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34 Mich. 369

Duncan v. Seeley

Michigan Supreme Court

Decided June 21, 1876

Michigan Supreme Court · decided 1876-06-21

<p>Evidence: Recollection refreshed by memorandum: Production of the writing^ Plaintiff, while on the stand as a witness, was questioned as to a date, and replied he could not state it positively without refreshing his memory by a memorandum he had; after professing to look, he stated that what he had looked at did refresh his memory; being called upon by defendant’s counsel to produce the memorandum, plaintiff’s counsel objected and the objection was sustained:—</p> <p>Held, That this was error; that the witness was in effect testifying not from recollection, but from something he professed to have in writing; and that defendant had a right to know what the memorandum was on which witness relied, and whether it had any legitimate tendency to bring to mind the fact in controversy.</p> <p>Testifying from memorandum: Refusal to produce the writing: Subsequent offer to produce: Error not cured. The error committed in declining to require the production of the memorandum thus referred to is held not to have been cured by an offer the next day to produoe the memorandum; the party was entitled to see it at the time, in order to test the candor and integrity of the witness.</p> <p>Evidence: Cross-examination. In an action to recover the price of barley claimed to have been sold and delivered by plaintiff to defendant, the question put to plaintiff on cross-examination, as to ho-w long he had speculated in barley, is held to have been improperly overruled, there being nothing to indicate that it was put in an offensive sense, and it being a proper question to test his skill in judging of qualities.</p>

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““On the trial the plaintiff, being on the stand, was questioned by his counsel as to the time when he was at the place of the alleged sale after the sale was made; it being deemed important to show that he was there on a certain day. Plaintiff, in reply, stated that he could not state positively without looking at something to refresh his memory; and, after professing to look, he stated, further, that what he had looked at did refresh his memory. He was then called upon by defendant’s counsel to produce the memorandum at which ho had looked; but the counsel for plaintiff objected, and the court sustained the objection. We think this was erroneous. The witness was in effect testifying, not from recollection, but from something which lie professed to have in writing; and the other party had a right to know what the memorandum was on which he relied, and whether it had any legitimate tendency to bring the fact in controversy to mind. It would be a dangerous doctrino which would permit a witness to testify from secret memoranda in the way which was permitted here. The error was not cured in this case by the plaintiff offering on the next day, on the conclusion of his testimony, to produco the memorandum. The defendant was entitled to see it at the time, in order to test the candor and integrity of the witness; and the opportunity for such a test might be lost by a delay which an unscrupulous witness might improve by preparing to procure something to exhibit.””

quoted by 1 later decision, including Morris v. United States

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1876-06-21

How this case has been cited

Cited by 8 later decisions — most recently February 1928

1 federal appellate · 7 state decisions

30187618801890190019101920decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Cooley, Ch. J:

¶1■ Seeley brought suit against Duncan to recover the price of certain barley, which he claimed to have sold to Duncan at Pontiac, and forwarded to him at Detroit according to agreement. The dispute between the parties related to the quantity bought, and whether all of that which was forwarded was included in the purchase.

¶2On the trial, the plaintiff, being on the stand, was questioned by his counsel as to the time when he was at the place of the alleged sale .after the sale was made; it being deemed important to show that he was there on a certain day. Plaintiff in reply stated that he could not state positively without looking at something to refresh his memory. And after professing to look, he stated further that what he had looked at did refresh his memory. He was then called upon by defendant’s counsel to produce the memorandum at which he had looked, but the counsel for plaintiff objected, and the court sustained the objection. We think this was erroneous. The witness was in effect testifying not from recollection, but from something which he professed to have in writing; and the other party had a right to know what the memorandum was on which,lie relied, and whether it had any legitimate tendency to bring the fact in controversy to mind. It would be a dangerous doctrine which would permit a witness to testify from secret memoranda in *371the way which was permitted here. The error was not cured -in this case by the plaintiff offering on the next day, •on the conclusion of his testimony, to produce the memorandum. The defendant was entitled to see it at the time in order to test the candor and integrity of the. witness ; and the opportunity for such a test might be lost by a delay which an unscrupulous witness might improve by preparing or procuring something to exhibit.

¶3We also think the court erred in overruling u, question put to the plaintiff on cross-examination, as to how long he had speculated in barley. The objection made to it was, that it was not shown that he had speculated in barley at all. But it appeared that he was a dealer in that grain; and there being nothing to indicate that the question was, put in an offensive sense, but only to test his skill in judging of qualities, we think it should have been answered. For these .errors a new trial must be ordered, with the costs of this court.

The other Justices concurred.
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