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34 Tex. 267

Rivers v. Washington

Texas Supreme Court

Decided July 1, 1871

Texas Supreme Court · decided 1871-07-01

<p>Appeal from Colorado. Tried below before the Hon. E. Rindsay.</p> <p>This case was submitted to the court below without a jury, and on the pleadings alone. The judge below sustained the defendant’s general demurrer to the petition, and dismissed the case at the plaintiff's cost. He delivered an opinion in writing, from which the following statement of the case, as presented by the pleadings, is extracted:</p> <p>It is alleged in the petition that there was a contract of sale of a tract of land made by R. J. Rivers, the plaintiff’s intestate, to the defendant, L. A. Washington, some time in the year 1850, and that the defendant was placed in the possession of the land under said contract. Notwithstanding such contract of sale, and delivery of possession under it in 1850, the personal representative of the vendor, upon the allegation of the failure of the vendee to pay the purchase money, according to the stipulations and conditions of such contract, brought suit in 1866 to try the title, and to recover the possession of the land, without accounting for, or giving any reason for the delay in instituting the suit. In addition tp the prayer for the recovery of the possession of the land, there is superadded a prayer for a rescission of the contract, and a cancellation of the title bond which was executed by the vendor at the "time of the delivery of the possession of the land to the vendee. The last prayer renders the case a blended proceeding in law and equity, and involves the application of principles of both branches of civil jurisprudence, in the determination of the rights of the parties.</p> <p>After this statement of the case, the judge below proceeded to give his reasons for sustaining the defendant’s demurrer; holding that the suit, though in form for the trial of the title, was, and could only be, a suit for rescission or for specific performance ; and that, in a case of this character, where the vendee had been let into possession, the vendor could not. in virtue of the non-pay.ment of the purchase money, declare the contract at an end, or ■re-sell the land, but must proceed in the courts, either for rescission or specific performance.</p> <p>The plaintiff excepted to the ruling of the court below, and "brings up the case by appeal.</p>

Cited by 1 later decisions — most recently May 1940

1 state decisions

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1871-07-01

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Ogden, J.

¶1That the statute of limitation cannot be interposed to defeat an action, by general demurrer, becomes most manifest on comparing the character and form of a general demurrer with the statute of sixteenth of February, 1852, (article 4629, Paschal’s Digest,) which provides that limitation shall be specially set forth in the answer, or it cannot be made available as a matter of defense. But it is believed that under the authority of Hopkins v. Wright, 17 Texas, 35, where it is held that the whole of the defensive pleadings or allegations constitute the answer, the statute of limitation ¡may be set up by special exceptions or special demurrer, which may invoke the judgment of .the court as to the legal rights .of the parties as presented in their pleadings ; or it may be specially set up by plea, or in the answer, technically so-called, to be determined by a jury from the facts of the case, under *275proper instructions from the court in regard to the law applicable to those facts.

¶2To the original petition in this cause the defendant filed a general demurrer and a general denial, and afterward the plaintiff and defendant amended their pleadings several times, and finally the defendant, in his last amended answer, set up specifically the plea of limitation. Upon these pleadings the parties announced themselves ready for trial. They waived a jury, and submitted the cause to the court on the petition and answer, and the several amendments to the same. There seems to have been no testimony adduced on either side, and the court was asked to render judgment on the merits of the petition and answer. The court decided the cause on the general demurrer, sustaining the same because the plaintiff’s cause was barred by her laches and the statute of limitation. From the peculiar manner' in which this cause was submitted to the court, not on the demurrer, but upon the whole pleadings, we are not prepared to say that the plea of laches, stale demand and limitation were not properly before the court for investigation and decision. We are of the opinion that, so far as the parties to this cause are concerned, it is immaterial whether this suit was originally instituted for the recovery of the land specifically, or whether it was for the rescission of the contract of sale, or for specific performance; since the plea of laches or limitation might be set up after the lapse of the same time as a bar to either form of action. There has been no change of parties since the original contract of sale, and when, the bond for title was executed the plaintiff’s intestate put the defendant in possession of the land, who has since held the same by actual possession ; and it is believed that under the authority of DeCordova v. Smith, 9 Texas, 129; DeWitt v. Miller, 9 Texas, 239; Walker v. Emerson, 20 Texas, 707; and Glasscock v. Nelson, 26 Texas, 150, this court would be fully authorized in presuming, and so deciding (without proof to the contrary), after the expiration *276of ten years from the time the last payment became due, that the whole purchase money had been paid and settled, and that the vendee was entitled to an absolute deed.

¶3We think that when a vendor has given a bond for title on the payment of the purchase money, and puts the vendee in possession, who continues to occupy as his own and improves the purchased property, and the vendor, knowing all this, rests quiet for the space of ten years after the purchase money has become due, he should be chargeable as one who had slept upon his right, (Walker v. Emerson, 20 Texas, 707,) and the same rule might be properly applied whether he sued for specific performance or a rescission of the contract, for in either case the presumption of payment would be equally strong and conclusive. But the Constitution of 1869, § 43, article 12, has adopted a new rule for computing the time when the statute of limitation has run as a bar to civil actions. That section declares that the statute of limitation did not run during the time between January, 1861, and the adoption of the Constitution. And this section was thoroughly and ably discussed in the case of Crawford v. Bender, at this term of this court, wherein the power and authority of the Convention to insert such a clause, and the binding force of the clause are fully recognized and sustained. With this clause of the Constitution recognized as in force, we are led to decide that the judgment of the court below, in sustaining the demurrer and plea of limitation, is erroneous, and for which error the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.

¶4Reversed and remanded.

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