State v. Rogers

108                   June 4, 2025               No. 498

   This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
    pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
         except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

        IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                STATE OF OREGON

                STATE OF OREGON,
                 Plaintiff-Respondent,
                           v.
               ANGEL MARIE ROGERS,
                 Defendant-Appellant.
              Marion County Circuit Court
                 22CR43587; A183447

  Audrey J. Broyles, Judge.
  Submitted May 15, 2025.
  Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and Neil F. Byl, Deputy Public Defender, Oregon
Public Defense Commission, filed the brief for appellant.
   Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and E. Nani Apo, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
   Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Kamins, Judge, and
Jacquot, Judge.
  TOOKEY, P. J.
  Affirmed.
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 

 (2025)                             109

           TOOKEY, P. J.
         Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction
for one count of second-degree manslaughter (Count 1),
ORS 163.125,1 and for one count of recklessly endangering
another person (Count 3), ORS 163.195,2 entered after a
stipulated facts bench trial. In two assignments of error, one
with respect to each of those counts, defendant challenges
the sufficiency of the evidence in the record to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that she acted recklessly, the necessary
mental state for both crimes. “[E]xamining the evidence in
the light most favorable to the state,” we conclude that “a
rational trier of fact, accepting reasonable inferences and
reasonable credibility choices, could have found [recklessness] beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Cunningham, 

, 

 (1994), cert den, 

 (1995).
We therefore affirm.
        This case concerns whether defendant’s conduct was
reckless, an essential element of both second-degree manslaughter and reckless endangerment. A person’s conduct is
reckless when he or she “is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk” that a particular
outcome will occur, and the “risk must be of such nature and
degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation
from the standard of care that a reasonable person would
observe in the situation.” ORS 161.085(9).
         Defendant argues, with respect to both convictions,
that she “did not act recklessly in running [a] stop sign
because she did not see the stop sign and therefore was not
aware of and did not consciously disregard a substantial risk
that her running the stop sign would cause her passenger’s
serious physical injury or death.” We are not persuaded by
that argument, which, as the state argued before the trial
court, rests on a “narrow view of the scope of the accident.”
The record shows that, leading up to the accident, defendant

   1
     ORS 163.125(1)(a) provides that “criminal homicide constitutes second-degree manslaughter when … it is committed recklessly.”
   2
     ORS 163.195(1) provides that:
   “A person commits the crime of recklessly endangering another person if the
   person recklessly engages in conduct which creates a substantial risk of serious physical injury to another person.”
110                                                       State v. Rogers

was “under the influence of methamphetamine and fleeing
from the scene of a crime, [driving] directly into an intersection with a larger road without slowing down or looking for a
stop sign or oncoming vehicles[.]” The record also shows that
“[i]t was dark and defendant did not have her headlights on,
and she had a passenger in the car who was not wearing a
seatbelt.”3
         Considering that evidence, we conclude that a
rational trier of fact could have inferred, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that defendant acted recklessly. See State v. Stuart,

, 

 (2017) (explaining
that a driver’s recklessness may “be inferred … from objective facts”); see also State v. Clark, 

, 

 (2013) (explaining that “when determining whether
a driver is guilty of a reckless crime, [the trier of fact] must
focus on the driver’s decision making, not just his or her
driving”).
           Affirmed.




    3
      We note that defendant’s passenger was the victim in the conviction for
second-degree manslaughter, but the driver of another vehicle was the victim in
the conviction for reckless endangerment.