34 Ill. 2d 487 - McDaniel v. Bullard’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 federal appellate · 66 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 82 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Actions which survive. In addition to the actions which survive by the common law, the following also survive: *** actions to recover damages for an injury to real or personal property ***.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 1101/2, par. 27-6.”

   8 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 212 Ill. App. 3d 335 - Bryant v. Kroger Co. · 61 Ill. 2d 31 - Mattyasovszky v. West Towns Bus Co.

2. ““We think the statute ought no longer be given such a narrow, technical construction. Whatever may be the distinction between a property right in its most general sense and ‘real or personal property,’ we cannot consider property tangible merely because people usually thought of it that way in the 19th century. Such a rule of statutory construction would lead to absurd consequences and would largely defeat the object of the Survival Act in modem society. Broad terms like ‘personal property’ must be construed with reference to the conditions of present-day life. The fact that particular forms of it were not in existence at the time of enactment, or were not specifically contemplated by the lawmakers, does not limit the application of the statute. Legislative enactments which are prospective in operation, and phrased in terms comprehensive enough to include things of the same class subsequently coming into existence, should be held applicable where such is consistent with the general legislative purpose. The act involved here does not say ‘goods and chattels,’ as it might well have done had it contemplated the narrow scope given to it in the Wilcox [v. Bierd (1928), 330 Ill. 571 , 162 N.E. 170 ] and Jones [v. Barmm] cases. Instead it employs the all-embracing term ‘personal property.’ The word ‘property is a generic term and its meaning in any case must be determined by the sense in which it is used.” (Emphasis added.) 34 Ill. 2d 487, 490-91 .”

   5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 177 Ill. App. 3d 799 - Williams v. Palmer · 212 Ill. App. 3d 335 - Bryant v. Kroger Co.

3. ““[w]hen actions or causes ex delicto are merely vindictive or retaliatory — a kind of substitute for private war — they may well be thought incapable of being continued on behalf of a victim who is dead and can no longer be appeased, or against a deceased wrongdoer who can no longer be punished. (See F. Pollock, The Law of Torts, 13th ed. 1929, pp. 62-65.) Accordingly all actions or causes in trespass originally died with the person by whom or to whom the wrong was done.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 241 Ill. 2d 495 - Vincent v. Alden-Park Strathmoor, Inc.