J. W. v. Devaney

No. 435                May 14, 2025                    547

   This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
    pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
         except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                  STATE OF OREGON

                            J. W.,
                   Petitioner-Respondent,
                               v.
                   DAWSON DEVANEY,
                   Respondent-Appellant.
                 Linn County Circuit Court
                   23SK04964; A183459

  Michael B. Wynhausen, Judge.
  Submitted April 11, 2025.
  Kent Hickam filed the brief for appellant.
  No appearance for respondent.
  Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, Powers, Judge, and DeVore,
Senior Judge.
  SHORR, P. J.
  Affirmed.
548                                          J. W. v. Devaney

        SHORR, P. J.
         Respondent appeals from the entry of a stalking
protective order (SPO) issued against him by the trial court
under ORS 30.866. Respondent raises one assignment of
error, contending that the trial court erred in concluding
that the second contact at issue below objectively and reasonably caused petitioner alarm. ORS 30.866(1)(b). We reject
that argument and, as a result, affirm.
         A full recitation of the facts would not benefit the
bench, the bar, or the public. We summarize only those
key facts that are context for this opinion. Petitioner and
respondent are former romantic partners and share a son.
Petitioner’s case relied on evidence that respondent violently
intruded into her home on April 2, 2022, followed and stalked
her in public over the ensuing months, and suddenly biked up
unannounced to within a foot of her while she was in a parked
car at a shopping mall parking lot on August 30, 2023.
          Respondent does not contest on appeal that the
April 2, 2022, incident was a qualifying unwanted contact
under ORS 30.866(1). We provide some details, however,
because they are context for the second qualifying contact.
The trial court found that on April 2, 2022, respondent had
been told not to come to petitioner’s home, but he had ignored
that direction, forced his way into her home, brandished a
gun, and was agitated, angry and threatening towards petitioner. There is evidence to support that finding as petitioner
and her housemate gave separate testimony that, considered as a whole, asserted that respondent had entered their
locked home uninvited, angry, and drunk; pounded on petitioner’s locked bedroom door while brandishing a firearm in
one hand; and demanded to be let into the locked bedroom.
Respondent was escorted out by the housemate’s friend, but
there is evidence that respondent continued to follow petitioner in public in the ensuing months despite being told to
stay away from petitioner.
        As noted, respondent contests on appeal that the
August 30, 2023, incident was a qualifying contact under
ORS 30.866. To obtain a stalking protective order, petitioner
had to establish at least two qualifying contacts. See ORS
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 

 (2025)                                  549

30.866(1)(a) (requiring “repeated and unwanted contact”);
ORS 163.730(9) (“repeated” means “two or more times”).
Respondent notes that the trial court found that, as to the
August 30, 2023, contact, petitioner had not tried to break
into petitioner’s car or place petitioner in fear. Respondent
argues, therefore, that it was error for the court to later conclude that the August 30, 2023, contact objectively and reasonably gave rise to petitioner’s alarm, a requirement under
ORS 30.866(1)(b).
          If the trial court’s initial finding is taken out of its
appropriate context, respondent’s argument would have
more persuasive force. However, the court made its initial
finding expressly in the context of rejecting petitioner’s separate request for a Family Abuse Prevention Act (FAPA)
restraining order. The court noted that it would not issue a
FAPA restraining order because petitioner had not proved
abuse within 180 days, and it is apparent that it limited its
consideration to the facts occurring within 180 days of petitioner’s request.1 See ORS 107.710(1) (applying statute to a
person who has been a victim of abuse within 180 days).
The court then noted that a “strange” part of the case was
that “ironically” when the court considered the larger history underlying the SPO case, which included the history
dating back to at least 2022, respondent’s prior violent and
stalking conduct provided fuller context for the August 30,
2023, incident. See ORS 30.866(6) (providing a two-year
limitation period in an SPO case). In that fuller historical
context of prior violence and stalking, the court concluded
that respondent quickly and aggressively approaching petitioner in her car in a public parking lot would have alarmed
petitioner and met the requirements for a second qualifying
contact under the statute. Based on that greater context for
the SPO case, which included the April 2, 2022, home intrusion and the ensuing stalking of petitioner, the trial court
did not err in concluding that it was objectively reasonable
for petitioner to have been alarmed by the August 30, 2023,
contact. See Boyd v. Essin, 

, 12 P3d 1003
(2000), rev den, 

 (2001) (noting that seemingly
innocuous contacts viewed in isolation take on a different
character when considered against a past history of violence
   1
       The trial court’s denial of the FAPA order is not on appeal before us.
550                                        J. W. v. Devaney

and can be the cause of a petitioner’s objectively reasonable
alarm).
        Affirmed.