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← 340 F.3d 178 - Rico v. Leftridge-Byrd

Rico v. Leftridge-Byrd’s Empirical Analysis

340 F.3d 178 · 2003

Citation profile

21
cited by 21 later decisions
1
states following
June 2019
most recently cited

15 federal appellate · 1 district · 1 state decisions

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1291 · 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on Miller-El v. Cockrell Director Texas Department of Criminal Justice Institutional Division · Batson v. Kentucky · Williams v. Taylor · Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle · Hernandez v. New York

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 21 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “A state court decision fails the `unreasonable application' prong only `if the court identifies the correct governing rule from the Supreme Court's cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular case or if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from the Supreme Court's precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend the principle to a new context where it should apply.'”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of- (A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; (B) the date on which the impediment to filing an plication created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action; (C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or, (D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “A state court decision based on a factual determination, ..., will not be overturned on factual grounds unless it was objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state proceeding. Miller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322 , 123 S. Ct. 1029 , 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). We must presume that the state court's determination of factual issues was correct, and the petitioner bears the burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (e)(1) ; Campbell v. Vaughn , 209 F.3d 280 , 285 (3d Cir.2000).”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.