State v. Taylor

146                   June 4, 2025                No. 509

   This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
    pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
         except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                 STATE OF OREGON

                 STATE OF OREGON,
                  Plaintiff-Respondent,
                            v.
               JOHNNY DEON TAYLOR,
                 Defendant-Appellant.
               Lane County Circuit Court
                 21CR45700; A183106

  Kamala H. Shugar, Judge.
  Submitted May 15, 2025.
  Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and Anna R. Johnson, Deputy Public Defender,
Oregon Public Defense Commission, filed the brief for
appellant.
   Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Shannon T. Reel, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
   Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Kamins, Judge, and
Jacquot, Judge.
  KAMINS, J.
  Affirmed.
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 

 (2025)            147

        KAMINS, J.
        Defendant appeals from a judgment revoking his
probation. In a single assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court acted arbitrarily and capriciously
in revoking probation based on a single probation violation.
Assuming that that argument is preserved and reviewing
for abuse of discretion, State v. Kelemen, 

, 

 (2019), we affirm.
         Defendant does not dispute that he violated his probation by missing a meeting with his probation officer and
failing to report; rather, he argues that a single violation
amounts to an insufficient basis to revoke his probation. The
state contends that the record reveals additional violations,
and, in any event, a single violation is a sufficient basis to
revoke probation. We agree with the state on this record;
defendant violated his probation, and the trial court acted
within its discretion in revoking it. See OAR 213-010-0001
(“The decision to revoke probation is discretionary and may
be exercised upon a finding that the offender has violated one
or more of the conditions of probation, or that the offender
has participated in new criminal activity.”); Kelemen, 

 (“[T]he plain terms of [OAR 213-010-0001]
make a trial court’s exercise of its revocation authority contingent on a finding of either a violation or a new crime.”);
State v. Licari, 

, 

, rev den,

 (2014) (explaining that, if the trial court’s decision was within the range of legally permissible options, “we
may not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court
even if we might have resolved the issue differently”).
        Affirmed.