature of the proceedings is inconsistent with the exercise of the general discretionary power of granting continuances possessed by Courts in civil actions. The expression of the particular mode and time of continuance is exclusive of all non-enumerated modes and times. The continuance from the sixth of the month, when the cause *641was on trial, to the thirteenth of the same month, against the objections of the respondent and without an affidavit showing cause, was unauthorized, and operates as a discontinuance of the proceeding.

¶5Judgment reversed.

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