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← 340 FSUPP 1261 - Richardson v. Snow

Richardson v. Snow’s Empirical Analysis

1972

Citation profile

34
cited by 34 later decisions
3
states following
May 1991
most recently cited

4 federal appellate · 6 district · 3 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 34 later decisions — most recently May 1991 · most notably Maiorana v. MacDonald (1979), Mrs. Cornelius Cuthbertson Hill v. W. A. Rowland and B. S. Treadaway (1973)

4 federal appellate · 6 district · 3 state decisions

300197219801990decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))

Relies on Beck v. State of Ohio · Roviaro v. United States · Pierson v. Ray · Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics · Whirl v. Kern

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 34 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““Ordinarily when a suit of this type is brought a court will already have determined that there was no probable cause for the arrest and search complained of. Nevertheless the agent has a complete defense if he can convince the trier of the fact that he acted in good faith and that it was reasonable for him to have believed that the arrest and search were lawful. Thus there are two standards to be considered. The first is what constitutes reasonableness for purposes of defining probable cause under the fourth amendment for the protection of citizens against governmental overreaching. The other standard is the less stringent reasonable man standard of the tort action against government agents. This second and lesser standard is appropriate because, in many cases, federal officers cannot be expected to predict what federal judges frequently have considerable difficulty in deciding and about which they frequently differ among themselves. It would be contrary to the public interest if federal officers were held to a probable cause standard as in many cases they would fail to act for fear of guessing wrong. Consequently the law ought to, and does, protect government agents if they act in good faith and with a reasonable belief in the validity of the arrest and search.” (Emphasis added.)”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““ ‘ * * * As stated in Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781 at 790 (5 Cir. 1969), “An arrest is often a stressful and unstable situation calling for discretion, speed, and on-the-spot evaluation.” To require the police officer, under penalty of personal liability for damages if he is in error, to make on-the-spot complex and intricate legal determinations of the existence or absence of probable cause under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments when the courts, acting in a more leisurely and relaxed atmosphere, have difficulty in making these decisions is to place the policeman in just such a position of acting at his peril as was declared to be intolerable in Pierson v. Ray, supra, 386 U.S. at 555 , 87 S.Ct. at 1218 . It is no answer to this intolerable burden to cite cases such as Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, at 97 , 85 S.Ct. 223 , 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964), where a subjective good-faith test for actions of the policemen in an arrest was rejected since those cases deal with constitutional standards applicable to the admission of evidence in the trial of a criminal case rather than to the question of civil liability of a policeman who, in good faith and with a reasonable belief in the legality of his acts, has attempted to perform his duty to protect society. Such a distinction in this court’s view is entirely compatible with the balancing of the interest of society in attempting to protect itself from the effects of criminal behavior and of the interests of the individual in the enjoyment o”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. ““The chief of police would not be responsible for the wrongful acts of the officer unless he was present or unless it is shown he directed such acts or personally cooperated in them, and there is no dispute but that he was not present, did not direct and did not cooperate in the making of the arrest. “The allegation that the arresting officer was acting under the general supervision, direction and control of the chief of police is not sufficient to render him liable * * *.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.