Dennis v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 district · 32 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 34 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[A Terry stop] is justified on the basis of the general interest in “effective crime prevention and detection.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 22 , 88 S.Ct. at 1880 , 20 L.Ed.2d at 906 . The rationale underlying a Terry stop is that, when the circumstances are appropriate, a police officer may stop a person “for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest.” Id. at 22 , 88 S.Ct. at 1880 , 20 L.Ed.2d at 906 -07 Whether appropriate circumstances exist depend upon “the facts and circumstances ... detailed before the trial judge ...” and whether a reasonably prudent person would have concluded that, under those circumstances, a detention for further investigation was justified. Id. at 28 , 88 S.Ct. at 1883 , 20 L.Ed.2d at 910 . Because the purpose of the stop is investigatory and must be justified by the facts and circumstances detailed to the court, it follows that the police officer must intend that the stop be investigatory and the stop, in fact, must be for that purpose.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 120 Md. App. 171 - Flores v. State

2. “In the case sub judice, the record reflects that once the driver stopped the fleeing vehicle, the petitioner got out and began walking away from the scene, disregarding Officer Foskey's command to stop. Officer Foskey could have concluded from that conduct that the petitioner was fleeing the scene. While fleeing from a police officer or disregarding a police officer's command to stop, in and of itself, does not give rise to probable cause or even a reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify the use of force to detain the person fleeing,... where that person is a passenger in the automobile as the driver attempts to flee from and elude the police, a police officer reasonably and objectively could entertain a suspicion that he was an active and willing participant with the driver in that attempt. In the instant case, however, that suspicion was not what prompted the officer to detain the petitioner. It was solely because the officer felt he would be safer if the petitioner were detained.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Dennis v. State

3. ““there must be a sufficient nexus between the police command and the probability of disorderly conduct. These commands cannot be ‘purely arbitrary and ... not calculated in any way to promote the public order.’ [Drews, 224 Md.] at 193, 167 A.2d at 344 (quoting People v. Galpern, 259 N.Y. 279 , 181 N.E. 572, 574 (1932)). See also Harris v. State, 237 Md. 299, 303 , 206 A.2d 254, 256 (1965) (holding that ‘[a] failure to obey a reasonable and lawful request by a police officer fairly made to prevent a disturbance to the public peace constitutes disorderly conduct.’).””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Attorney Grievance Commission v. Mahone