Volume 34 — Florida Reports

.Appeal from, the Circuit Court for Clay •.county. STATEMENT. The defendant, the railway company, demurred to the declaration and the demurrer was sustained with leave to amend, and thereupon the plaintiff filed an ; amended declaration, a demurrer to which was also sustained, and plaintiff suffered final judgment to be •entered and has appealed to this court, assigning as error the action on the latter demurrer.

<p>Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Polk county.</p> <p>The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>Writ of error to the Circuit Court for Duval county.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>'The judgment of the court below in this case is affirmed tor reasons stated in the case decided at the present term of Bartley vs. Bingham, ante page 19.</p>

This is a case of original jurisdiction. Motion to strike the answer of the defendant for insufficiency. The allegations of the pleadings are sufficiently stated in the opinion of the court.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Orange county.</p> <p>The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Volusia county.</p> <p>The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Orange county.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Madison county.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the-court. '</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for V olusia county.</p> <p>The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Volusia, ■county.</p> <p>The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

STATEMENT. ■ Mrs. Hodges, the appellant, sued A. P. Pries and J. W. Morrison, as partners doing business under the firm name of A. P. Pries & Co., for damages for the breach of an alleged rental contract.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Polk county.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the ■court.</p>

Writ of error to the Circuit Court for Duval county. STATEMENT.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough county.</p> <p>The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Manatee-county.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the? court.</p>

<p>Writ of error to the Circuit Court for Leon «county.</p> <p>The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the «ourt.</p>

<p>Writ of' Error to the Circuit Court for Baker •county.</p> <p>The factstof. the case are stated' in the opinion of .the- court.</p>

<p>Writ of error to the Circuit Court for St. Johns ■county.</p> <p>The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>'CRIMINAL LAW — FORMER JEOPARDY — DIOHAEGE OF JURY BEFORE VERDICT — EXCLAMATIONS OF CHILDREN AS PART OF RES GESTAE INADMISSIBLE WHEN — WHEN PARTY MAY IMPEACH HIS OWN WITNESS.</p> <p>1. Section 1093 R. S. providing as follows: “When a jury after due and thorough deliberation upon any cause, shall return into court without having agreed on a verdict, the court may explain to them anew the law applicable to the case, and may send them out again for further deliberation; but if they shall return a second time without having agreed on a verdict, they shall not be sent out again without their consent, unless they shall asii from the court some further explanation of the law,’’ is applicable alike to both civil and criminal eases; and confers upon juries the legal right to bo discharged from any cause, when, after clue anct thorough deliberation, they come into court for the second time, after being recharged, and avow their inability to agree upon a verdict, without requesting further explanation of the law. The statute is designed to put a limitation upon the right of the court to detain a jury indefinitely in any cause, after it is ascertained that on due and thorough deliberation it is impossible for them to agree upon a verdict. A plea interposed by the defendant in a criminal cause, claiming an abatement of the prosecution on the around of former jeopardy. that shows upon its face that the discharge of the jury before verdict, at the trial urged as the former jeopardy, was done in conformity to the provisions of this statute, is properly o verru led upon demurrer thereto: particularly where the same plea shows that before their discharge the jury reported some of their number to be sick.</p> <p>2. Where a little child, who, at three and a half years of age, was a by standing spectator of a homicide, proves, nearly two years subsequent to the occurrence, not to be possessed of sufficient comprehension and intelligence to be comp>etent then to testify as a witness, its exclamations and utterances at the time of the homicide, even though they may have been part of the res gestee, are not admissible in evidence through the mouth of a third person who heard such exclamations at the time; and this, upon the ground that a child of such tender years, so lacking in intelligence andfdiscrimination, can not comprehend passing events with anything like such accuracy as to render its exclamations or observations in reference thereto at all reliable or admissible as evidence.</p> <p>8. Under Section 1101 R. S. thatpermitsaparty producing a witness to impeach him when he proves adverse, a witness can not be impeached who simply fails to testify to beneficial facts that were expected from him; but he must become adverse by giving evidence that is prejudicial to the cause of the party producing him. When a party’s witness surprises him by not only failing to testify to beneficial facts expected of him, but 'b?/ giving harmful evidence that is contrary to what was expected, then, as is the purpose of tins law, he is permitted to counteract the prejudicial effect of such adverse testimony from his own witness, by proving that he has made statements on other occasions that are inconsistent with such adverse evidence.</p> <p>4. Even where a party’s own witness is properly impeached, under this statute, by proof of conflicting statements made on other • occasions, the conflicting statements as made to and detailed by the impeaching wituess should noibe considered as substantive evidence in support of the party’s cause who produced such impeached witness; but has weight only for the purpose of counteracting or annulling the harmful effects of the adverse testimony given in the cause by the impeached witness that is inconsistent with his statements shown to have been made on other occasions. It was never the purpose of the law to permit a party to produce a witness and upon his simple failure to testify to expected facts, without giving prejudicial evidence, to permit another witness to be produced, ostensibly for the pur: pose of impeachment, but in reality to introduce into the cause, as substantive independent evidence, the hearsay conflicting statements of the impeached witness alleged to havebeen made-on other occasions.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Jackson county.</p> <p>The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of' the court.-</p>

<p>Writ of Error' to ' the ' Circuit Court 'for Polk, county.</p> <p>The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of ■the court.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Leon county.</p> <p>The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pasco county.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the -court.</p>

<p>Writ of error to the Circuit Court for Polk, county.</p> <p>The facts of the case áre stated in the opinion of the-court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Orange 'county.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the •court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Orange •■county.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the ■.court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Putnam, county.</p> <p>The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the; court.</p>

<p>1. A declaration alleging that it was the duty of a railroad company to use good care in running and managing its locomotives and trains, and disregarding its duty in that r'espect so negligently and carelessly ran and operated a locomotive and train of cars on a day mentioned and in a designated town on the road as to strike and kill a mule of plaintiff, states a cause of action and will be good on demurrer.</p> <p>3. It is not required in sucli case to sot out in the declaration the facts constituting the negligence, hut an allegation of sufficient facts causing the injury a.nd that they were negligently and carelessly done will he sufficient.</p> <p>8. While the measure of recovery for personal property destroyed is its value at the time of destruction and which is- ordinarily fixed by ascertaining what was then its market value, yet it will be error to refuse to permit the defendant to show the cost of the property to the plaintiff when it is made to appear that the latter purchased the property a short time before it was destroyed and that the purchase price tended to fix the market value of such property.</p>

<p>Writ of error to the Circuit Court for Marion county.</p> <p>The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Sumter-county.</p> <p>The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Orange county.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>1. Where the judgment of the Circuit Court refusing a motion for change of venue in a criminal case is a plain and palpableabuse of the discretion permitted bylaw in such cases, it is such errólas requires the interference of the appellate court and a reversal of the judgment.</p> <p>2. The evidence offered by the plaintiffs in error on their motion for change of venue, as fully set out in the opinion herein, not being disputed by any evidence upon the part of the State, was. such a showing as necessitated a change of the venue, and the refusal to grant the motion -was error.</p> <p>3. Our statute (R. S. sec. 2918) simply permits the court in criminal cases “to order a view by the jury.” Being a criminal statute it should be strictly construed, and in the absence of any provision as to the manner of making the view, the action of the jury should be confined to a view — i. e., a seeing of and inspection of the premises.</p> <p>4. The statute cited in the preceding head-note does not authorize the examination of witnesses before the jury while they are away from the court house engaged in taking the view ordered by the court. Where there is a county court house in the county, that is the proper place for the trial of criminal cases; and no portion of the trial should be removed to any other place without express authority of law.</p> <p>5. In the absence of legislative provisions describing the mode in which jury views are to be conducted, it is more in consonance •with the theory and methods of judicial trials that the jury-should base their findings solely upon sworn testimony in open court, or by depositions taken as provided by law.</p> <p>'6. The extent to which the Circuit Court may go in ordering a view by a jury in a criminal case is to dire’t a view of the premises, where a crime is supposed to have been committed, by the jury. The defendants and counsel for the respective parties may be permitted to accompany them, and some person selected by the parties, or named by the court, may accompany the jury to point the premises out to them.</p> <p>‘7. Plaintiff’s in error offered evidence tending to establish an alibi for some of them. Their counsel insisted that such evidence was not offered to prove an alibi, but only to contradict other evidence offered by the State, and insisted that the court should not charge the jury as to the law upon the subject of alibi: Meld, that the court should charge the jury upon the law applicable to the evidence given by the witnesses, and is not bound to accept the construction placed upon such evidence by coun.sel.</p> <p>;3. The court in an instruction to the jury upon the subject of alibi, •after stating in effect that it need not be proved by the defendants beyond all reasonable doubt, but that “it was sufficient if, •when taken with all the testimony, it raised a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury of the presence of the defendants, or • either of them, at the commission of the crime,” said ‘'then ^it will be your duty to acquit all, or such of the defendants as you so believe not to have been present a,i the commission of the ■ crime:” Held, that the portion of this charge in italics was •erroneous. Instead of such language the following should •have been used, viz: “Then it will be your duty to acquit all • of the defendants to whom such reasonable doubt applies.”</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough county.</p> <p>This cause is brought here from Sumter county by . appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from tlie Circuit Court for Putnam,', county.</p> <p>The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the-court.</p>

<p>1. Under the act of November 15th, 1828, acknowledgment or proof of the execution of a deed before the officer authorized by law to record the same, or before some judicial officer of the Territory, was required before the deed could be duly recorded.</p> <p>2. Under the act of November 22d, 1828, clerks of county courts-were authorized to record deeds, mortgages, wills and other instruments required by law to be recorded.</p> <p>8. Where the certificate of acknowledgment, orproof of the execution of a deed, refers to the instrument itself in such manner as to connect the two, they may be considered together in determining the sufficiency of the proof of execution.</p> <p>4. The attestation clause of a deed recited that the deed was signed, sealed and delivered in the presence of two persons named, and one of them made oath before the county judge that the grantors in the deed, in the presence of the witnesses named signed and sealed the instrument as and for their act and deed, and for the uses and purposes therein expressed : Held, The proof sufficient to admit the deed to record as being duly recorded.</p> <p>5. A liberal construction obtains in favor of sustaining the proof of the execution of deeds and other instruments required to be acknowledged or proven for record.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Suwannee •county.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough county.</p>

<p>Writ of Error,to tlie Circuit Court for Suwannee .«ounty.</p> <p>The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of ihe court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Orange county.</p> <p>The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the-court.</p>

<p>Where the appellant entirely fails to argue the assignments of error made in the appellate court, they will be considered as abandoned and the judgment appealed from affirmed.</p>

<p>Certiorari.</p> <p>The facts in the case- are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>1. An order of court overruling a demurrer to a declaration on the special grounds assigned, that the praecipe and declaration had not been signed by plaintiffs or their attorney, recited that the pleadings were allowed to be amended instanter by signing them, and the record showed that the praecipe and declaration were properly signed: Held, that the action of the court was correct not only because the defects sought to be reached by the demurrer were removed by amendment, but such defects should be reached by motion, and not by demurrer to the declaration.</p> <p>2. The rule of the common law is, that a married woman can not be sued at law on contracts made by her during coverture, and express legislative authority being necessary in order to maintain such a suit against her, it is essential that the declaration allege the statutory facts showing her liability to be sued in the action.</p> <p>3. A declaration alleging that the plaintiffs sue defendant, a mar- ' ried woman conducting a mercantile business as a free dealer under the statute of Florida, using a firm name, for that she accepted a draft drawn on her on a date prior to the filing of tine declaration, does not aver that she had been made a free dealer under the statuie, or that she in fact was a free dealer thereunder when the contract of acceptance was made by her, and such declaration is so fatally defective as not to be cured by verdict or judgment.</p>

STATEMENT. The bill in this case was filed by A. B. Hawkins against Henry L. Mitchell, Governor, William I).

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon county.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>Appeal from tlie Circuit Court for Orange county.</p> <p>The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>MUNICIPAL LAW — CONSTITUTIONALITY OP CITY ORDINANCE PUNISHING ACTS MADE PENAL BY STATE LAW — SUNDAY LAWS.</p> <p>1. There is nothing in our Constitution that prohibits the Legislature from clothing our municipal governments with legislative power to prohibit and punish by ordinance any act made penal by the State laws, when perpetrated within municipal limits. And such an ordinance is not invalidated because it prescribes the same penalties as the State law for the commission or omission of the same act. Neither is it any objection to such au ordinance that the offender may be tried and punished for the same act under both the ordinance and the State law. A conviction or acquittal by the municipal courts under such an ordinance is uo bar to a prosecution under the State law. Neither is such an ordinance invalid because the trial thereunder is without a jury</p> <p>3. Under the provisions of Section one, Chapter 3034 laws of March 8th, 1877, Section 673 R. S., providing that our municipal gov. ermnents shall have the power, “to xiass all such ordinances and laws as may be expedient and necessary for the xireservation of the public x>eace and moralsHeld, That our municix>alities are empowered to enact ordinances prescribing penalties for the non-observance of the Sabbath in the conduct of business pursuits on that day within their corx>orate limits.</p> <p>3. A municipal ordinance prohibiting the carrying on of certain business pursuits within the city limits on Sunday, and prescribing penalties therefor, is not invalid because it excepts from its inhibition various business pursuits that are not excepted from the operation of the State law on the same subject.</p> <p>4. A municipal ordinance prescribing penalties for the carrying on of business pursuits within the city limits on Sunday is not subject to the charge of unreasonable and invalidating discrimination, when it excepts from its operation all persons generally who belong to any of the excepted classes of occupations. The exception from the operation of the ordinance of certain classes of occupations, when all belonging to those classes are included in the exception, does not render the ordinance obnoxious to the charge of unreasonable discrimination because all occupations of every class are not also included within the exception.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Marion county.</p> <p>The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia, county.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the-court.</p>

<p>CATTLE KILLED BY RAILROADS — WHEN STATUTORY INTEREST AND ATTORNEYS’ FEES RECOVERABLE — WHEN NOTICE TO PRODUCE INSTRUMENT NECESSARY AS PREDICATE TO SECONDARY PROOF THEREOF' —PAYMENT MADE BY MISTAKE, WHEN RECOVERABLE.</p> <p>1. The purpose of section 3 of Chapter 3743 laws, approved May 13th, 1887, making provision for the recovery of damages-for cattle killed by railroad companies in oases where they have failed to keep their roadways fenced and supplied with, cattle-guards, and for the recovery of interest on the damages-at the rate of fifty per cent, per annum, and attorney’s fees,, in requiring the plaintiff to give a -written notice of his claim, prior to the commencement of suit, is to afford the defendant, company an opportunity to investigate the justness of the-claim, and to permit it, without litigation, either to pay it in full as presented, or to make tender of, or an offer to pay, such, an amount'thereof as it deems to be just and reasonable. If,, after such tender or offer to pay, the plaintiff sues and recovers no more damages than he was tendered or offered before suit, then he can not recover either the special statutory interest, nor any attorney’s fee, nor any costs; but, on the contrary, in such a case, the defendant is entitled to judgment in its favor for all of its reasonable costs, to be deducted, from the amount of damages found for the plaintiff.</p> <p>3. In order to relieve itself of the liability to a recovery of the-special statutory interest, and of attorney’s fees, and of the-costs of suit in such cases, the defendant company must-have, before suit brought, made a tender or offer of payment to the plaintiff of some amount in settlement of his claim as-presented in the written notice thereof, and the amount thus tendered or offered must be nothing less than the amount after-wards awarded by the judge or jury as the damage actually sustained. If the plaintiff at the trial recoyers any greater amount as his damages than was offered or tendered before-suit, then he is entitled to the special statutory interest and attorney’s fees and costs, and this, whether the sum awarded, as damages be equal to or less than the amount claimed in, the prerequisite written notice.</p> <p>S. Where the plaintiff in such, cases gives the required written notice of his claim, and the defendant company ignores it and makes no tender or offer of any sum in settlement thereof before suit brought, then under this statute, if the plaintiff sues and recovers any damage whatever, he is entitled along with it to the special statutory interest, and to attorney’s fees and costs.</p> <p>4 The general rule is, that where it is desired to prove the contents of a written instrument that is in the possession of the adverse litigant, the party desiring such proof, before he can introduce secondary evidence of its contents, by copy or otherwise, must lay a foundation for the introduction of such secondary evidence by giving to such adverse litigant possessor of the instrument, or to his attorney, a regular notice to produce the original. This general rule, however, is subject to three exceptions where such notice to produce is not necessary as a preliminary foundation to the introduction of such secondary evidence, which exceptions are as follows: First, where the instrument to be produced and that to be proved are duplicate originals. Secondly, where the instrument to be produced is itself a notice, such as a notice to quit, or notice of the dishonor of a bill of exchange, etc. Thirdly, where, from the nature of the action, the defendant has notice that the plaintiff intends to charge him with possession of the instrument, as for example, in trover for a bill of exchange: Held, that the written notice of claims for stock killed by railroads, required by our statute to he given, belong to that class of notices where no notice to produce the original served on the defendant is necessary as a predicate for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents.</p> <p>■o. Money paid under a mistake of facts can not be reclaimed where the party paying it has derived a substantial benefit from the payment; nor where the party to whom paid received it m good faith in satisfaction of an equitable claim, nor where it was due in honor and conscience. The right to recovery in such cases turns upon the question as to whether the party receiving the money paid by mistake can in good conscience retain it.</p>

<p>EQUITY PRACTICE — VERIFICATION OF ANSWERS — SIGNING OF ANSWERS —DISMISSAL OF BILL WHEN THERE IS A CROSS-BILL — APPELLATE PRACTICE — WHO CAN APPEAL.</p> <p>1. In Merritt vs. Daffin, 24 Fla. 320, 4 South. 806, this court, passing upon the effect that our statute, making tlie realty of a decedent assets in the hands of his executor or administrator, bad upon the question of parties to suits for tire foreclosure of mortgages made by tlie decedent in his lifetime, held that tire heir at law of such decedent was not a necessary party to a suit for tlie foreclosure of a mortgage upon the realty of the estate; ' and that notwithstanding the heir was not a party to such foreclosure proceedings, he was concluded by the foreclosure - decree and sale. We now hold that, even as the law then stood, though the heir was not a necessary party, yet he was not an improper .party to suoli foreclosure proceedings in the event the complainant saw proper to make him a party defendant.</p> <p>2, Where the heirs at law of a deceased mortgagor have been made parties defendant, along with the administrator of the decedent, to a hill for foreclosure of a mortgage upon the lands of the deceased, and have had their pleadings to such bill stricken out, and the bill is subsequently dismissed as to them, but is carried into final decree against the administrator alone, such heirs at law are so affected by such final decree, under the</p> <p>ruling in Merritt vs. Daffin, supra, as to give them the right to an appeal from such final decree though they are not named as-parties thereto.</p> <p>S. In order to entitle any one to a writ of error or apipeal to reverse a judgment or decree, he must have been a party ox privy to the record, or must be prejudiced or injured by the judgment or decree so that he is to receive benefit and advantage by the reversal thereof. Writ of error or appeal can only be taken by him who would have had the thing if the erroneous judgment had not been given.</p> <p>4. An answer to a bill in equity, unless the verification thereof be-. waived, must be sioorn to by the defendant whose answer it purports to be; and when a joint, or joint and several, answer is interposed on behalf of several defendants, it can be considered and treated as the answer only of those of the defendants-who sign and verify it by oath.</p> <p>5. Equally strict is the rule that requires an answer to be signed by the defendant whose answer it purports to be. Such signing is necessary even where the oath thereto has been waived. If the answer lacks either the requisite signing or verification, it is proper to strike it from the files on motion as being no answer at all, unless the absent requisite has been waived.</p> <p>8. Where a defendant, however, subscribes his name to the affidavit appended to and verifying his answer, that is a sufficient signing thereof.</p> <p>7. Cross-bills should be filed either at the same time that the answer to the original bill is filed or subsequently thereto, but never before the complainant in the cross-bill has answered the original bill; and if filed before such answer it is proper on motion to strike it from the files.</p> <p>8. The dismissal of an original bill carries with it and disposes of a cross-bill filed thereto, when such cross-bill sets up matters only that are purely defensive to the original bill, and prays fox-no affirmative relief. But where the cross-bill sets up, ks it may, additional facts, relating to the subject-matter, not alleged in the original bill, and prays for affirmative relief in the case-thus made against the plaintiff in the original bill, the dismissal of the original billdoes not dispose of the cross-bill, but it remains for disposition in the same manner as if it had been-filed as an original bill.</p> <p>51. When default in pleading has been made, the Clerk of the Circuit Court, without some special authority from the court, lias no power to enter a decree pro confess® at any other time than upon a rule day.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval county.</p> <p>The facte of the (“.ase are stated in the opinion of the 'Court.</p>

<p>WHEN CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT TAKES EFFECT.</p> <p>1. Under the provisions of Section 1 of Article XVII of the State Constitution, any amendment to that instrument, that is proposed by the Legislature and approved and adopted by a majority of the votes of the electors of the State voting thereon, in compliance with the requirements of said section, takes effect and becomes operative, as part of the Constitution eo instanti upon its receiving the approving majority of the votes of the electors voting thereon.</p> <p>2. The amendment to Section 9 of Article XVI of the Constitution, approved and adopted by a majority vote of the electors voting thereon at the general election held in October, 1894, that makes provision for the payment by the counties of the costs and expenses of criminal cases, became operative and effective, as part of the State Constitution, at once upon its reception of the approving majority of the votes of the electors at said election; and the original section of said Article to which it was an amendment, then at once ceased to be operative as any part of the organic law.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Duval -county.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the -court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval county.</p> <p>The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>1. The general statute of limitations of 1872 (Chapter 1869 laws of Florida) has no saving clause in favor of non-resident plain, tiffs.</p> <p>’2. The limitations act of November 10th, 1828, which contained a saving clause, in connection with bringing actions to reJ cover real estate in favor of persons not within the State at the time their rights or title accrued, was repealed by the act of January 8th, 1848, which was a revision of the former</p> <p>3. Revision of statutes implies a re-examination of them. The word is applied to a restatement of the law in an improved or corrected form. A revision is intended to take the place of the law as previously formulated. '</p> <p>4. If there was any doubt whether the statute of limitations of 1828 wasrepealedby the revisory act of 1848, there can be none that it was repealed by the general limitations act of 1872 (Chapter 1869 laws of Florida, McClellan’s Digest, p. 730). This act was a general revision of all other acts upon the subject of limitations of actions, and operated as a repeal of them.</p> <p>5. Where there is a revision by a later statute, the later being intended as a substitute for the former, there need be no express words of repeal; neither is it required that the latter statute shall be so repugnant to the former that both can not stand and be construed together. The revision in itself operates as a repeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Putnam county.</p> <p>The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Duval •county.</p> <p>The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>Writ of error to the Circuit Court for Marions county.</p> <p>The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Orange county.</p> <p>The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the •court.</p>

STATEMENT. Einstein filed a bill in chancery against Minnie Halle and her husband, Philip Halle, to subject the statutory separate property of the wife to the payment of a debt alleged to have been contracted by her on the credit of her said estate.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval ■county.</p> <p>The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Appeai from the Circuit Court for Leon county. STATEMENT. Appellants filed a bill in the Leon Circuit Court, and .alleged in substance that on the 10th day of May, 1859, Thomas B. Winn made and published his last will and testament in due form of law in Thomas county, Georgia, and therein bequeathed to his wife Elizabeth, for and during her natural life, a plantation situated in said county, known as the “home place,” and the ¿residue of his real estate the testator…

<p>Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Duval ■county.</p> <p>The facta of the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>