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← 34 Md. App. 294 - Wilson v. State

34 Md. App. 294 - Wilson v. State’s Empirical Analysis

1976

Citation profile

11
cited by 11 later decisions
1
states following
July 2015
most recently cited

11 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 11 later decisions — most recently July 2015

11 state decisions

4019761980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Barker v. Wingo · Strunk v. United States · Epps v. State · 13 Md. App. 220 - State v. Lawless · Jones v. State

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 11 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “Traditionally, three approaches have been used to arrive at a determination of prejudice. One approach is that it is incumbent upon the accused to make a showing of actual prejudice or at least a strong possibility of prejudice resulting to him or to his defense from the delay. Another approach is that prejudice will be conclusively presumed and necessarily follows from long delay. The middle position, and that used in this State, is that a certain quantitative and qualitative degree of delay gives rise to a rebutta-ble presumption of prejudice and will shift the burden of going forward with the evidence from the accused to the State. Before that critical point is reached, there rests upon the accused, as the moving party, the burden of persuasion] .... Once that critical point has been reached, however, the presumption of prejudice arises and the burden of going forward with the evidence shifts to the State. That critical point on the delay scale where the presumption arises and where the burden shifts has been denominated the point of “substantial” delay.... [A] delay becomes “substantial” [depending on] the facts and circumstances of each particular case.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “There is, of course, a distinction between the threshold inquiry into whether the delay was of ‘constitutional dimension’ in the Barker sense and the later inquiry as to 'substantial' delay. Under this approach the Court looks first to see if there is some minimal delay which ‘triggers' an examination into the four prong test. While a short delay may be sufficient to warrant a scrutiny of the surrounding circumstances, a somewhat longer delay of ‘substantial’ length is necessary to ‘trigger’ the presumption of prejudice.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.