Miller v. Lampert’s Empirical Analysis
2006
Citation profile
9
cited by 9 later decisions
3
states following
May 2019
most recently cited
9 state decisions
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 9 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“"[Before Apprendi was decided], the Court twice had considered and rejected the argument that a sentencing factor constituted an `element' of the crime, which a jury had to find beyond a reasonable doubt. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 , 118 S.Ct. 1219 , 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998); McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 2411 , 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (illustrating proposition). The statute at issue in McMillan authorized a trial court to impose a mandatory minimum sentence if it found by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant `visibly possessed a firearm' while committing certain underlying crimes. 477 U.S. at 81 , 106 S.Ct. 2411 . The statute explicitly stated that visible possession of a firearm was not an element of the underlying crime. Id. at 83 , 106 S.Ct. 2411 . "Reaffirming its decision in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 , 97 S.Ct. 2319 , 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977), the McMillan Court reasoned that, `[w]hile there are obviously constitutional limits beyond which the States may not go in this regard, the applicability of the reasonable doubt standard * * * has always been dependent on how a State defines the offense that is charged in any given case[.]' 477 U.S. at 85 , 106 S.Ct. 2411 (internal quotation marks omitted). Under the terms of the statute, `visible possession' was not an element of the crime, which the state had to prove to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, and the Court rejected the petitioners' arguments that the Sixth”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“we look to the [United States Supreme Court] decisions that preceded petitioner's sentencing hearing and ask whether, in the exercise of reasonable skill and judgment, petitioner's counsel should have foreseen”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Jackson v. Franke
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.