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← 340 F.3d 398 - Weaver v. Shadoan

Weaver v. Shadoan’s Empirical Analysis

340 F.3d 398 · 2003

Citation profile

126
cited by 126 later decisions
3
states following
August 2022
most recently cited

32 federal appellate · 5 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 126 later decisions — most recently August 2022 · most notably Lyons v. City of Xenia (2005), Burgess v. Fischer (2013)

32 federal appellate · 5 state decisions

870200320102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1291 · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))

Relies on Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. · Terry v. Ohio · Harlow v. Fitzgerald · Estelle v. Gamble · Mitchell v. Forsyth

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 126 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “Reasonable suspicion is “more than an ill-defined hunch; it must be based upon a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person ... of criminal activity.” Houston, 174 F.3d at 813 (alterations in original) (internal quotations and citation omitted). It requires “ ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant’ an investigatory stop.” Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). Moreover, reasonable suspicion “can arise from evidence that is less reliable than what might be required to show probable cause.” Id.”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “The Supreme Court has equated deliberate indifference with “criminal recklessness.” That is, a defendant must know of and disregard a substantial risk of serious harm. The inquiry is subjective: “[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” It is insufficient for a plaintiff to allege that there existed a danger that an officer should have been aware of. Deliberate indifference is something more than negligence.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.