State v. Anania’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

11 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 12 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “We reject the appellant’s argument that the State had failed to prove that degree of criminal intent which is statutorily requisite for conviction of the crime of assault. An “intention ... to do some violence” may be established, given appropriate facts, by evidence of a specific, subjective purpose “to do some violence.” However, it is equally clear that proof of the requisite “intent” is not necessarily confined to such evidence .... Criminal “intent” may equally well flow, as a matter of law, from intentionally doing an act which has the inherent potential of doing bodily harm, and doing so in a criminally negligent manner, (emphasis in original). * * * Reverting to the facts, there can be no doubt that Mr. Anania intentionally procured the gun, intentionally carried it with him to confront the victim, and intentionally fired it at close range, seriously wounding [the victim] . . . . [T]he inference is inescapable that the act of shooting was reckless and wanton, particularly in view of the fact that the entrance wound was in the lower part of the victim’s abdomen. The totality of these facts and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom would legally justify the fact finder in concluding that the degree of criminal intent existed which the statute requires as a necessary element of the offense ....”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 2 Va. App. 1 - David v. Commonwealth

2. ““An ‘intention . . . to do some violence’ may be established, given appropriate facts, by evidence of a specific, subjective purpose ‘to do some violence.’ However, it is equally clear that proof of the requisite ‘intent’ is not necessarily confined to such evidence. This statutory language is not calculated to require as indispensible proof of a subjectively, existing conscious purpose ‘to do some violence.’ Criminal ‘intent’ may equally well floiv, as a matter of law, from intentionally doing an act which has the inherent potential'of doing bodily harm, and doing so in a criminally negligent manner. This position is not inconsistent with any of our prior decisions and finds general support elsewhere. Hutchins v. State, 265 A.2d 706 (Me. 1970); State v. Brough, 112 N.H. 182 , 291 A.2d 618 (1972); State v. Chiarello, 69 N.J.Super. 479 , 174 A.2d 506 (1961); see State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61 , 327 A. 2d 576 (1973); State v. Worrey, 322 A. 2d 73 (Me.1974); see also Parker v. United States, 123 U.S.App.D.C. 343 , 359 F.2d 1009 (1966); State v. Farmer, 324 A.2d 739 , n. 6 at 747 (Me.1974).””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Bowden