Hinkston v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 94 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 98 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “We have delineated a three-step process to be used in the case of Batson challenges. MacKintrush v. State, 334 Ark. 390 , 978 S.W.2d 293 (1998). First, the strike’s opponent must present facts to raise an inference of purposeful discrimination; that is, the opponent must present a prima facie case of racial discrimination. Id. Second, once the strike’s opponent has made a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the proponent of the strike to present a race-neutral explanation for the strike. Id. If a race-neutral explanation is given, the inquiry proceeds to the third step, wherein the trial court must decide whether the strike’s opponent has proven purposeful discrimination. Id. Here, the strike’s opponent must persuade the trial court that the expressed motive of the striking party is not genuine but, rather, is the product of discriminatory intent. Id.”

   6 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Holder v. State · Armstrong v. State

2. “The basis of our holding [in Stewart ] was that Rule 704 requires that expert opinion of the sort that “embraces an ultimate issue” must be “otherwise admissible.” To be otherwise admissible the evidence, according to Ark. R. Evid. 403, must be helpful to the jury and not tend to be confusing. We said in the Stewart case that the testimony in question was potentially misleading and confusing to the jury.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Laswell v. State · Bruner v. State

3. “We recognize that psychiatric testimony concerning whether a defendant has the ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of law at the time of the killing as part of an insanity defense may seem in some cases to approximate testimony on whether the defendant had or did not have the required specific intent to commit murder at a precise time. We draw a distinction between the two categories of testimony, however. A general inability to conform one’s conduct to the requirements of the law due to mental defect or illness is the gauge for insanity. It is different from whether the defendant had the specific intent to kill another individual at a particular time. Whether Stewart was insane certainly is a matter for expert opinion. Whether he had the required intent to murder Ragland at that particular time was for the jury to decide.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Bankston v. State