Gonzalez v. Pliler’s Empirical Analysis
341 F.3d 897 · 2003
Citation profile
24 federal appellate · 1 district · 15 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 80 later decisions — most recently December 2020 · most notably State v. Adams (2004), State v. Cruz (2008)
24 federal appellate · 1 district · 15 state decisions — followed in 11 states
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)
Relies on Kotteakos v. United States · Brecht v. Abrahamson · Teague v. Lane · Illinois v. Allen · O'NEAL v. McAninch
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 80 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“Given “the nature of the device and its effect upon the wearer when activated, requiring an unwilling defendant to wear a stun belt during trial may have significant psychological consequences.” [People v.] Mar, 28 Cal.4th 1201 , 124 Cal. Rptr.2d 161 , 52 P.3d [95,] 97 [ (2002) ]. These “psychological consequences,” id., cannot be understated. Stun belts, for example, may “pose[ ] a far more substantial risk of interfering with a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confer with counsel than do leg shackles.” Durham, 287 F.3d at 1305 . We have long noted that “one of the defendant’s primary advantages of being present at the trial[ ][is] his ability to communicate with his counsel.” Spain [v. Rushen], 883 F.2d [712,] 720 [(9th Cir.1989)]; see also Kennedy v. Cardwell, 487 F.2d 101, 106 (6th Cir.1973) (asserting that restraints confuse mental faculties and thus abridge a defendant’s constitutional rights). Stun belts may directly derogate this “primary advantage[ ],” Spain, 883 F.2d at 720, impacting a defendant’s right to be present at trial and to participate in his or her defense. As the Eleventh Circuit recently observed, “[w]earing a stun belt is a considerable impediment to a defendant’s ability to follow the proceedings and take an active interest in the presentation of his ease.” Durham, 287 F.3d at 1306 . “The fear of receiving a painful and humiliating shock for any gesture that could be perceived as threatening likely” hinders a defendant’s participation in defense o”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“[W]hen the imposition of restraints is to be based upon conduct of the defendant that occurred outside the presence of the court, sufficient evidence of that con duct must be presented on the record so that the court may make its own determination of the nature and seriousness of the conduct and whether there is a manifest need for such restraints; the court may not simply rely upon the judgment of law enforcement or court security officers or the unsubstantiated comments of others.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. State v. Kunze“allege[d] facts which, if proven, would entitle him to relief,” Gonzalez v. Pliler, 341 F.3d 897, 903 (9th Cir.2003) (quoting Belmontes v. Woodford, 335 F.3d 1024, 1053 (9th Cir.2003)), and because he”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.