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← 341 F.3d 1037 - Tracey v. Palmateer

Tracey v. Palmateer’s Empirical Analysis

341 F.3d 1037 · 2003

Citation profile

29
cited by 29 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
August 2016
most recently cited

8 federal appellate ·

Appellate journey

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1291 · 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on Williams v. Taylor · Irvin v. Dowd · Smith v. Phillips · Sheppard v. Maxwell · Tumey v. State of Ohio

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 29 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[a] court confronted with a colorable claim of juror bias must undertake an investigation of the- relevant facts and circumstances. An informal in camera hearing may be adequate for this purpose; due process requires only that all parties be represented, and that the investigation be reasonably calculated to resolve the doubts raised about the juror’s impartiality. So long as the fact-finding process is objective and reasonably explores the issues presented, the state trial judge’s findings based on that investigation are entitled to a presumption of correctness.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “[t]he trial judge never inquired further to ascertain the source of [the jurors’] biased opinions. Assume one of these jurors testified that her opinion was formed before trial by reading an excerpt of the case in the newspaper; or that an outside source had approached her before trial; or assume one of these jurors might have said that she felt that anyone charged with a crime was guilty of a crime — reviewing courts will never know .the basis of her prejudgment because the trial court failed to investigate the source of the obvious bias.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “[i]t would be a mockery of justice to say that the sentence relied upon by the majority [about how a hearing 'may' be proper] reduces the application of the constitutional mandate required of state courts to a matter of discretion when there exists a clear, colorable claim of bias. In this case, as in many other state habeas cases, the trial court owed a duty to”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.