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← 340 MD 690 - Romm v. Flax

Romm v. Flax’s Empirical Analysis

1995

Citation profile

121
cited by 121 later decisions
1
states following
December 2020
most recently cited

2 federal appellate · 101 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 121 later decisions — most recently December 2020 · most notably Marriott Employees Federal Credit Union v. Motor Vehicle Administration (1997), Degren v. State (1999)

2 federal appellate · 101 state decisions

7101995200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Kaczorowski v. Mayor of Baltimore · Tucker v. Fireman's Fund Insurance · Harris v. State · James v. Prince George's County · Morris v. Prince George's County

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 121 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[t]he primary source of legislative intent is, of course, the language of the statute itself____ Of course, where statutory provisions are clear and unambiguous, no construction or clarification is needed or permitted, it being the rule that a plainly worded statute must be construed without forced or subtle interpretations designed to extend or limit the scope of its operation. ... We ... recognize the rule that where a statute is plainly susceptible of more than one meaning and thus contains an ambiguity, courts consider not only the literal or usual meaning of the words, but their meaning and effect in light of the setting, the objectives and purpose of the enactment. In such circumstances, the court, in seeking to ascertain legislative intent, may consider the consequences resulting from one meaning rather than another, and adopt that construction which avoids an illogical or unreasonable result, or one which is inconsistent with common sense. [Citations omitted.]”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. ““In construing the meaning of a word in a statute, the cardinal rule is to ascertain and carry out the real legislative intention.” Tucker v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co., 308 Md. 69, 73 , 517 A.2d 730 (1986). We start by examining the language of the statute. Id. We are not constrained, however, by ... “the literal or usual meaning” of the terms at issue. Id. at 75 , 517 A.2d 730 . “A dictionary is a starting point in the work of statutory construction, but not necessarily the end.” Moms v. Prince George’s County, 319 Md. 597, 606 , 573 A.2d 1346 (1990).”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  3. “(g) Effect of failure to deliver a statement.—(1) If the disclosure statement is delivered later than 3 days after the vendor enters into a contract of sale with the purchaser, the contract is void.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.