Ebb v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

76 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 76 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant."”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 191 Md. App. 48 - Washington v. State · 191 Md. App. 196 - Rodriguez v. State

2. “In this State, in a jury trial, it is well settled that it is the function of the jury, rather than the trial judge, to judge the credibility of the witnesses, to weigh their testimony, and to resolve contested facts. Bohnert v. State, 312 Md. 266 , 278- 79, 539 A.2d 657, 663 (1988); Gore v. State, 309 Md. 203, 210, 214 , 522 A.2d 1338, 1341, 1343 (1987); Wilson v. State, 261 Md. 551, 566 , 276 A.2d 214, 221 (1971); Jacobs v. State, 238 Md. 648, 650 , 210 A.2d 722, 723 (1965). See also Dykes v. State, 319 Md. 206, 224 , 571 A.2d 1251, 1260 (1990). The petitioner does not claim that the State promised Timmons and Allen anything. For this reason, the petitioner has never challenged the accuracy of the State’s representation that it made no promises. The petitioner’s position, rather, is that whether or not Timmons and Allen subjectively expected to obtain some benefit for their testimony, the jury conceivably could have so found. The jury was not, therefore, obliged to accept the witnesses’ disclaimer. Accordingly, cognizant that the jury, as the trier of fact, is charged with responsibility for resolving credibility issues, the petitioner sought to cross-examine the witnesses as to their bias, interest, motivation, or the like, all of which are proper subjects of cross-examination. As discussed supra, the focus of the petitioner’s inquiry was for the purpose of putting before the jury information on the basis of which it could infer that the witnesses’ testimony lacked credibi”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Calloway v. State

3. “While counsel was permitted to ask [the witness] whether he was biased, counsel was unable to make a record from which to argue why [the witness] might have been biased or otherwise lacked the degree of impartiality expected of a witness at trial. On the basis of the limited cross-examination that was permitted, the jury might well have thought that defense counsel was engaged in a speculative and baseless line of attack on the credibility of an apparently blameless witness.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Marshall v. State