State v. Moore’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

10 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 10 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The district court relied on evidence the defendant placed his hand on the gearshift level in determining the defendant felt free to go. This evidence, apparently, is the only evidence upon which the court based its decision the defendant felt unrestrained by the officer. We further note that, according to Trooper Jimerson, the defendant was told the officer was finished with him at the time the license and registration were returned. “In contrast, the record undisputably demonstrates that Trooper Jimerson activated his emergency lights to stop the defendant’s vehicle. After returning the defendant’s license and registration, the trooper did not move away from the car but immediately asked if the defendant would answer some questions. During this time, Officer Oehm was standing near the defendant’s vehicle. When two officers are standing next to a stopped vehicle, presumably with the emergency fights still activated, no reasonable person would feel free to drive away. See State v. Morris, 276 Kan. 11, 22-23 , 72 P.3d 570 (2003) (discussing a string of cases dealing with the use of emergency fights as a show of authority). Under the circumstances presented in this record, the further detention of the defendant cannot be deemed consensual.” 34 Kan. App. 2d at 802 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Moore

2. ““ “What is reasonable is based on the totality of the circumstances and is viewed in terms as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement. [Quoting State v. Toney, 253 Kan. 651, 656 (1993)]. . . . ‘[W]e judge the officer’s conduct in light of common sense and ordinary human experience. [Citation omitted.] “Our task ... is not to pigeonhole each purported fact as either consistent with innocent travel or manifestly suspicious,” [citation omitted], but to determine whether the totality of the circumstances justify the detention. [Citation omitted.] We make our determination with deference to a trained law enforcement officer’s ability to distinguish between innocent and suspicious circumstances, [citation omitted], remembering that reasonable suspicion represents a “minimum level of objective justification” which is “considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of die evidence.” ’ ” 263 Kan. at 734-35 (quoting United States v. Mendez, 118 F.3d 1426, 1431 [10th Cir. 1997]; citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 , 104 L. Ed. 2d 1 , 109 S. Ct. 1581 [1989]).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Moore

3. ““The defendant [Moore] appeared more nervous than typical drivers during a routine traffic stop. However, as indicated in DeMarco , Trooper Jimerson had no prior interactions with this particular defendant to base his opinion that the defendant’s symptoms of nervousness were indicative of criminal activity. As a result, while this factor can be considered, it is not alone indicative of criminal activity. “Here, prior to the termination of the traffic stop, the investigating officers learned that the defendant was traveling across the country from Las Vegas to Baltimore. Unlike in DeMarco , the route used was a reasonably direct route between those destinations. However, the vehicle driven by the defendant was not registered to him. These are factors a court may consider in determining whether an officer possessed reasonable suspicion to justify a longer detention than required to effect the traffic stop, albeit very weak factors. [Citation omitted.]” 34 Kan. App. 2d at 804 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Moore