342 Ill. App. 3d 382 - Johnson v. Thomas’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

7 federal appellate · 6 district · 30 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 47 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Where the attorney’s fee is a contingent one or is otherwise fixed so as not to reflect the actual time spent on a cause of action, the rationale that the computer expense is counter-balanced by a benefit to the attorney in saving time holds water because the fee remains unchanged, while the time expended on research is reduced. On the other hand, where an attorney works on a per diem basis, the time he saves does not inure to his economic benefit because he will simply be paid for fewer hours, while nevertheless incurring the expense of computer assistance. Under these circumstances, the rationale for attorney advantage falls away, and the attorney should not be required to absorb the additional expense engendered by computer research fees in light of the diminished billable hours that result from such computer assistance.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Goesel v. Boley International (H.K.) Ltd. · Williams, Bax & Saltzman, P.C. v. Boley International (H.K.) Ltd

2. “Generally overhead office expenses, namely expenses that an attorney regularly incurs regardless of specific litigation, including telephone charges, in-house delivery charges, in-house photocopying, check processing, newspaper subscriptions, and in-house paralegal and secretarial assistance, are not recoverable as costs of litigation. See Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. American National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 230 Ill.App.3d 591, 599 , 171 Ill.Dec. 788 , 594 N.E.2d 1308, 1315 (1992), citing Kaiser v. MEPC American Properties, Inc., 164 Ill.App.3d 978, 989 , 115 Ill.Dec. 899 , 518 N.E.2d 424, 431 (1987). Such overhead refers mainly to fixed expenses which are, therefore, already reflected in an attorney’s hourly rate. See Harris Trust & Savings Bank, 230 Ill.App.3d at 599 , 171 Ill.Dec. 788 , 594 N.E.2d at 1315 . As a result, they should not be apportioned to any single cause of action so as to constitute an additional charge. This definition of overhead does not include charges for expenses specially in curred to third parties specifically in furtherance of a particular cause of action. See Harris Trust & Savings Bank, 230 Ill.App.3d at 600 , 171 Ill.Dec. 788 , 594 N.E.2d at 1315 . Accordingly, such services for which special payment is made to third parties are treated as independently recoverable costs of litigation. See Harris Trust & Savings Bank, 230 Ill.App.3d at 600 , 171 Ill.Dec. 788 , 594 N.E.2d at 1315 . Such recoverable costs would include expenses for expert”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Kikuchi v. Brown

3. “[w]ithin 20 days after receipt of a notice of rescission, the creditor [ (GreenPoint) ] shall return to the obligor [ (Hirt) ] any money or property given as earnest money, downpayment, or otherwise, and shall take any action necessary or appropriate to reflect the termination of any security interest created under the transaction.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 2018 IL App (1st) 170921 - Greenpoint Mortg. Funding, Inc. v. Cynthia Hirt, Mortg. Registration Sys., Inc.