Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

34 Mo. 211

Kempf v. Kempf

Supreme Court of Missouri

Decided October 15, 1863

Supreme Court of Missouri · decided 1863-10-15

The plaintiff maintains that the demurrer was improperly sustained; that the allegations in said petition constitute a good cause of action, and, if supported by proof, entitled the plaintiff to a divorce. (Hooper v. Hooper, 12 Mo. 354 ; E. C. 1855, p. 663.) I. The demurrer was well taken and properly sustained. The very definition of impotence implies this; impotence may be‘truly defined as such an incurable incapacity as admits of neither copulation or procreation.

Relies on Hooper v. Hooper

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1863-10-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 13 later decisions — most recently November 1969

13 state decisions

4018631870188018901900191019201930194019501960decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Bates, Judge,

¶1delivered the opinion of the court.

¶2This was a petition for divorce. An amended petition was filed, to which the defendant demurred. The demurrer was not sustained, and judgment given for the defendant, from which judgment the plaintiff appealed to this court.

¶3The amended petition stated two causes for divorce. The first was, that at the time of the marriage of the parties the defendant was, and still is impotent, in that the mouth of the vagina of the said Margaret was and still is closed, so as to prevent copulation. The second was, that the defendant offered to the plaintiff such indignities as rendered his condition intolerable, “ in this, that the defendant did, in his presence, and in the presence of others, make herself, by the use of whiskey, (which she, without plaintiff’s knowledge, obtained from one Coster,) beastly drunk; and in this, that defendant, in the presence of the plaintiff, as well as in the presence and under the eyes of others, laid down on the ground and urinated upon herself, making, by that means, her clothes wet, and in a most unseemly and unladylike condition.”

¶4The objection taken by the demurrer to the first cause of divorce, stated in the petition, was, that it was not alleged that the defect charged was incurable. The statute provides for impotence, as a cause for divorce, in these words, “ when either party, at the time of the contract of marriage, was, and still is impotent.” It does not define what shall constitute impotence; but this case shows such an incapacity as admits of neither copulation nor procreation; and the averment of impotence is in the words of the statute, with the specification of the particular character of the impotence. If the defect be curable, then the defendant is not impotent in the sense of the law, for it is not every temporary or occasional incapacity for copulation which is intended, but permanent and lasting inability. There is then meant by the word impotent, that the defect is incurable ; and the petition having charged that the defendant is impotent, has thereby *214alleged that the specified defect is incurable. The court therefore erred in sustaining the demurrer.

¶5As to the second ground of divorce charged, it is impossible to lay down any rules that will apply to all cases, in determining what indignities are grounds of divorce, because they render the condition of the injured party intolerable. (Hooper v. Hooper, 19 Mo. 357.) In the present case two acts are alleged, both very disgusting, but together failing to show tlujt the plaintiff’s condition is intolerable; that one, or repeated states of drunkenness, would not produce that condition, (as meant by the law,) is evident, from the fact that one ground of divorce given by the same act is “ habitual drunkenness for the space of two years.” Whilst it is not denied that occasional drunkenness (especially of the woman) may form parts of the indignities to the other party which might render his condition intolerable, it cannot be held that one act of drunkenness, accompanied by the other indecency stated, (which resulted probably from drunkenness,) make out a case such as was intended by the law. The second count should be stricken from the petition.

¶6Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

Judge Bay concurs.Judge Dry den did not sit in the cause, having been of counsel in the court below.
/34/mo/211 · .json · Public domain